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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this study was to identify the factors of capital structure decisions 
among firms in Sub-Saharan Africa (hereafter SSA) and to find out whether the 
fundamental assumptions underpinning the western capital structure theories are also 
valid in the SSA region. This study therefore examined the capital structure practices 
of firms in SSA countries by combining responses from a survey of 119 firms in 
Ghana and secondary data from seven other SSA countries obtained from   
Datastream. The two data were analysed separately using SPSS, STATA and 
ORIGIN to provide an in-depth understanding of the situation.  
 
The findings from this study indicate that firms in SSA possess a lower leverage 
ratio as observed in other less developed market economies. Firm-specific factors 
such as profitability, earnings volatility, and tangibility have significant impacts on 
leverage and are also consistent with the predictions of conventional capital structure 
models, particularly the pecking order and the trade–off models. In spite of the 
institutional differences that exist between the Western world and SSA firms, the 
results suggest that some of the firm-level factors that are relevant in explaining 
capital structure in the western context are also relevant in SSA. Besides, drawing on 
the institutional differences hypothesis, this study observes that tax is less important 
in capital structure decisions of firms in SSA. The results also show that firm size, 
asset tangibility, and rule of law moderate the association between firm-level factors 
and leverage. Notably, the results show that the weak regulatory environment in SSA 
facilitates tax evasion by large firms in SSA and that size-tax interaction is 
negatively related to leverage in SSA.  
 
This study has contributed to knowledge in a number of ways: Firstly, no study has 
specifically investigated the financing behaviour of firms through a cross-country 
comparison analysis in SSA. In addition, this study is the first within the SSA to 
quantify the effects of non-conventional institutional factors and to provide support 
for incorporating these factors as essential components in the traditional theories of 
debt-equity choice.  
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
1.1. Background of the Study 
 
The financing decision of firms has dominated the field of corporate finance for 
many years and the area has received growing research attention among researchers 
and practitioners during the last decade due to its significant importance in a firm’s 
growth and development (Kayo and Kimura, 2011; Abor, 2008; Salawu, 2007). A 
major issue that faces firms in need of finance is whether to use debt or equity. Abor 
(2008) asserted that the financing decision is extremely important as in almost all 
economies there are ample grounds to accept the fact that the corporate sector’s role 
cannot be underestimated. This is because the sector serves as one of the major 
machinery of economic growth. Thus, wrong financing decisions can endanger an 
economy. Abor (2008) further added that the corporate sector in developing 
economies plays a crucial role in the provision of employment to the people thereby 
reducing poverty, which is one of the major problems confronting most of these 
economies, especially those in Sub-Saharan Africa. For instance, according to the 
Central Intelligence Agency
1
 (2012), about 26 percent of the South African 
population are employed in the country’s industrial sector. Similarly, in Ghana, 15 
percent of the country’s population are employed in this sector. However, as 
established by Salawu (2006) one of the core reasons that make many of these firms 
in developing countries fail to progress has been the issue of financing. Finance is 
therefore important if firms are to play any important role in the growth of an 
economy. In order to understand and appreciate how firms in developing countries 
finance their activities, we must explore what determines their capital structure 
decisions.   
 
Capital structure has become an area of interest for  researchers since the publication 
of the “irrelevance theory of capital structure” by Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
(hereafter M and M). Capital structure could be defined as the mix of securities 
                                            
1
 CIA is the  Central  Intelligence Agency of the US government 
3 
 
employed by a firm for its operations and there are two forms of capital: equity 
capital and debt capital, with each having its own advantages and disadvantages. The 
choice of equity or debt can affect different aspects of a firm including its 
profitability, the dividend decision, and project financing. Thus, any wrong decision 
regarding the choice of capital can have detrimental effects on the overall 
performance of the firm. A prudent decision on an appropriate capital structure 
policy enhances the profitability of the firm. This explains why in recent times the 
issue of firms’ financing policy has attracted huge interest in the field of corporate 
finance and other related fields of study (Kayo and Kimura 2011). Thus, financial 
managers are required to adopt the lowest cost of capital that will ensure the 
maximisation of wealth for their shareholders.  
 
A firm is said to be highly geared if it employs more debt than equity and vice versa. 
There are however a number of factors that firms need to take into account in 
deciding the type of financing to employ. More importantly, since there are a number 
of factors that affect the capital structure decision of firms, the opinion of the person 
making the decision also plays a significant role in making the appropriate financing 
decision. For instance, two firms that are very similar (e.g. firms operating in the 
same industry such as Asda and Sainsburys) can have dissimilar capital structures in 
a situation where those involved in the decision making have differences in terms of 
their judgement about the relevance of the various factors involved in the decision 
making process.   
 
According to Panigrahi (2010), an optimal structure of capital is attained at the point 
when the market value per share is at its maximum. There is a wide range of policy 
issues involved in a firm’s financing decision both at the macro and micro levels. For 
instance, at the macro level, firms’ financing decisions have effects on many issues 
such as the development of capital markets, the rate of interest as well as the 
determination of security prices, and regulation (Green, Murinde and Suppakitjarak, 
2002). As a result, capital remains one of the most critical resources of firms and this 
explains why the question of what determines a firm’s financing policy is of central 
concern to many scholars (e.g. Joeveer, 2013; Kayo and Kimura, 2011; Daskalakis 
and Psillaki, 2008; Beattie et al., 2008; Chen, 2004).  
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As highlighted above, since the renowned work of M and M, the issue of capital 
structure has been well researched. Experienced researchers in the field (e.g. Jensen 
1986; Myers, 1984; Taggart, 1977) continue to explore as to whether or not the 
irrelevance model explains the financing behaviour of firms in the real world. 
However, how firms make their financing decision remains one of the debatable 
issues in academic circles despite decades of empirical and theoretical work. M and 
M suggested that in a perfect market, the capital structure decision has no influence 
on the value of the firm. The prediction of M and M irrelevance theory which 
suggests that the value of a firm is independent of its capital structure has been 
widely criticised by other scholars (e.g. Jensen, 1986; Myers, 1984; Taggart, 1977) 
who have demonstrated that due to the absence of perfect market conditions, debt-
equity mix can influence the value of a firm.  
 
 
1.2. Motivation for this work 
 
It is widely recognised that the debt-equity choice of firms depend predominately on 
firm-level characteristics. For instance, in their study of capital structure, Zou and 
Xiao (2006), Wiwattanakantang (1999), Harris and Raviv (1991) demonstrated that 
firm-level characteristics play a dominant role in the determination of the choice 
between debt and equity. However, empirical evidence on the issue has produced 
mixed results, which are often difficult to explain and these divergent scholarly 
views have necessitated the evolution and development of alternative theoretical 
viewpoints that seek to explain firms’ financing policy across countries.  
 
Some recent empirical studies (notably Joeveer, 2013; Gungoraydinoglu and 
Oztekin, 2011; Jong, Kabir and Nguyen, 2008) have attempted to shed light on the 
effects of the institutional environment on debt-equity choice of firms. Despite these 
recent scholarly efforts aimed at enhancing understanding of capital structure 
literature, the existing literature is limited in several respects. First, there is 
startlingly limited evidence of more practical opinion of firms’ financial managers, 
especially those in SSA. Most of the studies on capital structure from SSA tend to 
depend on secondary information, which is limited in its ability to explain the 
differences found in practice (Beattie, Goodacre and Thomson, 2006). Second, cross-
country comparison of capital structure studies from SSA is difficult to perform, as 
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studies from SSA tend to concentrate on single countries (e.g. Ramlall, 2009; Abor, 
2008; Salawu, 2007; Salawu, 2006; Yartey, 2006), which do not provide a holistic 
picture of the situation in the sub-region. Third, the possibility of moderating effects 
of firm-level factors and institutional factors remain under-researched especially 
within the SSA sub-region. In the existing scholarly works on capital structure (e.g. 
Joeveer, 2013; Gungoraydinoglu and Oztekin, 2011; Jong et al., 2008), institutional 
factors such as governance, economic and social measures have been emphasised as 
direct determinants of debt-equity choice. However, these factors are unobservable 
and that their effects are only captured on observed firm-specific factors (Bhaduri, 
2002). Thus, this study is the first within the context of SSA that addresses this issue 
by capturing the moderating role of institutional factors on firm level-leverage 
interaction.  
 
In addition to this, although the issue of capital structure is well explored and 
documented, most studies have been carried out in developed economies with 
relatively stable institutional environment and little attention has been paid to the 
perspective of developing countries. As such, very little is known about the capital 
structure of companies in less developed market economies where the institutional 
structures are different from those of the developed economies such as the UK and 
the USA. As a consequence, the general understanding of the capital structure 
practices of firms in developing markets is far from complete, as we are not sure 
whether findings and conclusions from these studies are valid and applicable or 
different set of factors influence capital structure decisions in these countries. There 
is therefore a need for capital structure research from the perspective of developing 
countries. Researchers (e.g. Zou and Xiao, 2006; Bhaduri, 2002; Booth, Demirguc-
Kunt and Maksimovic, 2001) observed that facts about capital structures of firms 
have mostly been obtained from information from the developed economies that 
have many institutional resemblances.  
  
Different economies have diverse institutional arrangements, primarily with respect 
to their tax system and the existing market for corporate control, as well as the roles 
played by the financial market. Furthermore, there are differences in socio-cultural 
aspects and even the levels of economic development. In line with this, Tong and 
Green (2005) commented that there are many reasons why firms in less developed 
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market economies have financing objectives dissimilar to those in the developed 
economies. These factors include the level of development of the capital market and 
differences in accounting and auditing standards. These differences in institutional 
set-up permit us to take a detailed look at the issue from the perspective of less 
developed market economies such as those in SSA. The knowledge of how firms in 
SSA choose their capital structure is crucial not only to the African continent but 
also provide the basis for comparing and explaining the differences between the 
capital structure strategies of the developed economies and less developed market 
ones. 
 
The corporate sector in SSA is a good laboratory for studies as the sector is the main 
driver that is critical in the transformation of the African economy from over-
reliance on the agricultural sector to a more developed economy. It is therefore 
essential that attention is devoted to the study of this area and how its capital 
structure policies impact on the African economy in general. In the past decade, 
companies all over the world are trying to increase their competiveness both 
domestically and internationally. Increasing competition forces firms to compare 
their key features with those of their international counterparts and capital structure 
decision is one of such key characteristics. This therefore underlines the importance 
of research in this area from the context of SSA. 
 
The current study therefore combines primary data from Ghana and secondary data 
from other seven countries
2
 in SSA to explore the role of firm and institutional 
factors in debt-equity decisions of firms. Ghana in particular and SSA in general is 
an interesting and peculiar region and remains a good place for the current study in 
that researchers are yet to examine in details the effects of firm and institutional 
factors on leverage decisions of firms. Thus, the current study is the first to examine 
that in detail. 
Indeed, the choice of the countries for this study was dictated by availability of 
adequate data to aid analysis. Whilst South Africa is considered the most developed 
country in SSA, it is important to indicate that statistical analysis conducted (see 
Appendix 40) indicate that the size of firms in South Africa was not different from 
                                            
2 Countries studied are Botswana, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Mauritius, Nigeria, South Africa and Zambia. 
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other countries sampled in this study. This suggests that the sample from South 
Africa is not biased towards data from the other countries studied.  
 
1.3. Objectives of the Study 
 
Having identified the motivation behind this research in the previous section, I 
formally state the objectives of the current study. This study aims at examining the 
capital structure practices of firms in SSA region by employing different data 
collection and analysis procedures in understanding the issue under consideration. 
The objectives of this study are three-fold. First, the study examines firm and 
institutional elements that drive leverage levels of firms. Second, it explores the 
moderating role of firm size and asset tangibility and finally, it seeks to understand 
the moderating effect of rule of law on the relationship between firm-specific factors 
and leverage. Therefore, the specific objectives that the study intends to achieve 
include: 
 
1. To examine sources of finance, barriers and factors influencing capital 
structure of firms in Ghana.    
2. To examine both firm-level and country-level determinants of capital 
structure. 
3. To examine the moderating effects of firm size on the relationship between 
other firm-level factors and leverage.   
4. To examine the moderating effect of asset tangibility on the relationship 
between earnings volatility and leverage. 
5. To examine the moderating role of rule of law on the relationship between 
firm-specific factors and leverage. 
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1.4. Contributions of the study 
 
This thesis makes substantive contributions to implications and understanding of 
corporate financing decisions in a number of ways and these are discussed below. 
 
1.4.1. The survey evidence 
 
In the area of corporate financing decision, various advances have been made in the 
literature following the seminal work of M and M (1958). However, since then, 
empirical works on corporate financing decisions have mainly been based on 
secondary data regression studies (e.g. Joeveer, 2013; Sheikh and Wang, 2011; 
Gungoraydinoglu and Oztekin, 2011; Huang and Song, 2006; Deesomsak, Paudyal 
and Pescetto, 2004) and are limited in their ability to explain the diversity found in 
practice (Beattie et al., 2006). To date, empirical studies from Ghana have relied 
mainly on secondary data. To the best of my knowledge, this thesis is the most 
comprehensive study that examines the financing behaviour of firms in Ghana by 
relying on a survey. This provides the opportunity to understand the diversity of 
financial practices of firms from the perspective of a developing country rather than 
relying on conclusions drawn from secondary information, which is often very 
patchy in developing countries.  
 
1.4.2. Government ownership and leverage 
 
In addition, this study examines the effects of government ownership on leverage. 
The influence of government ownership on firms’ activities has long been debated  
in the capital structure and social networks literature (Li et al. 2008; Kiss and Danis, 
2008). Especially in the context of less developed economies, literature on capital 
structure has failed to focus on government ownership as one of the key explanatory 
factors of financing decisions. In less developed market economies such as those in 
SSA, governments play significant roles in providing resources and opportunities to 
firms. Politicians and governments have considerable control over many financial 
institutions in Ghana. In the current study, it is observed that firms with government 
stake (shares) have higher leverage levels than firms that the government has no 
shares in. This underlines the importance of government ownership in debt-equity 
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decisions (e.g. Huang and Song). So far, this is the first study to examine the effect 
of government stake on leverage in the context of SSA. In doing so, the current 
thesis draws attention to the impact of government ownership on capital structure 
decisions and therefore opens the avenue for further investigations into the role of 
government ownership on the financing decisions of firms. 
 
1.4.3. The effects of tax on leverage 
 
M and M (1958) idea of ‘irrelevance’ has been the primary theoretical grounding of 
tax-leverage relationship and has directed the attention towards the effects of high 
taxes on leverage decisions. However, when inappropriately applied to the context of 
less developed economies (e.g. SSA), theories that originate in advanced economies 
(e.g. US, UK, Germany and France) run the risk of conceptual misspecifications 
(Julian and Ofori-Darkwa, 2013). In the past work on determinants of corporate 
financing decisions, researchers have paid insufficient attention to how institutional 
distinctions could lead to a different tax-leverage relationship (Sheikh and Wang, 
2011; Abor, 2007; Chen, 2004; Frank and Goyal, 2003; Graham and Harvey, 2001; 
Ross, Westerfield, Jordan and Firer, 2001). Premised on the insight of the 
institutional difference hypothesis (hereafter IDH), the current study contributes to 
the finance literature by arguing that differences in institutional contexts matter in 
the tax-leverage relationship. The root of the IDH can be traced to Julian and Ofori-
Dankwa (2013) argument that in a less developed market, weak regulatory 
structures, bribery and corruption facilitate the evasion of tax by firms and this 
allows them to marginalise their tax obligations. This condition alters the direction of 
tax-leverage relationship to be negative. Accordingly, drawing on the institutional 
differences logic, the current study makes a novel contribution to capital structure 
literature by arguing that weak institutional structures in less developed economies 
alters the direction of tax-leverage relationship. The empirical findings obtained 
provide support for this central proposition. 
 
1.4.4. Consideration of moderating effects of firm-level factors  
 
In spite of the rich tradition of research on firm-level determinants of capital 
structure (e.g. Joeveer, 2013; 2011; Jong, Kabir and Nguyen, 2008; Zou and Xiao, 
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2006; Huang and Song, 2006; Chen, 2004; Wiwattanakantang, 1999; Harris and 
Raviv, 1991), the focus of these empirical studies is the assumption of the direct 
effects of firm-level factors on leverage. Surprisingly, in the academic literature, no 
study has so far rigorously explored how some of these firm-level factors might 
serve as moderators. Therefore, building on from the above contributions, the current 
study addresses an important gap in literature by enriching our understanding of the 
moderating role of firm size.   
 
In addition, the current study enriches the notion of earnings volatility-leverage 
relationship by addressing the question of whether the earnings volatility-leverage 
relationship is conditioned by the level of asset tangibility of a firm. Empirical 
evidence mainly suggests that the earnings volatility-leverage relationship is 
negative due to the high possibility of default (e.g. Sheikh and Wang, 2011; Chen, 
2004; Deesomsak, 2004; Wiwattanakantang, 1999; Johnson, 1997; De Angelo 
1980). However, where a firm has enough tangible assets to be used as collateral, 
volatility in earnings might not matter much. Yet, there is limited empirical work on 
the interplay between earnings volatility, asset tangibility, and leverage. Thus, the 
current study contributes to the literature by exploring the interaction between 
earnings volatility, asset tangibility and leverage by arguing that asset tangibility 
moderates the earnings volatility-leverage relationship in such a way that the 
relationship is positive and significant. By integrating the moderating role of asset 
tangibility into the earnings volatility- leverage relationship, I propose an important 
insight into firm-level determinants of capital structure. Indeed, this thesis is the first 
to examine this relationship. 
 
1.4.5. Linking institutional perspective to capital structure  
 
Researchers (e.g. Luoma and Goodstein, 1999; Oliver, 1997; Oliver, 1991; North, 
1990) have long been interested in examining institutions. In many respects, 
institutional economists, most notably North (1990) have emphasized the central role 
of institutional environment in influencing the activities of firms. While the available 
evidence suggests that institutional factors matter in capital structure decisions, 
extant studies have only examined the direct effects of institutional structures on 
capital structure (e.g. Joeveer, 2013; Daskalakis and Psillaki, 2008). Yet, one could 
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argue that the actual effects of institutional structures might be through their effects 
on firm-specific factors (Bhaduri, 2002). Ultimately, drawing on the insight derived 
from institutional economics, I demonstrate the effects of rule of law on capital 
structure of firms through firm-level factors.  
 
The current study therefore makes a substantial contribution to the capital structure 
literature by looking at the moderating role of rule of law. The results show that the 
tax-leverage relationship is positive and significant when at a high level of rule of 
law. Moreover, the current study shows that asset tangibility-leverage relationship is 
negative and significant when moderated by a high level of rule of law. Therefore, at 
a high level of rule of law, creditors would be better protected (e.g. Fosu, 2013) and 
asset tangibility would be less important in debt acquisition. Thus, to a significant 
extent, firm financing decisions are driven by country-level factors. Empirical 
information on this relationship is limited in literature (both from the context of 
developed and less developed economies) and so far, this is the first study to 
examine that. Accordingly, by linking the institutional perspective to capital 
structure arguments through the incorporation of the moderating role of rule of law, 
this study extends the boundary of  the corpus of literature on the determinants of 
capital structure. 
 
1.5. Structure of the thesis 
 
This thesis is divided into nine chapters
3
. Chapter One presents the introduction and 
context of the study. The objectives and motivation of the study are also considered 
under this chapter. The contribution from this study is also considered here. Chapter 
Two presents background information of the context from which this study is 
conducted. Issues considered within this chapter include the financial markets in 
SSA and their constraints, the stock market and the effects of the financial crisis on 
SSA firms and economy, as well as some aspects of corporate governance.  
Chapter Three examines theories underpinning the capital structure decisions of 
firms. The goal of this chapter is to examine the extent to which research has been 
conducted in the area of capital structure. Theories considered under this section are 
the M and M (1958) irrelevance model, the trade-off model, Myers’ (1984) pecking 
                                            
3 The nine chapters are organised into four main parts. Chapters 1 and 2 form Part I; Chapters 3, 4 and 5 form 
Part II; Chapters 6, 7 and 8 form Part III and Chapter 9 forms Part IV. 
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order hypothesis, Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow theory and the market timing theory 
of Baker and Wurgler (2002). Other issues considered under this chapter are as 
follow: 
a) Firm, industrial and country-level determinants of capital structure. The 
relationship between leverage and firm specific factors including firm size, 
asset tangibility, firm growth, earnings volatility, types of ownership, 
liquidity, tax, firms’ age, dividend policy and uniqueness of a firm’s product 
are also considered under this chapter.  
b) Relationship between network ties and capital structure is also considered 
c) Studies conducted in testing the applicability of the theories of capital 
structure are also examined under this chapter.  
 
Based on the literature review and the objectives of this research, Chapter Four 
focuses on the conceptual frameworks and the hypotheses underpinning this thesis. 
With respect to the various theories of capital structure, this chapter argues that the 
pecking order and the trade-off theories are complementary and that both of them 
can help in explaining the financing behaviour of firms.  
 
Chapter Five sets out the methodology employed in this study. It begins by 
discussing  quantitative and qualitative research paradigms and justifying the choice 
of research design used in this study. This is followed by the discussion of various 
elements including sample choice, methods of data collection, primary and 
secondary data, designing, pre-testing and distribution of the questionnaires. Ethical 
considerations regarding the use of a questionnaire are also considered under this 
chapter. Challenges encountered in the distribution of the questionnaire are also 
covered here. The final segment of this chapter focuses on methods of data analysis.  
 
Since the study relies on two data sets (i.e. primary and secondary data), this chapter 
splits the discussion of the method of data analyses into two (i.e. primary and 
secondary) and discusses the various econometric techniques used in this study. 
Definitions of various variables studied (e.g. leverage, asset tangibility, firm size, 
firm growth, earnings volatility, rule of law, inflation, economic development, stock 
market development) are also provided under this chapter.  
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Chapter Six presents the analysis of the primary data. The chapter begins by 
presenting a descriptive account of the general characteristics of the respondents and 
their firms. This information is important in that it provides a fundamental 
understanding of the firms that were involved in the survey. Some of the other issues 
considered under this chapter are as follow: 
a) Main sources of capital  
b) Factors that moderate equity and debt choice.  
c) Factors that constraint the financing decisions of firms. 
d) Target debt setting 
e) Relationship between a company’s choice of short-term and long-term debt 
f) Spare borrowing capacity and target debt-equity choice.  
g) Effects of the 2007/08 financial crises on debt-equity choice of firms. 
The chapter concludes by looking at the effects of ownership on leverage. 
 
Chapter Seven analyses the firm-level data (secondary data) by pooling together data 
from all eight countries considered in this study. The chapter begins by providing a 
descriptive statistics of the various variables (i.e. leverage, profitability, firm size, 
firm growth, earnings volatility, assets tangibility and tax) measured under this 
chapter. Six independent variables are considered (i.e. profitability, firm size, firm 
growth, earnings volatility, assets tangibility and tax). Hypotheses in this chapter are 
tested with the aid of various econometric techniques. This is then followed by the 
discussion of the various econometric estimations. The chapter also conducts a 
number of sensitivity analyses to the robustness of the regression estimates. The 
chapter concludes by looking at some policy implications from the regression 
results.  
The penultimate chapter, Chapter Eight, examines firm-level and institutional 
moderators. Under this chapter, both firm-level factors and institutional elements are 
put together in the regression estimates. The chapter begins by examining the 
moderating role of firm size and asset tangibility. This is then followed by looking 
into the moderating effects of rule of law. Prior to the use of various econometric 
estimations to test the hypotheses, a residual centering approach (Little, Bovaird and 
Widaman, 2006) is adopted to help deal with multicollinearity issues that arise 
because of the use of interaction terms. A number of sensitivity analyses are also 
conducted to check the robustness of the results in this chapter.     
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The last chapter (i.e. Chapter Nine) of this thesis offers a conclusion and looks at 
future research possibilities. Specifically, this chapter revisits the aims of the study 
and a summary of the key findings is presented. The chapter also presents the 
theoretical and policy implications. The final section focuses on the limitations of the 
study and areas for future research.  
 
 
Table 1.1 presents a summary of the thesis outline. 
 
Table 1. 1: The Outline of the Thesis 
 
Parts Chapters Activity 
 
I 
Chapter 1 Introduction to the study 
Chapter 2 The macroeconomic overview 
 
II 
Chapter 3 Theoretical background 
Chapter 4 Hypothesis development 
Chapter 5 Research methodology 
 
III 
Chapter 6 Results and discussion of primary data 
Chapter 7 Results of Estimation of firm-level Factors 
Chapter 8 
Country-level factors and the moderating role of 
firm-size and rule of law. 
IV Chapter 9 Conclusion and future research 
 
 
1.6. Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter has set out the context of this thesis. I have identified the importance of 
the corporate sector and highlighted the issue of finance as one of the major 
problems that confront this sector in developing economies. The chapter therefore 
sets out the need for research in this area of study, as there has been relatively little 
research in the context of developing countries especially, those found in Sub-
Saharan Africa.  
I have also highlighted the objectives of the study and the structure of the thesis. 
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In order to provide some background information to readers who may not be familiar 
with the context of this study, the next chapter therefore provides some economic 
background information on SSA.  
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Chapter 2 
 
 
 
 
Macroeconomic Overview and Corporate Governance in 
SSA 
 
 
 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
In order to understand the context in which this study is conducted, this chapter 
provides an overview of the macroeconomic background in the African sub-region. 
This chapter also highlights the issue of corporate governance, as a crucial factor that 
influences firms’ access to finance. The chapter is organised into four sections. The 
first section provides an overview of the African macroeconomic condition as a 
whole. Specifically, this section looks at issues including the size of Africa’s 
population, GDP growth, the standard of living of the people and the issue of 
employment. This section concludes by pointing out some of the developmental 
challenges within the African continent. 
 
The second section focuses on the nature of the financial markets in Africa, with 
particular emphasis on countries within the Sub-Saharan region as a means of 
illuminating the macro and micro contexts of the research study. In particular, this 
section looks at the sources of funds for firms in Africa and the constraints firms in 
this region face in acquiring funds for developmental projects. The inflation and 
lending interest rate constraints, which are considered as the most underpinning 
factors affecting firms’ acquisition of funds in most developing countries including 
those in SSA are also discussed in this section. The third section looks briefly at the 
nature of stock markets within the African sub-region.  Issues considered under this 
section include a brief history of stock market in SSA, and the nature as well as the 
challenges of these markets in SSA. 
 
The fourth and final section examines the issue of corporate governance. In 
particular, the section begins with discussing the concept of corporate governance as 
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a crucial factor in influencing access to funds by firms. The nature of corporate 
governance across different economies is also covered. The last part of the fourth 
section looks briefly at the relationship between corporate governance and 
corruption, with a particular emphasis on the nature of corruption in SSA.    
 
 
2.2. Economic Growth and Development in Africa 
 
 
Africa is the second largest continent, which covers a geographical area of 
approximately 11.6 million square miles. The African continent consists of some 54 
independent countries and has a total population of 839.6 million. This continent is 
considered to be the poorest continent in the world according to the World Bank 
(2011). As of the end of 2011, Africa’s average GDP per capita stood at $1,127, as 
against $38,974 and $48,118 for UK and US respectively (World Bank, 2012). 
Between 2003 and 2007, the average gross domestic product (henceforth GDP) 
growth stood at over 5 percent, and of the 20 fast growing countries in the world in 
the year 2012, 13 were in Africa (Africa Development Bank, 2013). 
 
Africa Development Bank (henceforth AFDB) report suggests that when the global 
economy was going through turbulent times, the African economy was growing at a 
growth rate of over 5 percent and nine African countries were expected to achieve a 
growth rate of over 7 percent by the end of 2013 (AFDB, 2013). In Ghana for 
instance, the country’s growth rate has been increasing over the years. The country’s 
growth rate without oil increased from 6.5% in 2010 to 7.0% in the year 2013 and 
growth rate with oil increased from 6.5% in 2010 to 8.3% in 2013 (PWC, 2013). 
This impressive growth in the sub-region has come about as a result of various 
economic reforms and significant inflows of resources into the continent (Dahou, 
Omar and Pfister, 2009; AFDB, 2013).  
 
Similarly, the resilience of African economies has increased over the years. Despite 
the recent financial crisis that lead to a slowdown in most notable advanced 
economies (e.g. US, UK), the African continent has indeed remained very strong in 
terms of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The FDI into the continent is expected to 
reach an all-time high, growing from $84 billion in 2010 to $150 billion in 2015 
(Ernst and Young, 2011). In comparing Africa to Brazil, Russia, India and China 
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(i.e. The BRIC nations), Africa was third and ahead of Brazil and Russia in terms of 
FDI inflow. In terms of investment into new projects, the African continent is 
expected to surpass that of the developed countries by 2023 (Ernst and Young 2011). 
According to Ernst and Young (2013) FDI projects into Africa have grown at a 
compound rate of 20% between 2007 and 2011 and Africa’s global share of FDI has 
increased from 4.5% to 5.5% between 2010 and 2011, and this indicates how 
attractive the continent is becoming to foreign investors. 
 
In spite of this significant growth, the level of economic development in most 
African countries lags behind that of their counterparts in Europe and America. For 
instance, the general living standards of African countries tend to be low and poverty 
is pervasive. According to the World Bank’s Africa Development Indicators 
(henceforth ADI) for 2011, the poverty
4
 rate among African states have been 
declining at a rate of one percent per year. A one percent poverty decline rate 
indicates clearly that the continent needs effective and social intervention 
programmes in reducing the poverty levels within the sub-region. In addition to this, 
unemployment remains one of the major problems facing most African countries, 
with an estimated 7-10 million young people entering the labour market every single 
year (ADI, 2011). For instance, as of July 2013, the unemployment rate in South 
Africa was 25.6% (Trading Economic, 2013).  
 
According to the European Investment Bank (hereafter EIB), demographic trends in 
Africa also point to a surge in the working-age population in the region in the 
coming years (EIB, 2013). This indicates that the continent has a long way to go in 
reducing poverty, if not completely eradicate it. Agriculture remains the main 
occupation of most African countries
5
, with a large area of arable land that remains 
under-utilised. Yields from agricultural production remain deplorably low by 
international standards (EIB, 2013). Most farmers in the continent still adopt 
primitive methods of farming and depend on unpredictable weather conditions for 
their farming activities, thus struggling to produce enough for themselves, let alone 
                                            
4 Two main methods are used to identify poverty lines – relative or absolute. Relative lines are defined in 
relationship to overall distribution of income in a country. Absolute poverty lines are often based on the cost of 
basic food needs. The World Bank calculates poverty using the absolute poverty line (World Bank, 2014). 
5 According to World Bank (2014), agriculture accounts for three-quarters of employment in SSA. 
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for the international market. It is therefore not surprising that most African countries 
continue to import food products from other continents. 
Furthermore, most of the countries in Africa are rich in natural resources such as 
copper, silver gold, oil, gas, diamond, cocoa, ivory and timber, which should have 
been enough to improve the welfare of the people. However, their exploitation tends 
to be very limited, with foreign firms controlling most of these projects. Most 
African exports tend to be unprocessed, thus yielding little foreign exchange. In 
general, there is a lack of diversity of African economies as the continent depends 
predominantly on the primary sector. This indeed threatens the sustainable growth of 
the continent. 
In addition, the market size in most African economies tends to be small and less 
competitive, thus creating a risky business environment. This makes the market less 
attractive to investors. The nature of Africa’s market according to Venables (2010) 
hinders the supply of resources such as finance, transport services, and other capital 
resources that are important for the growth of the continent.  
 
In order to attract foreign investment into Africa, different economic integration 
initiatives (both regional and continental levels) have been implemented by African 
governments to expand their markets and also to make investments more efficient. 
These initiatives include the formation of the African Union, the establishment of the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), The Arab Maghreb 
Union (AMU), The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and 
the Abuja Treaty which establishes the African Economic Community (AEC). These 
efforts at  regional and continental integration are aimed at strengthening economic 
cooperation across the African continent. Each country within the continent 
according to Geda and Kibret (2002) is a member of at least one of these groups. 
However, the degree to which these initiatives have achieved their objectives has 
been mixed. None of these integration attempts according to Geda and Kibret (2002) 
has been a success. 
 
Despite these numerous integration initiatives, the African market still remains 
small, highly disjointed and perceived by many as being risky for meaningful 
investment activities. The presence of numerous regulatory hurdles (e.g. inadequate 
20 
 
credible commercial courts; high level of bribery and corruption
6
) deters many 
individuals from investing in this continent. Besides, the lack of political 
commitment  on the part of most African governments and the presence of  political 
instability among some of the African states (e.g. Mali, Guinea, Sudan, South Sudan, 
DR Congo and Ivory Coast) have been some of the major factors that have thwarted 
the continent from realising the benefits of the various economic initiatives and 
foreign investments. In addition to the above, the absence of efficient financial 
markets in Africa has been another reason behind the inability of the continent to 
develop to the required level.  
 
 
2.3 State of infrastructure development  
 
The role of infrastructure development cannot be underestimated as it contributes to 
reducing the cost of doing business, enhances trade and FDI. Unfortunately, 
available evidence shows that almost all African countries suffer from a critical 
shortage of infrastructure (EIB, 2013). According to EIB (2013), infrastructure 
development in Africa lags behind that of other developing countries particularly in 
the areas of electricity, information and communication technologies, access to 
transport networks, water and sanitation, as well as irrigation. Electricity supply 
remains the most critical issue affecting almost all countries in Africa. In Ghana for 
instance, power outage is an everyday reality. It is estimated that about a quarter of 
installed power generation in Africa is not operational and that chronic power 
shortages cost Africa between 1 and 2 percent of the continent’s GDP and only one 
in four Africans has access to electricity (EIB, 2013; World Bank, 2013). This 
situation condemns many firms to perform below their economic potential. 
 
In terms of telecommunication, there has been a rapid expansion in internet and 
communication technology among many African communities. EIB (2013) observes 
that the proportion of Africans with access to a telephone has gone up, from 1 
percent in the year 2000 to over 40 percent in 2009. Indeed, the expansion of 
telecommunication technologies have increased access to many financial services in 
many communities in Africa. For instance, the introduction of a mobile phone-based 
payment system in Kenya (i.e. M-PESA) is a typical example of how ICT has 
                                            
6 Details of corruption perception index of some countries in SSA are provided in Figure 2.7 below. 
21 
 
broadened access to financial services in Africa, especially to those in rural 
communities (EIB, 2013; KPMG, 2013). Available evidence shows that the 
introduction of ICT in Kenya
7
 has increased the number of active bank accounts 
from 2.5 million in 2007 to 12 million in 2012 (Vital Wave Consulting, 2012).  It is 
noteworthy that the penetration of ICT into Africa’s financial services also poses 
regulatory challenges (e.g. network systematic risk) for many countries in the 
continent. 
 
Africa also faces daunting challenges in terms of transportation and this remains a 
major challenge for doing business in the continent. Road networks in Africa are 
characterised by poor quality as well as low connectivity to major commercial 
centres (World Bank, 2014). EIB (2013) reports that paved roads 
8
accounts for just 
about 5 percent of the total road network in some of the countries in Africa. Other 
forms of transport (for instance rail, maritime and air transport) remain largely 
undeveloped and inefficient. This condition thwarts firms from operating beyond 
their local markets. 
 
Low access to clean water remains another terrible issue facing many communities 
in Africa. For instance, EIB, (2013) estimates that as of 2009, only 67 percent of the 
total population in Africa had access to clean water
9
.  The situation is even worse for 
sanitation with only about 40 percent of Africa’s population with improved access to 
sanitation. 
 
In short, it is a fact that the African continent faces a host of developmental 
challenges including a huge infrastructure gap, weak institutional capacity, high 
unemployment rates, high dependency on primary commodities, over-exposure to 
unpredictable weather conditions, weak governance, corrupt judicial services and 
above all, chronic political instability (World Bank, 2013). These conditions have 
undoubtedly contributed to the low inflow of capital resources into the continent. To 
this end, a number of measures are being adopted by the World Bank to help foster 
growth and development within the continent. These strategies include the 
diversification of exports from Africa, the generation of employment through skills 
                                            
7 KPMG (2013) reports that Kenya’s MPESA system caters for about 70% of the adult population in the country. 
8 World Bank (2014) reports that in 2011, the size of paved roads, as a percentage of total road network in Kenya 
was 6.95%. That of Ghana in 2009 was 12.59%. 
9 OECD (2007) reports that over 50 percent of water supply in African cities is unaccounted for or wasted. 
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building for the large number of youths who enter the labour market every year, 
improvement in macroeconomic policies and the strengthening of the voice of the 
citizens to enable them to demand proper governance from their leaders (ADI, 2011). 
These initiatives are vital in increasing investors’ confidence and ensuring flows of 
resources, which are vital for the growth of the corporate sector. 
 
Having provided an overview of the macroeconomic condition of the African 
continent, the next section specifically examines the financial markets in SSA.  
 
 
2.4. Overview of the Financial Markets in Sub-Saharan Africa 
2.4.1. Introduction 
 
The purpose of this part of the thesis is to examine the financial markets in Africa 
with particular emphasis on the countries under consideration. The importance of 
access to funds by firms in SSA cannot be underestimated if these firms are to 
contribute significantly towards the growth of the African continent. Nonetheless, in 
spite of the numerous initiatives that have been adopted by African countries, many 
firms in SSA continue to find access to finance one of the main hurdles. The 
financial system within the Sub-Saharan region remain relatively underdeveloped. In 
line with this, Dahou et al. (2009) commented that a major problem with most 
African economies is the narrow and illiquid capital market, thereby limiting the 
access to long-term financing which is needed for any meaningful investment.  
According to Andrianaivo and Yartey (2009), bond markets in most African 
countries are deeply underdeveloped as governments have mainly been the supplier 
of bonds in most of these economies and that the role of the corporate sector in the 
bond market is minimal. In the sections that follow, I provide an overview of the 
banking systems and stock markets in SSA. 
 
2.4.2. The Banking systems in SSA 
 
Many countries within the Sub-Saharan region including Ghana, Nigeria and South 
Africa have been pursuing economic and structural reforms and the banking system 
has been undergoing a process of  restructuring and transformation that forms part of 
a comprehensive strategy for enhancing prudential regulation and improving the 
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sector in general. In Ghana for instance, the liberalisation of the banking system has 
attracted many foreign banks (e.g. SG-SSB, Stanbic, BSIC) into the field of retail 
and commercial banking. In spite of these structural and policy changes, the banking 
system in SSA is still characterised by three or four banks that dominate lending 
(Venables 2010). In the view of Mahou et al. (2009), these banks favour large 
enterprises, which are considered as less risky than smaller ones. Competition in the 
banking sector is still very limited, despite few barriers to entry and exit (EIB, 2013). 
Also, African domestic economies provide the funding base for the banking systems, 
with funding from non-residents constituting a minor source of funds (EIB, 2013). 
 
Another common characteristic of the banking system in SSA is that a large 
proportion of both local and foreign banks invest in government securities (e.g. 
treasury bills). This indeed, is a problem in the banking system in that this activity 
demonstrates a highly dysfunctional banking intermediation that ignores the supply 
of credit needed by the private corporate sector in favour of safer government 
securities (Allen, Otchere and Senbet, 2011). In general, access to banking facilities 
by many individuals and organisations remains very limited (KPMG, 2013; World 
Bank, 2012; Jiggins, 1989) and various banking reforms have not fully translated 
into an increased availability of credit to the corporate sector. This is a key obstacle 
to the growth of the corporate sector in this region. Figure 2.1 below provides 
information on commercial bank branches (per 100,000 adults) in some selected 
countries
10
 in SSA. This figure indicates limited nature of financial services among 
many countries in SSA.    
                                            
10 In SSA, Global Finance (2012) reports that South Sudan, Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia have unbanked 
populations of at least 75%. 
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Figure 2. 1: Commercial Bank Branches 
 
  Source: World Bank (2012). 
 
In addition, the concentration of banks in a small number of urban centres in SSA 
constrains access to credit by many firms, especially those firms located in rural 
communities. With the introduction of new technology into the banking sector such 
as mobile phone-based banking
11
 in many countries (KPMG, 2013; EIB, 2013), it is 
expected that the share of the unbanked population will decrease with time. It should 
be noted however that these sorts of development in the banking sector also come 
with challenges for regulators including developing expertise to properly monitor the 
system. Besides, these developments in the banking system do not guarantee the 
provision of credit to firms, as firms would need to satisfy basic lending 
requirements (e.g. a good credit history, proper record keeping  and strong asset base 
to serve as collateral). Mahou et al. (2009) commented that many businesses in most 
African economies fail to register with the appropriate governmental bodies, thus 
making it difficult to engage in any enforceable contracts with financial institutions.  
Although there has been some increase in real credit in the last few years, lending to 
firms in SSA  still tends to be short-term in nature, with roughly 60 percent of loans 
with a maturity period of less than a year (EIB, 2013). Also, firms (especially small 
                                            
11
 A typical example of mobile-phone based payment system is M-PESA in Kenya, which was introduced in 
2007. This system allows the people to transfer and receive money without needing to have bank accounts (EIB, 
2013).  
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and medium-scale enterprises) still have considerable difficulty accessing credit. 
Figure 2.2 below shows the percentage of firms in some selected countries
12
 in SSA 
identifying access to finance as a major constraint for their business activities. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. 2: Finance as a Major Constraint 
 
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys (2011) 
 
Figure 2.2 above shows that on average, about 50 percent of the companies 
identified access to finance as a major constraint within SSA, whereas according to 
the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (WBES), the corresponding figure among the 
high-income OECD countries is just 14.6 percent (WBES, 2011). This clearly 
highlights the issue of access to finance as a major constraint to firms’ development 
within SSA. SMEs are typically constrained in terms of access to credit facilities in 
SSA (EIB, 2013; IMF, 2013).  
Where credit is even available, high interest rates makes it very difficult for firms to 
acquire the funds needed for their day to day activities and development. The 
absence of any effective mechanism to encourage repayment, including well-
established credit reference agencies
13
 within the SSA region, leaves financial 
lenders with no choice other than to charge high interest, due to the likelihood of a 
high default rate. Wiwattanakantang (1999) maintained that firms that are unable to 
                                            
12
 The selection of these countries was based on the availability of information 
13
According to the EIB (2013), the banks in SSA are characterised by excess liquidity and this is an indication of 
what the banks deem as the scarcity of credit-worthy borrowers. 
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provide assets as collateral when borrowing are subjected to worse lending 
conditions than firms that provide collateral. The presence of assets provides some 
sort of assurance to lenders and for that matter, the risk of default increases with the 
absence of collateral. Consequently, lenders may impose tougher lending conditions 
in a situation where borrowers are unable to supply any assets as collateral. For 
instance, an average of 80 percent of loans that are granted to firms require the 
provision of collateral (World Bank Enterprise Surveys, 2011). 
 
 
Figure 2. 3: Proportion of loans Requiring Collateral
14
 
 
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys (2011) 
 
                                            
14
 No data was available for Ghana and Nigeria for 2009. Therefore, data used for Ghana and Nigeria were 2013 
and 2007 respectively. 
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Figure 2.3 above depicts the percentage of loans granted to manufacturing 
companies requiring collateral among some selected countries within SSA. The 
availability of collateral enhances the availability of credit to firms. Thus, financial 
lenders will often be reluctant to offer any assistance to firms that do not provide the 
required collateral.  
It is important to point out that the type of finance that may be available to firms in 
SSA may be different from that available to their counterparts in the developed parts 
of the world. The major reason behind this is that the financial market in SSA is still 
at its developmental stage and that firms’ access to different types of finance is 
highly limited. For instance, many countries in SSA do not have bond markets. Even 
where bond markets exist, the public sector dominates bond issuance and the private 
sector is completely absent in the issuance of bonds. In Ghana for instance, out of the 
numerous companies in the country, only HFC bank regularly issues corporate bonds 
in the country.  
Figure 2.4 indicates the corporate bond market capitalization (from 2001 – 2010) as 
a percentage of GDP of SSA countries with bond markets.  
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Figure 2. 4: Corporate Bond Capitalisation in SSA 
Source: Mu, Phelps and Stotsky (2013). 
  
From 2001 to 2010, the average corporate bond market capitalization (as a 
percentage of GDP) of SSA stood at 1.12 percent and in 2010, the total corporate 
bond market capitalisation of all countries in Africa (as a percentage of GDP) stood 
at 1.8 per cent
15
 (Mu et al., 2013). This indicates that bond markets in Africa are still 
at a fundamental stage of their development. Within the Sub-Saharan region, Ghana 
was the second country
16
 to issue sovereign bonds. Ghana took this historical step in 
2007 when the country issued its debut $750 million Sovereign Bond on the 
international capital markets.  
                                            
15 In 2010, the corporate bond market capitalization as a percentage of GDP for US and Europe stood at 98.6per 
cent and 46.4per cent respectively (Mu et al. 2013).   
16 South Africa was the first country within the Sub-Saharan region to issue sovereign bonds. 
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Of course, the need for self-reliance in various economies within SSA requires that 
all available fundraising avenues are tapped to meet the investments needs of both 
the private and the corporate sector. Yet, not much attention has been given to the 
development of the bond market in SSA. Given the nature of this financial 
environment in this region, firms largely depend on internally generated funds 
(World Enterprise Surveys, 2011), compared to their counterparts in economies 
where the financial institutions are well established and properly regulated.  
Table 2.1 shows how manufacturing firms in some selected countries in the SSA 
financed their investments in 2009. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30 
 
Table 2. 1: Sources of funds for investment 
 
 
 
Country 
 
Investment 
proportion financed 
internally       
(per cent) 
 
Investment 
proportion financed 
by banks 
 (per cent) 
 
Investment 
proportion financed 
by equity/stock sales 
 (per cent) 
Benin 88.5 2 0.6 
Burkina Faso 77.2 15.6 2.4 
Cameroon 67.3 13 3.5 
Cape Verde 56.7 23.9 13.9 
Chad 83.8 2.3 2.5 
Congo Rep. 84.6 4 1.2 
Cote d’Ivoire 89 3.7 - 
Eritrea 94 1.3 1.1 
Ghana
17
 
Gabon 
86.5 
92.9 
9.6 
3.2 
0.6 
0.4 
Lesotho 50.9 23.3 6.6 
Liberia 79.8 6.7 2.8 
Madagascar 79.5 6.1 2 
Malawi 75.5 13.4 2.9 
Mauritius 51.9 30.8 - 
Niger 89.2 7.8 1 
Nigeria
18
 
Sierra Leone 
92.8 
87 
1.3 
3.7 
0.1 
5.2 
Togo 70.3 13.1 1.8 
Average 78.8 9.7 2.9 
 
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys (2011) 
 
Table 2.1 indicates that firms in SSA finance an average of 77.5 percent of their 
investment activities from internal sources. The proportion of funds that is provided 
by banks and what the stock market provides for investments remain at a low level. 
In Guinea for example, in 2006 only 0.5 percent of investment funds came from 
banks and 94.1 percent was raised internally (WBES, 2011). This highlights the 
                                            
17
 There was no data available for 2009 and therefore data used was for 2007 
18
 There was no data available for 2009 and therefore data used was for 2007. 
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limited roles of banks and the stock market in terms of financing for firms in the 
Sub-Saharan region.  
 
Many fundamental problems confront the Sub-Saharan region of Africa and these 
problems impact negatively on the debt-equity choice of firms within the region. 
SSA continues to remain highly uncertain as a result of the region’s exposure to high 
political instability. This has given rise to numerous incoherent economic policies 
within the region. In addition to this, as demonstrated by the Fisher equation
19
, high 
levels of inflation (as depicted by Figure 2.5) have made the lending interest rate (see 
Figure 2.6)
20
 within this region higher than that of their western counterparts. There 
is therefore a heightened demand for measures to solve these economic challenges to 
encourage the flow of funds needed by firms for their investment activities.  
 
 
Figure 2. 5: Rate of Inflation 
 
Source: World Bank (2014) 
 
 
 
                                            
19
 The Fisher Equation explains the relationship between interest rates and inflation. Expressed mathematically, 
the Fisher Equation is real rate of interest + inflation = nominal rate of interest 
20
 Figure 2.6 shows the lending interest rate for some selected SSA countries for 2011. The lending interest rate 
is the bank rate that meets the short – and medium-term financing needs of the private sector. The corresponding 
figures for US and Japan were 3.25per cent and 1.5per cent respectively. 
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Figure 2. 6: Corporate Lending Interest Rate (percent)21 
 
Source: World Bank (2012) 
 
2.4.3. The Pan-African Banks 
 
In recent times, many economies within SSA have seen a growth in pan–African 
banking groups across many countries within the Sub-Saharan region (EIB, 2013; 
KPMG, 2013). Banking sector reforms introduced within the last decade in many 
countries in SSA have restored stability in the financial services in many African 
countries. A typical example of these pan-African banks is Togo’s Ecobank22, which 
now operates in more than 32 countries within Africa. Several other banks (e.g. 
United Bank of Africa, Standard Bank and Stanbic Bank) have also expanded across 
many countries within SSA. According to EIB (2013), these four banking giants 
manage more than 30 percent of the total bank deposits in not less than 13 countries 
within SSA.  
One of the major contributions of these banking groups is the facilitation of 
international cross-border trade for firms, as these banks provide platforms for firms 
to easily manage their transactions across the region (Global Finance, 2012). 
Besides, the spread of these banking groups have encouraged the spread of 
technology within the sub-region and generated competition within the national 
                                            
21 For 2011, no information was available regarding the lending interest rate in Ghana. However, according to 
Bank of Ghana, the lending interest rate in Ghana as of 1st December 2011 was 7.04 %. 
22 Ecobank is the largest pan-African banking group among the pan-African banks with over 1200 bank branches 
across SSA. 
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banking system (EIB, 2013). However, as these banking groups expand rapidly, 
institutions that are required to supervise and regulate their operations have not 
evolved rapidly to match up with their expansion. This is a threat to the banking 
industry in SSA and raises challenge for regulators within this region (EIB, 2013; 
IMF, 2013). 
 
2.4.4. Micro-Finance Institutions 
 
Inadequate financial services constitute a major challenge for the development of the 
corporate sector in almost all countries in Africa. Addressing this gap demands 
creating new institutions to enhance access to financial services within this region. 
Thus, over the past few years, African countries have seen a growth in the activities 
of microfinance institutions (hereafter MFIs), with most of these MFIs operating in 
eastern and western parts of SSA (CGAP, 2012)
23
. In Ghana for instance, within the 
last decade, MFIs have been growing at a rate of 20 – 30 percent annually (Pollio 
and  Obuobie, 2010).  
 
The introduction of MFIs constitutes an important element in supporting the 
development of the private sector in SSA. The MFIs are important actors in the 
financial sector in Africa as they provide financial services to small and medium size 
businesses. According to (EIB, 2013), MFIs seem to target SMEs. Not being able to 
provide necessary documentation in the form of formal financial accounts, it is 
sometimes cumbersome for SMEs to access credit services from the commercial 
banks. Thus, the SMEs become a natural target group for MFIs. The MFIs provide 
opportunities for SMEs to save and access credit with a higher degree of flexibility 
than the commercial banks. Traditionally, MFIs concentrate on the provision of 
microcredit to the poor (Hermes and Lensink, 2011; Galema, Lensink, Spierdijk, 
2011; Mwenda and Muuka, 2004). In recent times however, there has been a shift 
from microcredit into diverse services (Galema, Lensink, Spierdijk, 2011). 
 
Services that are provided by these MFIs include deposits, loans, money transfer, 
payments and insurance services. The MFIs depend predominantly on deposit 
funding from their customers as the source of funds for lending, even though most of 
                                            
23
 CGAP (The Consultative Group to Assist the Poor) is a global partnership of 34 leading organisations that 
seek to advance financial inclusion. 
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these deposits tend to be in short-term in nature (CGAP, 2012). Most of these MFIs 
tend to charge high interest rates even if there is reduction in inflation and the central 
bank’s base rate. Most of these MFIs indicate that their unwillingness to reduce their 
lending interest rates is because of significant levels of non-performing loan.   
Although MFIs have been expanding rapidly across many countries in SSA, these 
institutions face a host of challenges including high operating costs and inadequate 
technological innovation (Lafourcade, Isern, Mwangi, and Brown, 2005). In 
addition, there has been an increase in competition from some commercial banks in 
Africa as these commercial banks have moved into microfinance. For instance, the 
Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe and K-REP in Kenya have started providing 
microfinance, in what is known as “downscaling” (Hermes and Lensink, 2011).  
 
2.4.5. Stock Markets in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
The preceding section gives a general overview of the nature of financial credit 
facilities available to firms in SSA. This is vital in fostering our understanding of 
some of the issues underpinning the debt-equity choice of firms within SSA. Within 
the past few years, most economies including those in Africa, as a result of the 
liberalisation of the financial market, have turned their developmental approach 
towards more dependence on private companies and on the utilisation of organised 
capital markets to finance these companies. According to Nwankwo and Richards 
(2001), many developing economies are trying to turn their economies from state 
domination to market domination. Therefore, stock market development is a central 
element in terms of the liberalisation of the financial market in SSA (Yartey and 
Adjasi, 2007). Accordingly, this section sheds light on the nature of the stock 
markets in SSA.  
 
The purpose behind the establishment of stock market is to serve as a source of long-
term capital that supports the growth of an economy in general and also help to 
diversify the financial market. Thus, businesses will not have to rely predominantly 
on the traditional banking sector as a means of financing their activities, but can also 
depend on the stock market as a way of generating the funds needed. In line with 
this, Yartey (2006) observed that the institutionalisation of the stock market is 
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required to enhance economic development by providing the means of savings that 
will eventually improve the quantity and quality of investment.   
 
The history of the stock market in SSA dates back to 1887 when the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange was founded. However, most of the other stock markets in SSA 
were established within the last thirty years. Unfortunately, the establishment of 
stock markets in SSA has been at the insistence of governments rather than as a 
result of the response to the demands from the corporate sector seeking stock 
markets as a means of broadening their financial options. In addition, until recent 
times, non-residents investors had limited access to stock exchanges within this 
region. For instance, before 1993, foreigners and non-resident Ghanaians could not 
invest in the Ghana Stock Exchange without seeking approval from the Bank of 
Ghana and these restrictions gave rise to low volumes in these markets (Emenuga, 
1997). 
 
Among the stock exchanges in SSA, the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) is 
relatively more developed than the other stock markets within the region. The JSE 
accounts for 90 percent of the total market capitalisation of all stock markets in SSA 
(Yartey and Adjasi, 2007). Still, the JSE has low liquidity levels by global standards 
(Irving, 2005). It is also worth mentioning here that there has been a remarkable 
improvement in terms of the performance of stock markets in SSA over the past few 
years (Yartey and Adjasi, 2007). For instance, in 2008 the total market capitalisation 
of the Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE) increased by 44 percent (GSE 2012). In spite of 
this improvement and efforts made by various governments within the region to 
improve the state of stock markets in SSA, stock markets continue to face a host of 
developmental challenges including low liquidity levels, high costs of going public, 
informational deficiencies, high transaction costs, manual operations and inadequate 
market infrastructure (Deutsche Bank, 2013; KPMG, 2013).  
Political and institutional structures that are vital for the smooth running of stock 
markets within this region are completely inadequate and these conditions thwart the 
market’s effectiveness in intermediating capital flow (Irving, 2005). Despite these 
developmental challenges, some of the stock markets within SSA have been serving 
as a major source of funds for firms within the continent. For instance, according to 
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GSE (2012) the stock market in Ghana has been a major source of capital inflow for 
investment purposes in Ghana.  
Indeed, recent evidence has shown an increased interest in investing in both the bond 
and stock markets in SSA (Deutsche Bank, 2013; IMF, 2013). This is an important 
element in promoting the developments of various capital markets across SSA. 
Unfortunately, due to inadequate market size and liquidity problems among many 
countries in SSA, the bulk of recent inflows is likely to move into a small number of 
countries in SSA with relatively frontier markets (IMF, 2013). 
 
In general, stock markets in SSA are characterised by limited numbers of domestic 
firms as compared to stock markets in other less developed market economies 
(World Bank, 2012). This low patronage of the stock market by indigenous firms in 
SSA is attributed to the reluctance of firms to reduce their dependence on bank 
finance as well as the absence of seasoned entrepreneurs with the experience and 
resource to float a company. In addition to this, there is also inadequate public 
awareness of the benefits associated with investing in shares (Emenuga, 1997; 
Irving, 2005).   
It is important to appreciate the fact that the mere establishment of stock markets in 
SSA is of no value unless the right environment is created for stock markets to 
function effectively. Until the fundamental challenges of African stock markets are 
addressed, stock markets within this region will continue to remain small and illiquid 
and will not be able to boost the financing opportunities of the corporate sector.  
 
In short, access to funds remains one of the biggest challenges for firms in SSA. The 
development of financial system in SSA lags behind the progress of the real sector 
economy, making it difficult to provide the necessary funds and services to the 
private sector. This undoubtedly presents a significant constraint to economic growth 
and development. Similar to the observation of Park (2011), the financial system in 
SSA remains structurally unbalanced. This indeed, can undermine the structural 
resilience and stability of the financial systems within SSA. The lack of well-
developed domestic stock markets in SSA limits the availability of capital needed by 
the corporate sector for long-term projects. 
 
Additionally, the regulatory frameworks that are required in creating and promoting 
the capital market are not well developed. The few institutional structures available 
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are characterised by bureaucratic procedures (Kwakye, 2010) and uncertain policy 
environments full of corrupt practices (Julian and Ofori-Dankwa, 2013). As a result, 
the ability of SSA’s financial system to create the enabling environment to generate 
innovation remains uncertain. Indeed, the presence of these conditions stifles the 
growth of the financial system in that investors become less attracted towards 
investing in the region.   
Apart from these, the performance of the domestic resource mobilisation (especially 
through the bond and stock markets) by the corporate sector remains discouraging. 
Also, the absence of a well-developed financial infrastructure (e.g. public credit 
registries, private credit bureaux and payment and settlement systems) constrains the 
effective operation of financial intermediaries by increasing information 
asymmetries and legal uncertainties, which increase risk to lenders and impede the 
supply of credit, especially from foreign investors. For instance, the development of 
the credit reporting industry in SSA remains hindered by a weak and bureaucratic 
legal framework. The SSA economy can still be described as a cash-based economy 
which creates high transaction costs. As indicated by Bawumia (2010), the absence 
of a potent payment and settlement system infrastructure constrains the development 
of an efficient domestic capital market, which is vital for supplying the long-term 
funds needed by the private sector.  
 
Besides, the financial system in SSA remains largely fragmented (Dahou et al. 
2009), thwarting the deepening and broadening of the region’s financial services and 
thus effectively constraining the mobilisation of the region’s savings for its vast 
investment needs. Another challenge facing the financial system in SSA (particularly 
the banking sector) has to do with the difficulty that many businesses go through in 
opening bank accounts. For instance, the high level of documentation required for 
opening accounts poses a serious challenge for many individuals. Furthermore, the 
improper address system in SSA and the informal nature of the SSA economies 
make it difficult for individuals to get the documentation required to open a bank 
account. This constrains the financial system as it limits savings mobilisation.  
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2.4.6. The Financial System in SSA and the Global Financial Crisis 
 
There is a widespread impression that there is a low level of financial integration of 
Africa’s financial systems with the rest of the world. This low level of integration 
could be a blessing in disguise by insulating the region from the direct effects of the 
2007/08 global financial crisis. For instance, scholars (e.g. KPMG, 2013; Allen and 
Giovannetti, 2011; Kiyota, 2009) observed that the global economic crisis had a 
minimal impact on the financial system in SSA due to the region’s low level of 
integration with global financial markets. Indeed, banking systems in SSA are 
characterised by minimal levels of cross-border banking linkages and less exposure 
to complex financial products (Allen and Giovannetti, 2011; IMF, 2009).   
The 2007/08 financial crisis came as a surprise to many. What began in the U.S. sub-
prime mortgage market quickly spread to other sectors of the U.S. economy by first 
affecting the financial markets, before extending to the real economy and then 
spilling over worldwide (Allen and Giovannetti, 2011). The financial crisis had 
different impacts on different economies (IMF, 2009) and its impact on SSA was 
relatively modest (Allen and Giovannetti, 2011). The banking systems in Africa 
were well positioned to handle the impacts of the 2007/08 financial crisis (IMF, 
2013; KPMG, 2013). Countries in SSA with relatively well-developed financial 
systems were initially affected by the crisis due to their cross-border financial 
linkages (IMF, 2009)
24
.  
Banks in particular came under remarkable pressure during the crisis period (Allen 
and Giovannetti, 2011). Most countries in SSA have a high degree of foreign bank 
presence and this exposes the region to contagion risks (Kiyota, 2009). Available 
evidence further suggests that some major international banks with subsidiaries in 
SSA experienced stresses during the global economic downturn. However their 
spillover impact on operations in SSA was minimal (IMF, 2013; Allen and 
Giovannetti, 2011; Kiyota, 2009). ADB (2009) even observed that subsidiaries of 
some international banks in SSA saw a significant increase their market 
capitalisation during the financial crisis. For instance, Standard Bank of Ghana and 
Nedbank of Swaziland saw an increase in their market capitalisation between 2007 
                                            
24 The IMF (2009) observed that in SSA, South Africa, Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria were hit first by the global 
economic downturn leading to falling prices in the equity market, pressure on exchange rates and capital flow 
reversals.  
39 
 
and 2009. Thus, as described by Murinde (2009), foreign banks operating SSA were 
protected from the contagion impact of the global economic downturn.  
In general, the global financial crisis led to a reduction in exports from SSA and  
slower economic growth, which affected borrowers, and thus leading to a high level 
of non-performing loans. Thus, the banking systems in SSA were indirectly affected 
by the financial crisis through international trade linkages (IMF, 2013). However, the 
magnitude of the impact of the crisis depended on a combination of factors including 
the performance of macroeconomic indicators and the level of dependence of the 
economy on external financial flow, as well as the extent to which the financial 
system inter-relates with the international market (Allen and Giovannetti, 2011) 
 
In discussing the macroeconomic background of SSA, it is important to look at the 
issue of corporate governance (henceforth CG) since it is vital in enhancing capital 
inflow to firms (Mehran, 1992). As such, in the section that follows, an overview of 
CG from the perspective of SSA is provided. 
 
 
2.5. Corporate Governance   
2.5.1. Introduction 
 
The previous section of this chapter has provided a general idea of the financial 
market in SSA. This is vital in fostering our understanding of the various financing 
opportunities available for firms within the region. Nonetheless, the issue of 
corporate governance is also a vital factor that influences the availability of finance 
to firms. The term ‘corporate governance’ has been defined by different scholars 
from different perspectives. For example, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) define 
corporate governance as “the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations 
assure themselves of getting a return on their investment’’ (p.737). The Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (2003) hereafter referred to as OECD,   
in its report also defined corporate governance as a system by which business 
corporations are directed and controlled. Monks and Minow (2011) defined 
corporate governance as the relationship among various participants in determining 
the direction and performance of corporations.  
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Good CG ensures transparency and a reduction of mismanagement among firms. 
This ensures that resources are used in the best interests of shareholders. Jensen and 
Meckling’s (1976) agency theory is among the major theoretical viewpoints on CG. 
Agency theory is about separation of ownership and control. Investors commit their 
funds or resources into firms and these resources are expected to be managed by 
other individuals (agents) with the view of generating returns for these investors.  
However, this separation of ownership and control can lead to potential conflict 
between the managers and the owners. Personal interests of managers can 
overshadow the interests of the shareholders, thus leading to expropriation of funds. 
Firm managers can misuse company resources by spending on things that do not 
bring about improvement in the company’s performance. As such, CG measures are 
the means of ensuring that investors or suppliers of finance are provided with a 
convincing assurance that firm managers will act in their best interests by ensuring 
that resources are used towards the improvement of the company’s performance. In 
other words, the CG mechanisms offer protection for the rights of shareholders 
against any selfish interests of firm managers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
 
The past few years have witnessed a growing interest in the issue of CG and several 
factors have indeed given rise to the heightened interest in CG. These factors include 
major financial scandals and other fundamental failures in the US and other 
developed economies such as the failure of the Royal Bank of Scotland in October 
2008. Fraudulent accounting manipulation in the Enron, Polly Peck International, 
Parmalat and Madoff investment scandals led to some of the major insolvencies in 
history. In line with this, Becht, Jenkinson and Mayer (2005) observed that the issue 
of corporate governance has been given keen attention due to the perceived failures 
of corporations brought about by firms being run for the selfish interest of the 
managers rather than the maximisation of the shareholders’ capital.  
 
CG is all about the rules that control the operation of a firm. Scholars (e.g. Johnson, 
Boone, Breach and Friedman, 2000) have demonstrated that corporate control 
influences the inflow of capital. This eventually impacts on financing decisions of 
firms. The nature of CG is crucial in the determination of the risk premium 
demanded by shareholders and also underlines why firms are able to raise different 
levels of funds. Chen, Chen and Wei (2009) asserted that efficient firm-level CG is 
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essential in the reduction of cost of capital employed by firms. Since the required 
returns demanded by investors are also influenced by the risk level of the firm. Thus, 
better firm-level governance leads to a reduction of the risk premium, thereby 
lowering the overall cost of debt employed by firms. Other scholarly works (e.g. Wu, 
2005) have also demonstrated that firms that are better governed stand a better 
chance of being evaluated more highly, and have a better chance of growth than their 
counterparts that have less effective CG measures. 
 
2.5.2. Evidence from SSA 
 
CG structures exist in all countries, but there are differences in the composition of 
the structures across countries. According to OECD (2006), corporate governance 
issues do not only vary from one business to the other but also among countries. It 
must be appreciated that institutional development of a country is vital for CG and 
that effective corporate governance system is essential for establishing the proper 
investment environment (Khan, 2011). However, in many cases, developing and 
transitional economies do not have the strong and sound institutional structures that 
are crucial in enforcing the acceptable level of CG (CIPE, 2001). Young, Peng, 
Ahlstrom, Bruton and Jiang (2008) observed that generally, CG structures in less 
developed market economies are similar to those of the developed economies. 
Nonetheless, the institutional frameworks in less developed market economies are 
weak (Julian and Ofori-Dankwa, 2013), leading to less efficient and unpredictable 
legal systems.   
 
Better corporate control is crucial to attract capital to SSA. Many firms in Africa 
have in place CG codes that reflect the principles of OECD. Still, the degree to 
which these firms comply with CG principles is very limited and thus, the desired 
effects of these CG principles are not being realised (Mensah, 2001). For example, in  
Nigeria there is a lack of protection for the rights of minority shareholders in the 
country, despite the availability of laws that are supposed to protect such rights 
(Okpara, 2011). In some cases for instance, minority shareholders may not even be 
allowed to express their views during general meetings. Nigeria has adequate laws 
that are meant to protect shareholders’ rights. Yet these laws are often flouted 
because shareholders are not aware of their rights. There is also a lack of 
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commitment on the part of board members regarding the discharge of their duties. 
Additionally, states have failed in supervising and enforcing such laws, as 
government departments that are supposed to supervise such laws are usually 
influenced by politicians and other law makers. Thus, there are problems such as   a 
weak regulatory framework, inadequate disclosure, lack of transparency and other 
corrupt practices among firms in Nigeria (Okpara, 2011). 
 
The situation in Nigeria is not very different from other countries in SSA. For 
instance, in the case of Kenya, weak CG continues to be a major problem. The 
collapse of many firms in the country in recent times has also been attributed to the 
ineffectiveness of CG measures (Musikali, 2008). These are of course some of the 
major reasons that have hindered major foreign investment into this part of the 
world.   
 
Although South Africa is considered to have a financial market which is similar to 
those in some developed countries according to the Institute of International Finance 
(hereafter IIF) report in 2007, poor CG has been identified as a major problem that 
has led to many corporate scandals in the country. This, in the view of IIF (2007) 
depicts a disconnection between the CG structure and the real CG practices in the 
country. A common problem with some South African firms that is normally 
highlighted by investors is the failure of the companies to provide adequate 
information about their CG practices (IIF, 2007).   
 
In the case of Ghana, different measures that aim at encouraging good CG have been 
initiated. This includes the enactment of the Securities Industry Law of 1993, which 
led to the establishment of the Securities and Exchange Commission (previously 
known as the Securities Regulatory Commission). This commission among other 
things controls the fund management industry, oversees the security laws that affect 
joint investment schemes and assesses how funds that are collected through public 
subscription are utilized. This commission also ensures that companies disclose 
information that is required by the investing public (Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 2011). This is vital in dealing with the issue of information asymmetry 
between firms and their stakeholders and also for an efficient capital market. 
Accordingly, Abor (2007) observes that in fostering transparency, stakeholders 
demand that relevant information is disclosed by corporate bodies. As part of best 
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corporate practice, the Securities and Exchange Commission further demands that all 
listed companies also appoint independent directors. This is important as these 
independent directors bringing external expertise to the firm, thereby strengthening 
the overall management of firms (SEC 2011). However, sometimes strong political 
ties and lobbying lead to the appointment of individuals who may not have 
specialised skills and knowledge to act as independent directors, thereby giving rise 
to dysfunctional board of directors. 
 
In order to protect the rights of investors, legislation has been established in many 
countries within SSA to create  a more liberal environment for investment purposes. 
For instance, similar to the British legal framework, Ghana’s constitution provides 
for the independence of the judicial system and prevents any kind of interference 
from political leaders. This is imperative in terms of increasing the confidence of 
investors in the country as it ensures that investors’ rights and their investments are 
well protected. The establishment of unconventional means of resolving disputes 
within the judiciary such as the Arbitration Centre in 1996 and the Fast Court system 
by the New Patriotic Party (NPP) government also attests to the determination of 
Ghana’s government to increase the confidence in the legal framework that among 
other things protects interests of a commercial and economic nature. These 
alternatives ensure that cases are acted upon with speed and efficiency.   
 
Certainly, it must be pointed out that effective enforcement and monitoring of 
existing CG regulations constitute a major challenge to a host of countries, especially 
the developing ones. The available of these measures does not mean that companies 
comply with them to the fullest extent. There is still the issue of a low level of 
transparency/disclosure among many firms in many countries within SSA (e.g. 
Tsamenyi, Enninful-Adu and Onumah, 2007). There are also inadequate effective 
mechanisms for dealing with firms that fail to live up to CG expectations. In some 
cases, political influence leads to some CG rules being circumvented.  
 
2.6. Corruption in SSA 
   
Closely related to the issue of corporate governance is corruption, which is indeed a 
major challenge to good CG. Mensah et al. (2003) observed that companies 
worldwide have put in place stronger corporate governance measures, introduced 
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code of ethics and provided training programmes, all towards dealing with 
corruption. Yet corruption continues to be a major problem that confronts CG in 
both developing economies and the most advanced economies such as the US and 
the UK, where democratic and other institutional frameworks are well advanced. In 
line with this, the Centre for International Private Enterprise asserts that corruption 
exist in every part of the world, and that it would be a mistake to think that some 
countries are corruption-free (CIPE, 2001).  
 
However, the effects of corruption on one country can be different from the other 
due to different levels of institutional development. In spite of the number of anti-
corruption measures that have been proposed at both national and international 
levels, corruption continues to be a major barrier to both the private and the public 
sectors especially in SSA (Lawal, 2007). The 2012 corruption index of Transparency 
International (Henceforth TI) which ranks countries according to their perceived 
levels of public corruption indicates that a greater portion of the 176 countries 
surveyed scored below 50 on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean). Figure 
2.7 indicates the corruption perception index (CPI) of some selected SSA countries
25
 
in 2012. 
 
 
Figure 2. 7: Corruption Perception Index 
  
 (Source: TI, 2012) 
                                            
25
 The comparative figures for UK and US are 74 and 73 respectively. Denmark, Finland and New Zealand had 
the best score in the world (i.e. 90). 
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Almost all the African countries assessed in 2012 by the TI scored below 50. This 
indicates the widespread nature of corruption in these economies. Africa is seen as 
one of the most corrupt places in the world and this has contributed to the low inflow 
of capital needed by the corporate sector and has limited the expansion of the 
financial services. In spite of the numerous measures that have been adopted to deal 
with the issue, the problem still persists in SSA, as efforts continue to show mixed 
results (Hanson, 2009).   In the case of Nigeria for instance, Okpara (2011) observed 
that corruption accounts for the ineffective corporate framework in the country.  In 
the context of Ghana, a number of measures have been taken to deal with the issue. 
Examples of such measures are the Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition (GACC) that 
was launched in 2001 and the setting up of the National Institutional Renewal 
Programme aimed at transforming a number of institutions. Despite the 
implementation of these measures and other educational programmes initiated by the 
Ghana Integrity Initiative (Ghana’s version of Transparency International), 
corruption is seen by most Ghanaians as a serious problem in the country and as 
such, most public departments in the country are regarded as low in honesty and 
integrity (Mensah, Aboagye, Addo and Buatsi 2003). The situation in Ghana is 
similar to other countries within SSA.  
 
No matter what form corruption takes, it is imperative to note that corruption has 
detrimental effects on the development of a nation, including the creation of 
inefficiencies in the market system, thereby leading to wastage of limited available 
resources. It can even push a country into a political crisis. The way any society 
perceives corruption will undoubtedly affect the way the issue is dealt with in that 
society. Where corrupt practices are accepted as part of the societal norms, then 
dealing with it will require more effort. Effort to deal with corruption should begin 
from the top governmental levels. Once this is done, it will be much easier to deal 
with the issue at the other levels of the economy. Weak corporate governance 
provides fertile ground for corrupt practices (Mensah et al. 2003; Wu 2005). Thus, 
encouraging good corporate governance, in the form of maintaining strong internal 
control measures and the appointment of a competent and dedicated board that 
represents the interest of shareholders, and also renders regular accountability as 
required, must be seen as some of the steps in reducing the incidence of corruption. 
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These measures deter individuals from indulging in any corrupt practices due to the 
high possibility of being caught. The recent increase in the importance of the issue of 
corporate governance all over the world should be welcome news for those who 
continue to champion the anti-corruption campaign. This is important in maintaining 
investors’ confidence in the capital market, especially in developing economies such 
as SSA. 
 
2.7. Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter has provided a macroeconomic overview of the African continent. This 
is essential in providing the background information of the context from which this 
study is conducted. Clearly, the continent faces huge developmental challenges on 
the one hand and has great potential on the other. The level of economic 
development of this continent lags behind the rest of the world as Africa faces huge 
infrastructural gap and relatively poor regulatory environment. The pace of growth 
across the continent remains uneven due to varying preconditions for social and 
economic development among the countries. Much remains to be done to encourage 
the flow of capital resources into this part of the world. Generally, the capital market, 
which is vital in the allocation of the resources into the different sectors of the 
economy, remains narrow and illiquid in the African continent. The financial 
systems remain small and inefficient at financial intermediation. Inadequate CG 
measures and the issue of corruption are some of the major challenges of the 
financial systems in SSA.     
 
Having provided the macroeconomic background information of the context this 
study, I now proceed to examine the theoretical background of this study. 
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RESEARCH PROCEDURE 
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Chapter 3 
 
 
Literature Review 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
The financing decision is of paramount importance to every firm. This is 
underscored by the evidence that there is a considerable corpus of research literature 
on capital structure decisions of firms. As such, under this chapter I will be looking 
at some of the theories explaining the capital structure decision among firms. These 
include the traditional theory, irrelevance model, the trade-off, the pecking order and 
the free cash flow theories. The market timing theory is also considered in this 
literature review. Studies conducted in testing some of these models are also 
considered. The limitations of the models are also looked at under this review. Firm, 
industrial and country-level determinants of capital structure are also considered 
under the second part of the literature review. The final parts focus on the studies 
conducted in testing the applicability of theories of capital structure in both advanced 
and less developed markets.   
 
 
3.2. Theories of Capital Structure 
 
A wide range of theoretical perspectives that aim at explaining the capital structure 
decisions of firms have been propounded in the field of corporate finance and other 
related area of studies. There is however lack of consensus among these theories in 
explaining firms’ financing behaviour as each of these theories looks at the issue of 
capital structure from a different perspective. According to Eldomiaty (2007) each 
theory of capital structure presents a diverse explanation of corporate financing with 
respect to different assumptions. This section of the thesis focuses on some of the 
theories of capital structure, their limitations and studies conducted in testing these 
theories. This section begins by examining the traditional theory of capital structure. 
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3.3. Traditional View of Capital Structure 
  
Also known as the intuitive view, the traditional view arguably dates back through 
many decades and seeks to explain capital structure decisions of firms based on 
intuition. Its proponents believe that the value of a company and its capital structure 
are in fact related. Thus, a firm’s level of debt or gearing has an impact on its value. 
Hence, there is an optimal level of debt at which the cost of capital is minimised, or 
the value of the firm is maximised (Samuels, Wilkes and Brayshaw (1997). As the 
firm brings in a considerable size of debt into its capital structure, the weighted 
average cost of capital will fall. This is because the benefit of low-cost debt finance 
more than outweighs any increases in the cost of equity needed to compensate equity 
holders for higher financial risk. On the other hand, as the proportion of debt goes 
up, equity holders will demand increasingly higher returns and ultimately, this 
increase will begin to outweigh the benefit of cheap debt finance and the weighted 
average cost of capital will rise as the firm’s value falls. Furthermore, at an excessive 
level of gearing, the cost of debt will begin to go up (as debt holders become agitated 
about the security of their loans), equity holders will continue to increase their 
required returns and this will give rise to a rapid increase in weighted average cost of 
capital. At a higher level of gearing, certain problems (e.g. less assets left to offer as 
collateral for new loans; restrictive conditions from investors and other stakeholders) 
become more possible. Both customers and suppliers begin to be doubtful and this 
could have detrimental effects on overall sales (Samuels et al. 1997; MacKie-Mason 
1990; Wrightsman 1978)  
 
It is evident from the traditional theory’s perspective that for firms to operate 
effectively and profitably, they must keep an optimal level of gearing at which the  
WACC is minimized or the value of the firm is maximized. Thus, firms that operates 
beyond this level of gearing are likely to have a damaging consequence on their 
overall performance and their future survival as well.   
A number of criticisms have been levelled against the traditional theory. The most 
prominent criticism to this proposition was postulated by M and M (1958). Based on 
the assumptions of the irrelevance theory, M and M (1958) arguably noted that under 
a perfect market condition, the firm value is not contingent on the capital structure of 
the firm.  Therefore, the irrelevance theory is counterpoised against the traditional 
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theory, by arguing that there is no need to manipulate the capital structure by 
applying only debt or equity finance or a certain proportion of each. To M and M 
(1958), finance managers cannot in any way increase the value of their firms by just 
altering the capital structure of their firms. In the section that follows, the irrelevance 
theory of M and M (1958) is examined. 
 
 
3.4. Irrelevance Theory of Capital Structure 
 
M and M’s Irrelevance theory of 1958 has provided the platform for the huge interest 
in the corporate financing behaviour. In their pioneering work on capital structure, M 
and M made a number of assumptions in deriving their famous irrelevance theory 
which has in recent times attracted a wide variety of research in corporate finance 
and other fields in the academic circles. The assumptions include the following; 
1. No taxation for either individuals or companies 
2. No transaction cost 
3. Debt is risk free 
4. Perfect capital markets where investors have the same information as 
management regarding the future state of affairs upon which they can act 
rationally  
They also assumed that a firm’s average cost of capital and for that reason, the value 
of the firm is independent of its capital structure. To them therefore, there is no 
optimal capital structure that maximises the firm’s value and for that matter a firm 
can make use of any amount of debt or equity. In contrast to the claim of the 
traditionalist perspective therefore, M and M (1958) argued that the market value of 
their company cannot be changed by simply altering the capital structure.    
In addition to the above, M and M (1958) assumed that the rate of returns that 
shareholders of a firm demand goes up as more debt is applied. The reason behind 
this argument is that shareholder see the firm as more risky as the firm stands a high 
chance of experiencing a financial distress (i.e. due to the high level of debt in the 
capital structure). As a result of this, the increase in cost of equity offsets any 
benefits derived from the use of cheaper debt finance and therefore the weighted 
average cost of capital remains the same. The implication of this is that the choice of 
finance is not relevant to the wealth of shareholders and firms can therefore make 
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use of any mix of funds (Modigliani and Miller 1958; Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
1999). 
According to M and M, firms that operate in the same kind of business or industry 
(e.g. firms in the construction industry or in the retail industry) and which have 
identical operating risks must have the same overall value, regardless of their capital 
structures. M and M (1958) base their argument on the fact that the value of a firm 
depends on the future operating income generated by its assets and not by altering its 
debt-equity mix. In other words, the manner in which this operating income is 
divided between returns to equity holders and debt holders must not make any 
difference to the total value of the company. Accordingly, the overall value of the 
company will not change so as its average cost of capital (Stiglitz, 1974). The 
implication of M and M’s argument is that financial managers who want to 
maximise the value of their firm (i.e. increasing the wealth of shareholders), must 
aim at other aspects of the firm rather than just altering the debt-equity level.    
 
3.4.1. Limitations of the Irrelevance Theory 
 
The irrelevance theory offers a number of assumptions (e.g. perfect market 
conditions; no transaction costs) to support its theoretical proposition. However, in 
reality, these assumptions do not exist and therefore the underlying notions of the 
theory are not realistic. The irrelevance theory has been considered as being limited 
in its validity. The most valid criticism is that the impact of tax could not be ignored 
in view of the fact that debt interest is tax deductible (Green et al., 2002; Cheng and 
Shiu, 2007). The existence of taxes and differences in information, as well as the 
presence of agency costs certainly influence firms in their financing decisions. Firms 
consider these factors in the choice of capital to ensure that the best financing 
decision is made. 
Critics of the irrelevance theory (e.g. Green et al., 2002) question M and M (1958) 
assumptions and contend that the advantages derived from debt (e.g. deductibility of 
interest payment) could influence firms to finance their operations using debt finance 
rather than employing only equity finance. The criticisms levelled against M and M 
(1958) theory therefore made them modify their model to reflect the idea that the 
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corporate tax system gives tax relief on payments of interest (M and M 1963; Myers, 
2001). 
In their previous argument, M and M (1958) were of the view that firms that differ in 
their capital structure only, must have the same total value of debt plus equity. The 
reason behind this being that it was the size of the company’s operating earnings 
stream that determined its value, and not the manner in which it was split between 
equity holders and debt holders. The corporate tax system nonetheless, carries a 
distortion under which debt holders’ returns in the form of interest are tax deductible 
to the company, whereas returns to equity holders are not. In view of that, M and M 
(1963) concluded that firms that are geared have advantage over un-geared firms 
(that is, they pay less tax and therefore will have greater market value and a lower 
weighted average cost of capital). In addition, M and M’s (1958) theory was 
criticised on the grounds that the irrelevance theory ignores the cost involved in 
financial distress (e.g. bankruptcy costs) which comes about as a result of excessive 
use of debt (Brigham and Ehrhardt, 2008). 
 
Despite the fact that the underlying assumptions of M and M (1958) were not 
generally welcomed due to their unrealistic nature, further scholarly works did focus 
on relaxing some of the assumptions in developing a more realistic approach in 
testing the financing behaviour among firms. Testing the M and M’s (1958) theory 
in a real world situation is practically impossible due to the nature of the underlying 
assumptions. Nonetheless, the consensus view is that the irrelevance theory provided 
the platform that has indeed influenced the development of many other theories of 
capital structure of the modern days including the well-known trade-off model. 
 
3.5. Trade-off Theory of Capital Structure 
 
This is one of the commonly recognised models of capital structural theories and 
remains one of the most influential theories of the capital structural models in 
modern times.  In contrast to the irrelevance theory, the trade-off theory presupposes 
that there are costs and benefits connected with the use of debt as against equity. As 
a result, firms must choose an optimal capital structure that trades off the marginal 
benefits and costs of debt after taking into consideration market imperfections (e.g. 
agency costs, taxes and bankruptcy costs). The marginal benefit derived from debts 
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reduces as the level of debts increases and at the same point the marginal cost of 
debts rises as debts rises.  Thus, a rational firm will optimise by the trade off point to 
find out the optimum level of equity and debt to finance its activities. The benefits of 
debts are the advantages derived from tax and the reduced costs of the agency 
problem regarding free cash flow, while the costs of debt denotes the bankruptcy 
costs, as well as the increased agency costs that come about when the 
creditworthiness of the company is in doubt due to its rising debt level (Dawood et 
al., 2011; Yu-Shu, Yi-Pei and Chu-Yang, 2010; López-Gracia, Sogorb-Mira, 2008;  
Bancel and Mitto, 2004; Shyam-Sunder and Myers 1999; Scott, 1977). 
 
 
3.5.1. Empirical Studies of the Trade-off Theory 
 
In testing the applicability of the trade-off model, pieces of empirical evidence are 
identified in literature that attempt to provide support for the key theoretical position 
of this theory. Notably, Frank and Goyal (2003) conducted a study to look into the 
relative significance of 39 factors in the leverage decisions of US firms that are 
traded publicly. In general, the result was consistent with the trade-off model, where 
a firm’s leverage increases in line with the average leverage in the industry, with the 
presence of collateral and with firm size. More importantly, they observed that firms 
that are deemed risky by lenders have lower leverage ratios. This is because financial 
lenders are not willing to lend to such firms, thus leading to a lower leverage level. 
On the other hand, they found that an increase in leverage leads to a higher interest 
rate, not a drop in the interest rate as might have been expected by the theory. 
Financial lenders are made nervous by high levels of debt that increase the risk of 
default, thus pushing the interest rate up. 
Similarly, Kjellman and Hansen (1995) conducted an investigation into the capital 
structure practices of some listed firms in Finland. Their result revealed that most 
Finnish firms seek to maintain an optimum leverage or target capital structure policy 
as suggested by the trade-off theory, even though, small Finish firms are unlikely to 
maintain a target capital policy. This clearly supports the prediction of the trade-off 
hypothesis. Furthermore, Taggart (1977) examined the trade-off theory using a static 
approach and realised that the movements in the market value of equity 
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counterbalance the movement in the market value of long-term debt as predicted by 
the trade-off theory.    
 
3.5.2. Limitation of the Trade-off Theory 
 
Despite its popularity, the trade-off theory has been criticised due to some limitations 
inherent with its argument.  For instance, Chen (2004) observed that the trade-off 
model has not been able to offer any explanation to the corporate behaviour 
concerning the stock market response to decreases and increases in leverage which 
constantly give rise to stock price decreases and increases respectively. Another 
major criticism that has also been levelled against the trade-off theory is its failure to 
suggest an explanation for alternative financing patterns among firms (Smart, 
Megginson and Gitman, 2007). Indeed, the explanation offered by the theory-off 
theory does not completely describe the financing behaviour seen among firms.  
Furthermore, under the trade-off model profitable firms should borrow more to take 
the advantage of tax to shield their income. Thus, a positive relationship is expected 
between profitability and leverage (Tong and Green, 2005). However, there are 
limits to which this assumption can be accepted as scholarly evidence also depicts 
negative relationship between profitability and leverage (Sheikh and Wang, 2011; 
Chakraborty, 2010; Frank and Goyal, 2009; Cheng and Shiu, 2007). It must be noted 
that the available empirical evidence does not wholly support the trade-off model 
and for that matter, critics (e.g. Myers, 1984) argue that different theories of capital 
structure are likely to exist.  
 
 
3.6. Pecking-order Theory of Capital Structure 
 
The pecking-order theory (henceforth POT) of Myers (1984) is one of the prominent 
theories of capital structure and it seeks to offer an explanation into alternative 
financing behaviour among firms, something which was overlooked by the trade-off 
theory. The theory does not seek to search for an optimal capital structure through a 
theoretical process (as it has no precise or a well-defined capital structure target). 
However, POT postulates that firms initially depend on internally generated funds, 
which is then followed by straight debt, convertible debt and finally new issue of 
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equity (Dawood et al., 2011, Gaud, Hoesli and Bender, 2007; Chen and Strange, 
2005; Fama and French, 2002; Chirinko  and Singha, 2000; Kjellman and Hansen, 
1995; Barclay and Smith, 1999; Myers and Majluf, 1984; Myers, 1984). Internally 
generated funds have the least issue cost, followed by debt and equity in that order. 
 
Existing scholarly works offer a variety of explanations for the preference of 
internally generated funds to other sources of funds. For instance, funds from outside 
sources (such as debt) may lead to increased scrutiny over the activities of the firm 
(Kjellman and Hansen, 1995; Ang and Jung, 1993). Creditors and shareholders tend 
to carefully watch the activities of the firm to ensure that their funds are put to good 
use. Managers however do not feel comfortable being monitored and thus rely on 
internally generated funds in order to avoid the drawback of outside interference of 
their operations.  
An alternative explanation offered for the reliance on internally generated funds is 
based on the idea of asymmetric information. This is where, due to their access to 
various information about a firm, managers know that the value of the shares is 
greater than the current market value. When it comes to a fresh project, the 
predictions of managers could be higher and  more pragmatic than that of the market.  
 
In such a situation, where the firm issued fresh shares, there is the likelihood that 
their prices could be very low, therefore shifting wealth from existing shareholders 
to the fresh ones. This under-pricing could lead to existing shareholders rejecting 
projects that could have generated a positive net present value. The issuance of new 
debt may be interpreted as a sign of bad news. Ryen, Vasconcellos and Kish (1997) 
argued that in a situation where a firm sees it stock as under-priced, the firm 
managers are unlikely to issue new stock even where there is a positive net present 
value project.  As a result of that, there is the natural tendency to rely on retained 
earnings which has no problem with asymmetric information.  
The next option according to POT is debt, if additional funds are needed over and 
above the retained earnings. In this sense, firms that  generate a lot of wealth and for 
that reason have high retained earnings are more likely use less debt finance than 
firms that generate less internal funds (Dawood et al. 2011; Abor,  2008; Smart et al. 
2007; Fama and French, 2002; Samuels et al. 1997; Myer, 1984). The issue of equity 
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comes in as a last option and this will only take place when information asymmetry 
is at its minimum (Ryen et al. 1997). 
 
Alternatively, transaction cost (e.g. issuance expenses) has also been offered in 
explaining the POT (Kjellman and Hansen 1995). It is worth pointing out that the 
cost involved in employing any external funds influences management decision 
regarding the choice of funds. Funds from equity investors have a high transaction 
cost and firms will only resort to this after exhausting all less costly avenues. Myers 
and Majluf (1984) see the use of retained earnings by firms as the safest option that 
reduces the cost associated with transaction and information asymmetry. This also 
prevents the dilution of ownership (Kjellman and Hansen, 1995). Narayanan (1988) 
also suggests where a firm with an asymmetric information problem is allowed to 
choose between equity and debt, such a firm is likely to choose debt or will 
completely discard the investment that is being financed. 
 
Notable scholarly works offer explanations for the asymmetry information among 
firms. For instance in the UK and the US, Seifert and Gonenc (2008) observed that 
among other things, the information asymmetry problem is caused by the widespread 
ownership of firms in these countries and as a result, managers have more 
information on what is happening within the company than shareholders. In Japan 
and Germany however, they observed that the problem of information asymmetry is 
due to the restrictions on investors’ rights and also a lesser and distorted flow of 
information. Indeed, lack of proper regulations could easily lead to an information 
gap between the management and the stakeholders. 
 
Brounen, Jong and Koedijk (2006) agree that the information that managers have is 
exposed to outsiders by the financing decision taken by management. They further 
argued that companies that follow the pecking order model tend not to have a 
specific or a target debt ratio because their preferences are determined by the 
ordering in relation to the issuance of fresh capital. Commentators (e.g. Frank and 
Goyal, 2003) have pointed out that high growth companies that have high financial 
needs are likely to end up with a high proportion of debt. The explanation offered for 
their argument is that managers will be unwilling to issue equity and may therefore 
depend on debt for its activities. This assumption however challenges earlier 
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literature (e.g. Barclays, Morellec and Smith, 2001) which demonstrate that high 
growth firms make use of less debt. Myers (2001) did point out that debt finance 
constitutes the bulk of external finance in capital formation. 
   
3.6.1. Empirical Studies of POT 
 
Existing scholarly works on POT seeks to test the applicability of the theory as to 
whether firms finance their investment by following the order postulated by this 
theory. For instance, Seifert and Gonenc (2008) examined the existence of the 
pecking order theory in four major countries (UK, US, Japan and Germany). While 
their results from Japan were consistent with the POT mainly during the 1980s and 
the early parts of the 1990s, the results from the other three remaining countries were 
not consistent with the pecking order hypothesis. During the latter part of their study 
however, Seifert and Gonenc (2008) observed that the evidence for the pecking order 
model among Japanese was diminished, because of less restrictions on equity issues, 
coupled with enhanced investors’ rights, thereby encouraging dependence on other 
funds rather than retained earnings.  
Other notable empirical works in Europe and the US (e.g. Beattie et al. 2006; Benito, 
2003; Lemmon and Zender, 2002) have also found evidence for the pecking order 
hypothesis.  In contrast to the above results, in their investigation into the existence 
of the pecking order model among some US companies, Frank and Goyal (2003) 
noted that equity financing is not dominated by debt financing.  Despite the fact that 
equity finance is seen as more expensive than debt finance due to the relative risk of 
the two sources of finance, firms may still resort to equity finance, especially where 
there is the existence of a high level of finance risk due to the substantial level of 
previously existing debt. Also, in some cases financial lenders may require assets to 
be used as collateral for the acquisition of debt finance and in the absence of such 
collateral, firms will have no other choice than to resort to equity finance. 
Fama and French (2002) also tested both the pecking order and static theories using 
system equations and found out that firms that are profitable and those with new 
investments have higher dividend payouts. They further noted that firms that are 
more profitable are less geared. The result of Fama and French (2002) was in line 
with the predictions of both models. It must however be pointed out that profitable 
firms could still have lower levels of dividend payment and not higher payments as 
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observed by Fama and French (2002), especially where there is the need for funds to 
finance new investment opportunities. Big projects could require large amounts of 
funds and where a firm wishes to reduce its dependency on external funds, there is 
the likelihood that the level of dividend payment will be reduced in order to channel 
a greater proportion of the available earnings into such investments opportunities. 
 
Other scholarly works include Ang, Fatemi and Tourani-Rad (1997), who  
investigated the capital structure and dividend policies among some listed Indonesian 
firms and noted that firms prefer internally generated funds to other sources of funds. 
This is consistent with the pecking order theory. However, no evidence was found 
regarding the problem of information asymmetry as firms were prepared to make 
more information available publicly.  
 
In trying to establish whether the pecking order model or the trade-off explains a 
firm’s financing decision, Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) concluded that the trade-
off theory can be rejected and that the pecking order theory has a much better time-
series explanatory power than trade-off theory in terms of testing the statistical 
power of alternative hypotheses. The general consensus is that each of the theories of 
capital structure describes some financial pattern among firms. Fama and French 
(2002) showed in their research that both the pecking order and trade-off theories 
explain some of firms’ financing behaviour and for that, none of them can be 
rejected. 
 
Furthermore, Helwege and Liang (1996) also tested the presence of the pecking 
order theory among US companies that went public in the year 1983. The pecking–
order hypothesis predicts that firms will resort to the use external funds, once they 
have exhausted any available internal funds. Helwege and Liang (1996) found out 
that firms that generate surplus funds do not resort to the external market for any 
additional funds as predicted by the theory. However, firms do not seek external 
funds just because of a shortfall in internal funds but may be due to other reasons. 
Those firms that were investigated did not appear to follow the pecking–order model 
laid down by its proponents. The evidence from this study indicated that firms were 
prepared to issue equity finance, regardless of the availability of debt and that the 
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presence of information asymmetry was not seen as an engine for the reliance on 
debt finance. 
 
Similarly, Baskin (1989) examined the pecking order model and observed that the 
payments of higher dividends diminish the amount of the retained earnings and 
consequently, increase the demand for debt. It is important to note that there is a 
close relationship between dividend payment and the retained earnings available for 
investment. Thus, higher dividend payment could lead to less funds being available 
for investment purposes. Consequently, debt may be sought to support any 
investment project. This situation leads to a negative relationship between dividend 
payment and the amount of funds available for investment purposes. Similar to the 
above empirical studies, Donaldson (1961) noted that management was strongly in 
favour of internally generated funds and will only resort to debt finance when the 
retained earnings is not sufficient for their investment activities. This shows a 
consistency with the pecking order theory. Norton (1989) also found a similar result.    
 
3.6.2. Limitation of POT 
 
The POT is among the very few capital structural theories that have received a lot of 
support. However, a greater proportion of the study in testing this theory has been 
based on the developed economies (e.g. Seifert and Gonenc, 2008; Beattie et al. 
2006; Benito, 2003; Lemmon and Zender, 2002), with very limited study from the 
developing ones. Thus, the applicability of this theory in the developing economies 
is not well known. It must be emphasized here that dissimilarities in the institutional 
structures of both the developing and the developed economies could affect the 
applicability of this theory across the globe. Despite the popularity of this theory in 
explaining the financing patterns among firms, the POT has failed to give 
explanations of certain regularities in capital structure. For instance, in a study of the 
pecking order theory using managers from South Korea, Ang and Jung (1993) 
pointed out that firms prefer bank loans to internal funds, despite the presence of 
asymmetric information. A similar result was also obtained by Ang et al. (1997) who 
concluded on the evidence obtained from investigating the capital structure of 
Indonesian firms that firms do not rely on internally generated funds because of the 
issue of information asymmetry and that firm may still strongly prefer internal funds 
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even in the absence of information asymmetry. Their results therefore do not wholly 
support the pecking order theory put forward by Myer (1984). Along similar lines, 
Vasiliou and Daskalakis (2009) found no evidence of the pecking order theory 
among Greek firms. This clearly indicates inconsistencies in the argument of the 
pecking order hypothesis and that Myers pecking order model may not always hold 
despite the presence of information asymmetry. 
 
Minton and Wruck (2001) have also pointed out that firms seek credit from the 
capital market even when they have not fully utilized their internally generated 
funds. Under the pecking order hypothesis, firms will only turn their attention to 
external funds (debt) after utilising all the internally generated earnings. Minton and 
Wruck (2001) are however of the view that firms will seek debt when even all 
internally generated earnings have not been fully consumed. This argument 
contradicts the prediction of the POT where one would expect all internally 
generated funds to be used before seeking external finance.  
 
In their study of the pecking order theory in providing an account of the financing 
pattern among American companies between 1971 and 1998, Frank and Goyal 
(2003) pointed out that American publicly traded companies in the 1980s and 1990s 
do not match the evidence postulated by Myers in 2001. Frank and Goyal (2003) 
further observed that the pecking order hypothesis is much more evident in the 
financing behaviour of large firms rather than small ones.  Smart et al. (2007) also 
observe that the pecking order theory fails to take into consideration the effects that 
bankruptcy costs, tax and issuance of security cost have on the amount of debt a firm 
uses. Another empirical weakness of this model observed by Frank and Goyal (2009) 
is that tangibility and the role of firm size in debt-equity choice do not flow clearly 
from the fundamental logic of this theory.  
Like other theories of capital structure, the pecking order model does not provide an 
explanation for the overall financing behaviour among firms. This has contributed to 
a new way of looking at the capital structure decisions among firms by incorporating 
issues of credit supply, which has not been given attention by followers of the 
pecking order and the trade-off models. 
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3.7. Free Cash Flow Theory of Capital Structure 
  
In 1986, Jensen propounded the free cash flow theory. Jensen (1986) argued that 
unless the excess cash flow in a company is given back to its investors, managers are 
motivated to cause their firms to grow further than their optimal size by spending 
greatly on activities or projects, even though such projects might yield negative 
NPV.  Since all shareholders cannot be involved in the management of the firm, the 
day-to-day management of the firm is left in the hands of management (agents). 
Managers are therefore expected to make decisions aimed at maximizing the wealth 
of the shareholders. However, the interest and objectives of management may differ 
from that of the shareholders of the firm. Managers could conduct their activities to 
their own advantage and may spend the resources of the firm for their personal 
happiness at the expense of the wealth maximization of shareholders. This conflict of 
interest has been identified as one of the main factors giving rise to the agency 
problem.  
 
Excessive cash under management control could widen the divergence of interest of 
managers and shareholders. Therefore, the increase in leverage entails financial 
discipline in managers and thwarts pointless investments, due to the fact that 
creditors require their scheduled payments such as interest payment and demand any 
free cash flow that is available to the company and keeping the company slim and 
cost-efficient. In other words, the use of debt ensures that less funds are made 
available to management to engage in any venture that is not in line with the interest 
of the owners of the firm (Kayo and Kimura, 2011; Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti, 
2006; Grossman and Hart, 1982; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Creditors will have 
the firm declared bankrupt if it is not able to meet its debt obligations and 
management and it is likely to face legal action. In view of this, Grossman and Hart 
(1982) stated that if bankruptcy is expensive for the managers for the reason that 
they may lose the opportunity of control and reputation as well as the loss of salaries, 
then a rise in the level of debt could coerce managers to generate the needed cash 
flows to meet interest debt repayments. This decreases the probability of 
management engaging in extreme empire building. The use of debt also ensures that 
firm managers work as hard as possible to meet the interest commitment required by 
creditors (Ryen et al. 1997). Similarly, Gaud et al. (2007) observed that the use of 
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debt places constraints on managers regarding the payout of cash. Therefore, apart 
from the tax advantage derived from debt as explained by the trade-off hypothesis, 
the free cash flow theory believes that the use of debt helps in the reduction of the 
agency problem and this encourages managers to act in the best of shareholders. 
 
3.7.1. Empirical Studies of the Free Cash Flow Theory 
 
Scholarly works testing Jensen’s theory include Miguel and Pindado (2001) who 
examined how ownership concentration reduces the free cash flow problem by using 
data from 133 Spanish companies. They concluded that low ownership concentration 
reduces the negative impact of free cash flow compared to high ownership 
concentration. According to them, firms with highly concentrated ownership tend to 
have greater incentives to control managers. For this reason, these firms need to 
issue less debt in order to prevent managers from carrying out investment projects 
with a negative NPV.   
Gul (2001) also examined the explanatory power of the free cash flow theory in 
managers’ choice of FIFO versus LIFO in inventory management. The relationship 
between free cash flow and the choice of inventory methods is based on the idea that 
there is a possible conflict of interest between shareholders and firm managers when 
LIFO is the tax minimization method. Non-value maximising managers of firms 
with the free cash flow problem are motivated to select the FIFO inventory method 
(an income increasing method) in order to boost their compensation. Nonetheless, 
since debt serves as a monitoring device and reduces the agency problem as argued 
by Jensen’s free cash flow hypothesis, using data from 88 US firms, Gul (2001) 
demonstrated that managers of firms with high free cash flow are less likely to 
choose FIFO than managers of firms that have low debt and high free cash flow. 
Another empirical testing of the free cash flow theory is that of Kallapur (1994). 
Using data from 112 large, mature NYSE firms, Kallapur (1994) examined whether 
on average firms suffer from the free cash flow problem. Kallapur (1994) based this 
study on the idea that with the presence of the free cash flow problem, earning 
response coefficients depend positively on payout ratios. This is because rather than 
earnings being wastefully retained, shareholders prefer it to be paid as dividends. 
Kallapur (1994) concluded that there is a positive relationship between earning 
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response coefficients (ERCs) and payout ratios as predicted by the free cash flow 
hypothesis. 
 
3.7.2. Limitation of the Free Cash Flow Theory 
 
While the use of debt has been seen as a way of dealing with the agency problem 
between management and shareholders (Jensen, 1986), it must be pointed out that 
the excessive use of debt could have detrimental effects on the operations of a firm. 
These effects include the inability to meet financial commitments (e.g. interest 
payments) as they fall due which leads to serious implications on the survival of the 
firm. Booth et al. (2001) argued that the use of risky debt could give rise to creditors 
having a share in a firm’s profitable investment returns, in so doing hauling out some 
of the NPV. In view of this, shareholders may even forego positive investment 
opportunities. Although debt restrains management from undertaking certain 
unhelpful activities, it is important that managers do not employ debt at level that 
could put the future of their firms into doubt.  
  
 
3.8.   Market Timing Theory of Capital Structure 
 
Baker and Wurgler (2002) have also propounded a new theory of capital structure 
known as market timing theory, which looks at the effects that the timing of the 
market has on the capital structure. The theory assumes that the existing capital 
structure is the cumulative effects of past attempts to time the equity market. Baker 
and Wurgler (2002) argue that both the long term leverage ratio and market-to-book 
ratio are correlated and that firms that have low leverage raise capital when their 
equity valuations are high and conversely firms with high leverage raise capital when 
their equity valuations (market-to-book ratios) are low. According to Baker and 
Wugler (2002), market timing means that new shares are issued by companies when 
they perceive that they are overvalued and that companies repurchase own shares 
when they consider these to be undervalued. Baker and Wurgler (2002) 
demonstrated that the effect of market timing on capital structure is very persistent. 
Using an earnings based evaluation model, Elliott, Koeter-Kant and Warr (2008) 
asserted that firms can lower their cost of equity by successful timing of the equity 
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market and this ensures that existing shareholders benefit at the expense of new 
equity holders.   
3.8.1. Empirical Studies of the Market Timing Theory 
 
Among those who have conducted studies in testing the validity of this theory are 
Elliott, Koeter-Kant and Warr (2007) who tested the effects of market timing on how 
firms finance their funding deficit. Elliott et al. (2007) concluded that there is the 
high possibility that firms with overvalued equity will issue equity to deal with the 
financial deficit than their counterparts that are undervalued.  In a similar vein, 
Mahajan and Tartaroglu (2008) studied the market timing model and observed that 
leverage in most of the countries studied was negatively correlated to the historical 
market-to-book ratio. They further established that with the exception of Japan, all 
other countries studied revealed that after the issuance of equity, firms do rebalance 
their capital fully. This result however questions the market timing model which rule 
out the issue of firms rebalancing their capital structure in relation to short-term 
shocks such as equity market timing attempts. 
 
 
3.9. Summary and Conclusion on Theories of Capital Structure 
 
This chapter has provided an account of the various theoretical models explaining 
the capital structure policy among firms. Certainly, since  celebrated paper of M and 
M (1958), the issue of capital structure has received a huge amount of attention from 
different quarters in the academic arena aimed at finding a coherent explanation 
regarding the factors that influence firms’ choice of capital structure. There are 
several theoretical differences among the various models of capital structure. Earlier 
on, M and M (1958) demonstrated that capital structure decision has no effect on the 
value of the firm and for that matter, a firm can make use of any type of finance. A 
subsequent study by M and M (1963) however demonstrated that by relaxing some 
of the assumptions of the irrelevance theory, the debt-equity mix can influence the 
value of the firm. Unarguably, M and M (1958) irrelevance theory did set the pace 
for the study of capital structure policy among firms and eventually influenced the 
development of other well-known theories including the pecking order, the trade-off, 
the free cash flow and the market timing theories. Yet, the irrelevance theory has 
been subjected to considerable criticism. In his speech to the American Finance 
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Association in 1984 where the pecking order model was first presented, Myer (1984) 
observed that firms finance their investment activities by first using internally 
generated funds before resorting to debt and equity as a last resort.  
 
At the other extreme, the trade-off model also assumes that there are costs and 
benefits associated with the use of debt and that value-maximizing firms must 
choose an optimal capital structure that trades off the marginal benefits and costs of 
debt. Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow model also observes that unless the excess cash 
flow in a company is given back to its investors, managers (acting as agents of 
stakeholders) can pursue actions that enable firms to grow further than their optimal 
size by spending greatly on activities or projects that might yield a negative NPV. 
Alternatively, the market timing model also believes that the existing capital 
structure is the cumulative effects of past attempts to time the equity market. Limited 
number of these theories appears to have many advocates. The pecking order model 
and the trade off theory tend to have the popular support (Seifert and Gonenc 2008). 
However, no single theory of capital structure has been successful in providing a 
broad explanation for the financing behaviour among firms. Each of these theories 
provides a unique explanation of financing behaviour of firms. 
  
Despite the numerous pieces of studies that have been conducted in testing the 
capital structural theories, there is no consensus regarding the superiority of any of 
these theories. Firms’ financing decisions continue to be a puzzle and difficult to 
test. The debate and search for an optimal capital structure therefore continues. The 
primary concern of the present study expands upon this general understanding of 
capital structure policy by exploring the concept from the perspective of SSA where 
empirical study on the subject is extremely limited.   
Across these different theoretical perspectives, a growing number of studies observe 
that financial managers do not just make decisions on the type of capital to use but 
rather are influenced by certain factors. What are these factors and to what extent do 
these factors influence the choice of capital sources? An attempt is made in the next 
sections to find answers to these questions by examining the firm- and country-level 
determinants of capital structure. 
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3.10. Determinants of Capital Structure 
 
The previous section examines various theories of capital structure. Corporate 
finance literature (e.g. Joeveer, 2013; Sheikh and Wang, 2011; Frank and Goyal, 
2009; Chen, 2004; Deesomsak et al. 2004) has demonstrated a link between various 
firm or country level factors and leverage. This section therefore focuses on firm-
level and country–level determinants of capital structure.  
 
3.11. Firm-level Determinants of Capital Structure 
 
Scholarly works (e.g. Joeveer, 2013; Sheikh and Wang, 2011; Dawood et al. 2011; 
Zou and Xiao, 2006; Chen, 2004; Wiwattanakantang, 1999; Harris and Raviv, 1991) 
observe that theories of capital structure and their empirical tests have yielded a 
reasonably comprehensive set of features (e.g. profitability; tax rate; asset tangibility; 
firm size; firm growth; earnings volatility) that influence the financing decisions of 
firms. In the light of this, I examine the various firm-level factors
26
 that underline the 
financing decisions of firms. 
 
3.11.1. Earning Volatility   
Under the trade-off hypothesis, firms which have high inconsistency in earnings 
have a greater risk of not being able to meet their debt commitments. Such firms are 
likely to encounter situations where cash flow may be too low which increases the 
probability of failure to pay their creditors and meet other financial commitments. In 
a situation where bankruptcy costs are higher, a rise in volatility of earnings (proxy 
for firm risk) leads to a decrease in a company’s debt ratio. De Angelo (1980) 
observed that the cost of debt is high for companies whose earnings are variable as a 
result of the fact that investors can predict with less accuracy their future earnings 
based on the information that is available publicly. Building on the above argument, 
Titman (1984) observed that stakeholders’ fear of bankruptcy places limitations on 
the amount of debt that a company may be willing to take on. In most cases, 
financial lenders are reluctant to extend any meaningful financial help to firms with 
earnings volatility due to the fear of default. Thus, firms with a high degree of risk 
are less likely to use much debt (Bradley, Jarrel and Kim, 1984; Kim and Sorensen, 
                                            
26 Due to data limitation, only six of the firm-level factors discussed below were tested in this thesis. 
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1986; Wiwattanakantang, 1999 and Johnson, 1997). Other studies that also suggest 
an inverse relationship between earnings volatility and debt include Titman and 
Wessels (1988); MacKie-Mason (1990); Kim, Mauer and Sherman (1998).  
Notwithstanding the above studies, a number of other empirical studies (e.g. 
Esperance et al. 2003; Michaelas et al. 1999; Jordan, Lowe and Tylor 1998) have 
indicated a positive relationship between risk and debt ratio. The assumption here is 
that firms with earning volatility employ more or additional debt to invest in other 
business operation to ensure stability in earnings. Thus, the relationship between 
earnings volatility and leverage remains mixed.   
 
3.11.2. Size of the Firm  
 
Various scholarly works have demonstrated a link between firm size and leverage. 
Nonetheless, the relationship between firm size and leverage seems to be unclear. 
The traditional argument is that larger companies are more diversified than smaller 
ones and for that matter, large companies have less variability in earnings, thus 
enabling them to cope with higher debt ratios. This argument supports the view of 
the  trade-off model. In this case, a positive relationship is expected between size and 
leverage (Voutsinas and Werner, 2011; Frank and Goyal, 2009; Salawu, 2007; Smart 
et al., 2007; Cheng and Shiu, 2007; Zou and Xiao, 2006; Bancel and Mitto, 2004; 
Korajczyk and Levy, 2003; Frank and Goyal, 2003; Wald, 1999 ; Castanias, 1983; 
DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980) 
 
The role of a firm’s size in the determinant of capital structure has also been 
recognized by Rajan and Zingales (1995), who pointed out that firm size and the 
possibility of default are likely to have an inverse correlation. The larger the firm, the 
less the likelihood of default and therefore, bigger firms would be expected to use 
more debt than smaller firms. Normally larger firms have a huge asset base that 
could even be relied upon by financial lenders in case of default. Larger companies 
are therefore more likely to be able to repay debt more easily and also less likely to 
fail than smaller firms. This is empirically supported by Cassar and Holmes (2003), 
whose investigation of 1555 Australian firms revealed a positive correlation between 
debt ratio and firm size. Also, Baner (2004) looked at the capital structure practices 
of some listed firms in selected Eastern European countries. His findings revealed a 
positive relationship between firm size and leverage. In addition, Qian, Tian and 
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Wirjanto (2009) investigated the determinants of capital structure of publicly 
Chinese listed firms and found a positive relationship between a firm’s size and 
leverage.    
 
Several other empirical studies have shown a positive relationship between a firm’s 
size and debt (Hovakimian, Hovakimian and Tehranian, 2004; Abor, 2008; Kim et 
al. 1998; Barton, Ned and Sundaram, 1989). Friend and Lang (1988) pointed out that 
managers of larger firms are more likely to influence debt ratios in protecting their 
own interest in the company due to the diluted ownership of such large firms, thus 
limiting ownership control over managerial decisions. Since debt has no effect on the 
dilution of ownership, firm managers who wish to limit ownership control and any 
other influence will employ debt rather than issuing equity. It must be pointed out 
here that there are limits to how far this argument can be taken due to the fact that 
although debt holders do not dilute the ownership concentration of a firm, they  
could enter into some sort of restrictive covenant with firms. This restricts future 
financing decisions of such firms. These restrictions are important in helping firms 
meet their interest payments and avoid increasing the riskiness of any existing debt. 
Equally, financial lenders use restrictive covenants to ensure that loans are used for 
the stated purpose. Therefore, debt does not fully enable firm managers to protect 
their interest as proposed by Friend and Lang (1988) but could also exert control 
over managerial decisions. 
 
Bevan and Danbolt (2002) noted that larger firms are more likely to have a better 
credit rating than smaller firms and for that reason, larger firms have access to 
financing from non-banking sources, which are normally unavailable to smaller 
firms. Notwithstanding the above studies, Rajan and Zingales (1995) observed that 
in Germany, larger firms tend to have less debt than expected. One may argue that 
the larger the firm, the greater the possibility of generating internal funds that are 
sufficient to support business operations, thus leading to an inverse correlation 
between firm size and debt.  
Similarly, Chen (2004) observed a negative relationship between size and long-term 
debt among Chinese firms and argued that the inverse relationship between size and 
the long-term debt could be attributed to large Chinese firms having a better 
reputation, thus enabling them to gain access to equity finance. Wiwattanakantang 
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(1999) holds the view that information about larger firms is made more available to 
the public than information from smaller firms. The various regulatory frameworks 
in most countries ensure that larger firms periodically make certain vital information 
available to the public. This reduces the problem of information asymmetry as 
suggested by the pecking–order model and therefore favours the use of equity 
finance by these large firms. This leads to an inverse relationship between size and 
amount of debt used.   
 
Pike and Neale (2006) also pointed out those smaller firms which do not over-
depend on debt capital, are by and large forced to do so due to their inability to raise 
equity financing. Most of the smaller firms are unable to meet the requirement 
needed to be listed on the stock market and as such, they are forced to depend on 
debt for their business operations.   
Whilst some studies including Cassar and Holmes (2003), Baner (2004) observed a 
positive relationship between firm size and leverage, others including Rajan and 
Zingales (1995 and Chen (2004) rather questions the logic behind this and thus claim 
a negative relationship between firm size and leverage. It is therefore striking to 
observe that the effect of a firm’s size on leverage remains tentative. It is however 
important to note that financial lenders often consider small firms to be more risky 
than large firms. This is a particular issue for newer firms, which may not have got 
established track records and sufficient quality assets to serve as security for loans, 
thus making the acquisition of debt capital difficult.   
 
3.11.3. Tangibility (Asset Structure) 
 
Extensive literature exists on the relationship between asset tangibility and leverage. 
For instance, Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984) observed that firms with more tangible 
asset are more likely to have higher financial leverage. This is based on the fact that 
such firms can borrow at cheaper interest rates if such debt is secured against the 
assets. Equivalently, the trade off theory suggests that firms with tangible assets tend 
to use such asset as collateral so that lenders could rely on the assets in case of 
financial distress. Williamson (1988) takes the above argument a step further by 
observing that tangible assets reduce lenders’ risk as lenders are protected from the 
moral hazard that arises as a result of default. In line with this, Frank and Goyal 
70 
 
(2009) commented that tangible assets are easier to value than intangible assets, thus 
leading to a reduction in expected distress cost.  
In a similar line of argument, Wiwattanakantang (1999) maintained that firms that 
are unable to provide assets as collateral when borrowing are subjected more 
stringent lending conditions than firms that provide collateral. Along similar lines, 
Cheng and Shiu (2007) also claimed that the asset base is crucial in the acquisition of 
long-term debt, especially in countries where there is an absence of good creditor 
protection. In spite of the above findings, Chakraborty (2010) observed that studies 
from some developing economies tend to produce mixed findings between 
tangibility and leverage. In his study of listed firms in some Eastern European 
countries, Baner (2004) found a negative relationship between tangibility and 
leverage.   
 
3.11.4. Tax rate 
 
M and M (1963) argued that firms that have large tax liability are expected to make 
use of debt to gain advantage in the deductibility of interest payments. The tax 
advantage ensures that the firms’ tax commitments reduce and thereby make more 
profit available to shareholders. Therefore, a positive relationship is expected 
between tax and debt. In line with this, Ross, Westerfield, Jordan and Firer (2001) 
pointed out that a high tax rate serve as an incentive to borrow more. Other studies 
(e.g. Frank and Goyal, 2003; Graham and Harvey, 2001) have revealed a similar 
result.  
In their study of the capital structure of firms, Barakat and Roa (2004) observed that 
firms in taxed countries use more debt than firms in un-taxed countries (e.g. Saudi 
Arabia and Jordan). Other empirical works (e.g. MacKie-Mason, 1990) have 
however given different views regarding the positive relationship between tax and 
leverage. Using discrete choice analysis in studying the incremental financing 
decision of firms, MacKie-Mason (1990) observed that numerous firms failed to 
show significant effects on tax behaviour due to that fact that debt-equity ratios are 
the cumulative outcome of separate decisions of years and most tax shields have an 
insignificant effect on the marginal tax rate for most companies. Likewise, Graham 
(1999) noted that in general, taxes have some effects on the financing policy of 
firms, however the degree of the influence is mostly not so pronounced. 
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Generally, while the tax rate is seen as one of the important firm-level features in 
influencing capital structure, it is important to note that the degree by which taxation 
influence firms in their capital structure decision may vary from one country to the 
other due to the differences in the tax system. Thus, a good understanding of the tax 
system in the context in which the firms operate is crucial in understanding the 
impact of tax on debt-equity choice. For instance, some economies in SSA grant 
various tax incentives to their listed companies in order to help the growth of their 
exchanges. Ghana for instance grants fifteen years of tax incentives for firms listed 
on the Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE). Consequently, a rise in corporate tax may 
encourage firms to go public, leading to an increase in equity capital.   
 
3.11.5. Profitability of the Firm 
  
The pecking order theory postulates that firms with high profits will be expected to 
maintain a minimal debt ratio since they can generate internal income to finance 
their activities. Consequently, a negative relationship is expected between firm 
profitability and leverage (Sheikh and Wang, 2011; Zou and Xiao, 2006; Chen and 
Strange, 2005; Hall et al. 2004; Cassar and Holmes, 2003; Fama and French, 2002; 
Myers, 2001; Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999; Wiwattanakantang, 1999; Barton, 
Ned and Sundaram, 1989; Titman and Wessels, 1988). The trade-off theory however 
suggests a positive relationship between profitability and leverage due to the tax 
shield on interest the payment derived from the use of debt (Pike and Neale, 2006; 
Tong and Green, 2005; Frank and Goyal, 2003; Ooi 1999). It could also be argued 
that profitable firms are more attractive to financial lenders due to having a lower 
risk of financial distress and are therefore more likely to take on much debt than less 
profitable firms. Fama and French (2002) also argued that profitable firms with large 
investment commitments are likely to have a high leverage level, especially when 
investments are larger than earnings. In general, there is no conclusive evidence on 
the relationship between profitability and leverage despite the numerous theoretical 
and empirical works. Whereas the tax-based theories suggest a positive relationship, 
the pecking-order suggests otherwise.   
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3.11.6. Growth Opportunities 
 
The pecking order model predicts a positive relationship between growth 
opportunities and leverage (Kayo and Kimura, 2011). In a similar vein, Cheng and 
Shiu (2007) concluded that firms that have growth opportunities utilize more 
liabilities in general. Thus, firms with a higher growth potential but that have 
inadequate internal cash flow will require more funds. According to the pecking 
order model, firms employ more debt to finance growth opportunities since 
managers avoid issuing new shares due to the presence of information asymmetry 
(Chakraborty, 2010; Cespedes  et al. 2010; Salawu, 2007; Zou and Xiao, 2006; 
Booth et al. 2001; Rajan and Zingales, 1995). However, in their study of the Chinese 
listed firms, Huang and Song (2002) found no evidence that firms with good growth 
prospects have a high leverage ratio. This is in line with the agency theory that 
predicts an inverse relationship between growth opportunities and leverage (Kayo 
and Kimura 2011).  
Consequently, the empirical findings on the relationship between leverage and 
growth are either positive or negative. The general consensus is that firms that 
generate enough profit and have large growth opportunities are expected to finance 
this with internally generated funds, since it is always cheaper to do so than to 
borrow from outside. On the other hand, firms with growth opportunities that have 
less retained earnings may have to depend on externally generated funds to finance 
such opportunities. 
 
3.11.7. Government Ownership 
 
Empirical works establish that a government owning a large percentage of the equity 
share in a firm is a positive indication to financial lenders of the company’s 
guaranteed solvency. This, points to a positive correlation between government 
control and debt, as lenders would supposedly be prepared to lend more to such a 
firm (Harris and Raviv, 1991; Frank and Goyal, 2003).  
In China for instance, scholarly evidence (i.e. Huang and Song, 2002) observed that 
the government was the biggest controlling shareholder in most listed Chinese firms. 
In the view of that, such companies were less probable to go into any financial 
difficulties than their counterparts that are privately owned. It is important to note 
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that financial lenders will be more than happy to lend to such government-owned 
firms because of their guaranteed solvency. Debts that are granted to governments 
are seen as more secured as governments can easily raise money to defray such 
debts, even in case of economic difficulty. Despite the fact that the government of 
China owns a large percentage of shares in most Chinese firms, Chen (2004) found a 
negative relationship between government control and debt. The absence of a 
properly developed financial market and better regulations for protecting 
bondholders would mean that creditors are not willing to lend to firms in China even 
if such firms are largely controlled by the government. In their study of taxed and 
non-taxed Arab economies, Barakat and Rao (2004) did not find any evidence that 
government ownership is a significant determinant of corporate debt. 
 
3.11.8. Managerial Ownership 
The role of managerial ownership in debt-equity choice is also well noted in 
literature (e.g. Wiwattanakantang, 1999). Different managements may have different 
attitude towards risk. For instance, risk-averse managers may tend to employ funding 
strategies that reduce the overall financial risk of their firm. Debt finance poses a 
greater risk to firms as debt commitments must be met to avoid the firm being 
declared bankrupt. In this case, less debt may be employed by risk-averse managers.  
Furthermore, firms that have concentrated ownership are unwilling to share control 
rights with others and therefore rely on debt rather than the issuance of equity to 
avoid the dilution of control. Wiwattanakantang (1999) noted that owner-managers 
of family businesses are not willing to issue equity and therefore depend on debt for 
all business operations in order to prevent the dilution of the families’ controlling 
power. In his study of international joint ventures in Ghana, Boateng (2004) built on 
the above discussion and argued that managements’ desire to maintain control of 
their firms ensures that in making capital structure decisions, debt is favoured against 
equity, even if the cost does not favour the use of debt so as to avoid any influence 
from the equity investors.  
Related to the above is the observation reported by Cespedes, Gonzalez and Molina 
(2010) who conducted a study in the capital structure of Latin American firms. Their 
results indicated debt levels similar to firms in the US. In relation to the US, Latin 
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American firms enjoy lower tax benefits and experience higher bankruptcy costs. 
Therefore, firms in Latin America would be expected to employ a lower level of 
debt. Cespedes et al. (2010) however contended that one of the reasons for the 
presence of the heavy use of debt among firms in Latin America is the unwillingness 
to issue equity in order to avoid sharing control rights. In conclusion, available 
empirical evidence suggests a positive relationship between managerial ownership 
and leverage.  
3.11.9. Uniqueness of a Firm’s Product 
 
Various attempts have been made to establish the relationship between uniqueness 
and debt-equity choice (e.g. Chakraborty, 2010). Firms which offer unique products 
or services tend to have their customers and other related groups experience 
reasonably high costs  in a situation where there is a liquidation, thus increasing its 
bankruptcy cost. Less debt is therefore expected to be employed by such firms to 
avoid experiencing any financial distress which could have serious detrimental 
impacts on their future operations. Theoretically, a negative relationship is expected 
between leverage and uniqueness (Titman, 1984; Chang, Lee and Lee, 2009). It 
could be argued that firms that provide unique services or products can have a very 
high demand for their products or services and for that matter may require more 
funds in order to expand so as to meet the expected demand. Therefore, in this 
situation, a positive relationship will be expected between uniqueness and leverage 
level.   
3.11.10. Dividend Policy of Firm 
 
The debt-equity choice of a firm can also be determined by the dividend policy of 
that firm. Adedeji (1998) and Baskin (1989) argued that there is a positive 
relationship between dividend pay-out and debt. A firm that pays out a generous 
dividend will mean that there will be lower retained earnings available for 
investment. The firm will therefore resort to the use of debt if any investment 
opportunity comes up that requires resources greater than the retained earnings. This 
is consistent with the prediction of the pecking order hypothesis (Salawu, 2007).  
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3.11.11. Age of the Firm 
 
As a firm continues in operation, it is seen as an ongoing business and for that 
reason, its ability to take on more debt is enhanced. It is obvious that any responsible 
lender will be much more prepared to extend financial assistance to a firm that has 
been in operation for a considerable longer period than a firm that has not been in 
business for long or has no track record. Being in business for a longer period is seen 
as a guaranteed solvency. Therefore, age and debt are said to be positively related 
(Abor, 2008). According to Diamond (1989), aged companies which have an 
extensive credit history will have a comparatively low default possibility and smaller 
agency costs in using debt financing than companies that are newly established.  
Hall, Hutchinson and Michaelas (2004) however argued that there is an inverse 
relationship between age and debt. To them, firms that have not been in business for 
long may not have accumulated enough capital for investment opportunities and for 
that matter, may be forced to borrow more from outside to finance investment 
opportunities.   
It is worth mentioning here that lenders may be prepared to extend financial 
assistance to newly established firms, especially in situations where those firms are 
deemed to have bright future prospects. Thus, even in the absence of an extensive 
credit history, newly formed firms may still have access to a considerable amount of 
debt finance for their operations. From the above discussion, it is clear that there is a 
positive relationship between age and leverage. Older firms with better established 
track records stand a better chance of securing debt finance than newly established 
ones with in sufficient track records. There are however exceptional situations where 
younger firms show a positive relationship with debt (Hall et al., 2004).   
 
3.11.12. Liquidity 
 
The pecking-order theory predicts a negative relationship between liquidity and 
leverage since firms with greater liquidity prefer to use internal earnings rather than 
external funds so as to protect shareholders against the interests of debt holders. On 
the other hand, the trade-off theory predicts a positive relationship between liquidity 
and leverage since firms with greater liquidity have the ability to meet their debt 
obligations on time (Deesomsak et al., 2004; Sheikh and Wang, 2011). 
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3.12. Implications of Firm-level Factors and Leverage 
 
Table 3.1 summaries the implications of the above firm-level factors on leverage as 
postulated by various theories of capital structure. 
 
Table 3. 1: Firm-Level Factors and their relationship with leverage 
 
Firm-Level 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign 
Theory Empirical Evidence 
 
Volatility 
 
+ 
 
Trade-off 
Sheikh and Wang (2011), 
Bradley et al. (1984) 
─ Agency Titman and Wessels (1988); 
 
Firm Size 
+ Trade-off Barton et al. (1989) 
─ Pecking order Titman and Wessel (1988) 
 
Asset Tangibility 
 
+ 
Trade-off and 
pecking order 
Chung (1993) 
Profitability + Trade-off Dammon and Senbet (1988) 
─ Pecking order Friend and Lang (1988) 
 
Growth 
+ Pecking order Deesomsak et al (2004) 
─ Agency  
Trade-off 
Sheikh and Wang (2011), 
 
Liquidity 
+ Trade-off De Jong et al. (2008) 
─ Pecking order Sheikh and Wang (2011), 
Viviani (2008) 
 
 
3.13. Summary and Conclusion on Firm-level Determinants 
 
This section of the thesis has given an account of the intrinsic firm characteristics 
that are vital in explaining capital structure policy among firms. It has been 
demonstrated that firms’ choice of particular funds depend on various circumstances. 
Available theoretical and scholarly evidence suggests that it is not easy to give a 
definitive answer as to the exact effects of these firm-level factors on debt-equity 
choice. Still, this thesis seeks to understand the manner in which these firms-level 
features affect firms from the perspective of SSA, particularly whether the outcomes 
of studies in the developed economies are also applicable in less developed ones. 
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One thing that needs to be pointed out is that so far, most studies on the determinants 
of capital structural practices of firms (particularly from the context of SSA) have 
focused mainly on these firm-level characteristics. These features have been found 
across countries and the degree to which they affect firms’ financing decision may 
differ from country to the country due to institutional differences.  The next section 
examines some of the country-level factors that underline debt-equity choice of 
firms.    
 
3.14. Country-Level Determinants of Capital Structure  
  
In the preceding section, I have examined firm-level factors that are vital in the 
determination of firm’s capital structure. Indeed, the importance of institutions in 
shaping both human and economic activities (including financial decisions of firms) 
is evident in the literature (Julian and Ofori-Dankwa, 2013;Faria and Mauro, 2009; 
Wan, 2005; Co, 2004). However, so far, the analysis of the determinant of debt-
equity choice has focused mainly on firm-level characteristics with very little 
attention on country-level factors (Gungoraydinoglu and Oztekin, 2011). Different 
countries have different institutional structures and other socio-economic features, 
and these features account for differences in debt-equity choice of firms, especially 
in cross-country comparisons. For instance, Deesomsak et al. (2004) contended that 
a firm’s own characteristics are not the only determinants of a firm’s capital structure 
but also the result of the legal structure, the institutional environment and the 
corporate governance of the country in which the firm operates. This view is 
corroborated by other scholarly works (e.g. Fan, Rui and Zhao, 2008; De Jong, Kabir 
and Nguyen, 2008; Cheng and Shiu, 2007). Consequently, this section of the thesis 
focuses on some of the country-level characteristics that impact on capital structure 
decisions of firms. These factors are discussed below. 
 
3.14.1. Nature of Financial Market  
 
The level of development of a country’s financial market can affect the debt-equity 
choice of firms. In a country with a well developed financial market (e.g.UK, US and 
Germany), firms are more likely to have better access to credit facilities than their 
counterparts in countries (e.g.Sudan) with poor financial facilities. The study in this 
area originates from the work of researchers including Cespedes et al. (2010) who 
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attribute the low issuance of equity finance in Latin America to the poorly developed 
financial markets in this area. A similar view is shared by Delcoure (2007), whose 
empirical investigation revealed that most firms in less developed economies in 
Central and Eastern Europe depended predominantly on short-term debt as opposed 
to long-term debt, due to the underdeveloped nature of bond markets in these 
economies.  
 
The above study supports an earlier work by Chen (2004). Chen (2004) observed 
that Chinese listed firms employ mostly short-term debt rather than long-term debt 
for financing their working capital needs. Most of the capital required for long-term 
investment is from equity. A common reason cited for this situation according to 
Chen (2004) is the underdeveloped nature of the bond market in China. In a similar 
vein, Faulkender and Petersen (2006) commented that firms with better access to 
public bond markets tend to have higher leverage levels than their counterparts with 
no access to bond markets. The role of financial market development in the debt-
equity choice of firms is also documented in the work of De Jong, Kabir and Nguyen 
(2008). However, they take the above argument a step further by adding that a GDP 
growth can enhance the confidence of firms to employ in the market and this could 
influence firms in employing more debt in their capital structure.   
 
3.14.2. Stock Market Development  
 
A widespread view holds that the development of stock market facilitates the 
issuance and trade of equity and this should therefore reflect in the financing 
decisions of firms. Indeed, a number of empirical studies have reinforced this view. 
For instance, (Kayo and Kimura, 2011) observed a negative relationship between 
stock market development and leverage. (Kayo and Kimura, 2011)  argue that  firms 
in countries with well-developed stock markets reduce their level of debt capital, 
since stock markets provide an alternative to finance and investment through a more 
flexible source of capital. Stated somewhat differently, the development of stock 
market facilitates the issuance of equity capital and this reduces the leverage level of 
firms.  
Previous works in the area of stock market development and financing choice of 
firms (e.g. Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2006) however observed that stock 
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market development is more likely to affects firms differently depending on the size 
of the firm. For instance, unlike large firms, stocks from small firms are unlikely to 
be traded often due to the issuance cost and also there is high cost for traders to 
acquire information about small firms. In essence, the development of the stock 
market is likely to affect firms differently depending on the size of the firm.   
 
3.14.3. Nature of Legal and Regulatory Environment  
 
There is now an extensive literature linking the legal and regulatory environment to 
capital structure decisions. Empirical works point to the fact that an effective 
regulatory framework is one of the essential elements required to increase the 
confidence of financial lenders in granting financial assistance to firms. For instance, 
in emerging central and eastern European countries, Delcoure (2007) observed that 
laws are not well developed to protect financial lenders in the event default, thus 
limiting lenders’ ability to offer long-term financial assistance to firms. 
According to Nivorozhkin (2003), firms in transitional economies (e.g. South Africa) 
depend more on external short term financing than on long-term financing. 
Nivorozhkin (2003) further pointed out that a poorly developed legal framework 
coupled with a weak bond market discourages the formation of enforceable debt 
agreements. Utrero-Gonzalez (2007) also commented that appropriate banking 
regulations ensure that financial lenders are well protected. This according to Utrero-
Gonzalez (2007) reduces the need for collateral from firms before being granted 
financial assistance.   
Likewise, Alves and Ferreira (2011) pointed out the importance of creditors and 
shareholders’ rights, law and the capital market development in the determination of 
a firm’s capital structure. To them, properly developed laws influence capital 
markets, creditors’ and shareholders’ rights, which impact on a firm’s capital 
structure. For instance, a properly developed legal system creates incentives for the 
development of the capital market, thereby making more debt available to firms. 
Properly developed laws ensure that the financial market is well regulated, proper 
accounting standards are adopted and required information is made available 
publicly, thereby mitigating the issue of information asymmetry. The above study by 
Alves and Ferreira (2011) is in line with a study by Cheng and Shiu (2007) who 
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posited that firms in countries with better creditor protection make use of more debt 
than their counterparts in countries where creditors’ rights are not well protected.  
Gonzalez and Gonzalez (2008) also attempted to shed more light on the effects of the 
regulatory framework on firms’ debt-equity choice by using data from 39 different 
countries. They concluded that firms in countries with better banking facilities and 
an effective regulatory framework are more likely to rely on external funds. Central 
to their argument is the fact that a properly developed legal framework and the rule 
of law enhance enforcing debt contracts with less difficulty.  
3.14.4. Corruption 
 
Scholarly developments have shown the effects of corruption on the capital structure 
of firms. For instance, literature underlines the level of corruption as an alternative 
measure of the severity of asymmetry information (Joeveer, 2013). Indeed, Joeveer 
(2013) contends that where there is a high corruption perception index (which 
indicates a low level of corruption), the symmetry information problem is less 
severe. Thus, countries that show a high corruption perception index are expected to 
make use of more external finance (e.g. debt). This suggest that in countries with a 
lower level of corruption, investors feel better protected and this provides 
opportunities for firms to access more debt.  
 
3.14.5. Inflation 
 
There is a growing body of scholarly literature on the relationship between inflation 
and leverage (e.g. Joeveer, 2013; Cheng, Shiu, 2007; Demirguc–kunt and 
Maksimovic, 1996; DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980). However, empirical evidence on 
the relationship is mixed. Inflation leads to volatility in a firm’s earnings, which is 
caused by uncertainty in the volume of sales, the firm’s price and cost structure. This 
can lead to instability in a firm’s operating income and even the probability of 
insolvency. DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) provided a pleasing explanation of the 
effects of inflation in financial decision-making. To them, inflation gives rise to an 
increase in the demand for corporate bonds due to a reduction in the real cost of debt.  
Inflation leads to a decline in the real cost of debt as noted by the Fisher effects. As 
such, firms in countries (e.g. Zimbabwe) experiencing a high degree of inflation 
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should employ a higher level of debt so as to expand their assets and exploit the 
residuals from the inflated asset and the fixed amount of liabilities. 
 
A serious weakness with DeAngelo and Masulis’s argument, however, is that it fails 
to recognize that inflation may lead to a reduction of the number of investment 
activities a firm can embark upon as a result of the fact that inflation generates 
interest rate uncertainty. Debt holder will tend to demand additional returns to 
compensate for inflation. Thus, firms may decide not to employ any more debt for 
their operations but rather wait and see if there could be any change that might be 
worthwhile. In effect, there will be a reduction of the number of investments that can 
be embarked upon by firms. Commentators including Demirguc–kunt and 
Maksimovic (1996) also observed that countries with high inflation tend to be 
associated with uncertainty. In such a situation, financial lenders are less willing to 
provide debt to firms. As a consequence, firms in countries with high inflation rate 
are expected to make use of less debt.   
 
 
3.15. Summary and Conclusion on Country–Level Characteristics 
 
Although, the importance of institutional structures in capital structure decisions is 
accepted (e.g. Joeveer, 2013; Gungoraydinoglu and Oztekin, 2011; Cheng and Shiu, 
2007), the bulk of research on corporate leverage decisions have focused on firm-
level factors that may not adequately explain the capital structure decisions of firms. 
Institutional structures can be critical in providing explanations for the diversity of 
capital structure decisions found across countries. Therefore, in this section of the 
thesis, I have explained that firm-level variables are not the only factors affecting 
firms’ capital structure in terms of comparing debt-equity choice of firms across 
countries. The quality of the institutions and the macroeconomic environment in 
which firms are situated are also important. Accordingly, it is crucial that in looking 
at the determinants of firms’ capital structure across countries, different macro-
economic conditions and the institutional environment are also considered.   
Surprisingly, studies from SSA that document the effects of country-specific factors 
on capital structure are difficult to come by. The purpose of this study among other 
things is to fill this gap by examining the effects of country-specific variables on 
capital structure of firms in SSA.  
82 
 
3.16. Network ties and capital structure 
 
The preceding sections examine firm and country (institutional) factors that underlie 
the capital structure of firms. Indeed, researchers have long been interested in 
examining these factors as the main determinants of financing decisions of firms. 
However, despite the important of social and political network ties in Africa, studies 
that examine the effects of these network ties on financing decisions have been rare. 
Such omission is significant given that social and political network ties play a 
significant role in the allocation of resources in SSA (Acquaah and Eshun, 2010). 
 
In less developed market economies such as those in SSA, governments and 
bureaucrats play crucial roles in providing resources and opportunities for firms as 
politicians and government officials have considerable power and control over the 
allocation of resources. Thus, many firms depend heavily on governments for 
valuable resources, including access to finance from various financial institutions 
(Acquaah and Eshun, 2010; Adjibolosoo, 1995; Li, Meng, Wang and Zhoug, 2008). 
For example, scholarly literature in Ghana suggests that managers develop personal 
and social networking ties with policymakers at different levels of government, and 
officials in government institutions (Kuada and Buame, 2000; Adjibolooso, 1995). 
Since politicians and government officials have considerable power. Firms whose 
owner-managers are able to get access to these politicians and bureaucratic officials 
will more easily be able to secure the resources necessary for the strategic 
organisation of their activities and be successful in the acquisitions of loans and 
other financial resources that are required by their firms. This point seems to be 
consistent with Acquaah and Eshun (2010: 675) contending that ‘‘politicians have 
control over most financial institutions and the awarding of major contracts, while 
bureaucratic officials control the regulatory and licensing procedures’’. 
Accordingly, it can be seen that developing extensive personal and social networking 
relationships with politicians and bureaucratic officials is likely to enhance firm 
access to financial resources and firms that have such network ties are likely to have 
higher leverage levels than firms that have no political connections. 
The next section looks at the empirical studies on capital structure practices. 
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3.17. Previous Studies on Capital Structure Practices 
 
The objective of this section is to provide an empirical evidence on previous studies 
in both the advanced and the less developed economies. I begin by first looking at 
some of the studies conducted in western economies such as the UK and the US, 
followed by a discussion of studies in some less developed economies, with the final 
part focusing solely on the few studies conducted in Africa.  
 
3.17.1. Studies in the Advanced Economies 
   
Following the path breaking work of M and M, a significant amount of both 
empirical and theoretical  works on capital structure practices have been done, with 
the greater percentage centred on the developed economies. This section seeks to 
look at some of the studies that have been conducted in the advanced economies. 
 
For instance, Bevan and Danbolt (2002) investigated the determinants of capital 
structure of UK firms by replicating the method of Rajan and Zingales (1995). Bevan 
and Danbolt (2002) observed that gearing is positively associated with tangibility 
and negatively associated with profitability. Furthermore, they observed that a firm’s 
size is positively correlated to both short and long-term borrowing and negatively 
correlated to a short-term bank debt. Since gearing could be defined in diverse ways, 
Bevan and Danbolt (2002) contended that the relationship between gearing and these 
determinants depends on the definition of gearing employed.  
 
Also, Gaud, Hoesli and Bender (2007) investigated the debt-equity choice of more 
than 5000 firms across 13 EU countries. Using panel econometric techniques, Gaud 
et al. (2007) observed that neither the trade-off nor the pecking order model in their 
most commonly accepted forms offer a suitable description of the capital structure 
policies in Europe. However, they found evidence of the effects of national 
environment (i.e. institutional factors) on a firm’s financing choice. This appears to 
be in consistent with other empirical studies (e.g. Joeveer, 2013; Deesomsak et al. 
2004). Gaud et al. (2007) further observed that debt does not constitute an 
appropriate form of financing for firms with value-enhancing investment projects but 
rather such firms issue equity. In contrast, when there is a lack of profitable projects, 
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debt disciplines managers (similar to Jensen, 1986) as firms prefer issuing debt and 
increasing dividends. 
 
An investigation into the capital structure practices of US multinational companies 
was also conducted by Ramirez and Kwok (2010). Proponents of portfolio theory 
posit that diversification leads to risk reduction. Accordingly, multinational firms 
(e.g. Microsoft, American Express, Coca Cola) will be expected to have a lower 
level of risk. This lower level of risk should encourage lenders to extend debt to such 
firms due to the lower chance of default. As such, firms with international 
diversification will be expected to have a high level of leverage. Yet, Ramirez and 
Kwok (2010) observed that US multinational companies exhibit a lower level of debt 
than firms situated domestically. They also noted that many of the multinational 
companies investigated are likely to sell their products in countries that are less 
developed, thus subjecting themselves to more risk. This situation could account for 
the low level of debt of the firms investigated.   
 
Voutsinas and Werner (2011) also investigated the effects of financial constraints on 
1537 Japanese listed companies. Their results indicated the effects of monetary 
policy and credit supply on firms’ capital structure. Smaller firms were found to 
experience financial constraints during the period of economic crisis. It is worth 
noting that financial lenders are careful at extending credit to firms during economic 
downturn, since the survival of many businesses can not be predicted with any 
degree of accuracy. Large companies often have large asset base, that serves as 
collateral in debt agreements. As such, these companies are better positioned that 
smaller ones in accessing the limited credit available in times of economic crisis. It is 
therefore not surprising that Voutsinas and Werner‘s (2011) study revealed that 
smaller firms had difficulty in obtaining credit in a period of economic downturn. 
 
3.17.2. Studies in the Context of Developing Economies 
 
The preceding section focuses on some of the studies conducted in testing the debt-
equity choices of firms in the advanced economies. Over the last couple of decades, 
a few studies have been conducted in the context of the developing parts of the world 
to test the applicability of the capital structural theories. Surprisingly, the empirical 
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results of Delcoure (2007) from eastern European countries and Chen (2004) from 
China showed that none of the capital structure theories derived from the Western 
setting provides a persuasive explanation for firms in developing countries. In testing 
the pecking order hypothesis for instance, firms seem to follow what they called a 
modified pecking order (i.e. retained earnings, equity, bank and possibly market 
debt) in financing their activities. Various reasons account for this. These include the 
underdeveloped nature of the financial markets in these economies, thereby limiting 
the availability of debt finance. Consequently, firms have to rely on equity finance 
for investment projects in situations where internally generated funds are not 
sufficient. Where these firms have to rely on debt, they depend on short–term debt 
rather than long-term debt. Empirical evidence from Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-
Kunt and Maksimovic (2001), however, challenges the study by Delcoure (2007) 
and Chen (2004). They conclude that the characteristics that are crucial in explaining 
the capital structure policies in the UK and the US are also vital in the developing 
economies, despite the presence of institutional differences among these developing 
countries. 
 
Singh and Weisse (1998) also carried out a comprehensive analysis of financing 
patterns in ten least developed economies (India, Pakistan, South Korea, Jordan, 
Thailand, Mexico, Turkey, Malaysia, Zimbabwe and Brazil). They found no 
evidence for the pecking order theory. According to them, firms in these countries do 
not follow the strict hierarchy of financing preferences as prescribed by the pecking 
order theory.  
In a similar study of the capital structure practices among Indian firms, Chakraborty 
(2010) however concluded that notwithstanding the differences in institutional 
structures between the developed and the developing economies, the  dynamics 
which are important in explaining the capital structural decisions among firms in the 
developed economies are also vital in case of the emerging economies such as India.   
 
Glen and Singh (2004) conducted a similar study using data from both developed 
and emerging economies and concluded that firms in emerging markets have higher 
levels of fixed assets than their counterparts in the developed economies. They 
further contended that firms in emerging markets show lower levels of leverage than 
their counterparts in developed economies. Under the trade-off model, one might 
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expect firms with larger assets base to employ more debt in their capital structure. 
Therefore, the low level of debt observed by Glen and Singh (2004) could be 
explained by the limited access to credit experienced by firms in many emerging 
economies. 
 
Also, Nguyen and Ramachandran (2006) examined the capital structure decisions of 
small and medium sized businesses in Vietnam (a country characterised by a bank 
based financial system) and found out that the average leverage ratio was similar to 
firms in the US. Indeed, the availability of the banking based financial system in 
Vietnam makes it more likely that firms will have adequate access to debt financing. 
It is therefore not surprising that the leverage ratio was similar to that of the US. 
 
In Malaysia, an investigation into the capital structure of firms by Mustapha, Ismail 
and Minai (2011) established the importance of firm-level characteristics such as 
profitability, ownership structure and tangibility in the debt-equity structure of 
Malaysian firms. They further observed that Malaysian companies in the property 
and construction sectors are more leveraged than their counterparts in the other 
sectors of the economy. The large asset base of firms in property and construction 
sectors accounts for the higher leverage level. 
 
In relation to the Arab world, Alimari (2003) observed that firms in most Arab 
countries employ considerably less leverage than their counterparts in western 
economies. Firms in Arab countries tend to have less corporate tax commitments 
than their counterparts in the western economies. Higher corporate tax encourages 
firms to use more debt so as to gain advantage in the deductibility of interest 
payments
27
. This explains why firms in Arab countries employ less debt than their 
counterparts in western world. Also, firms in Arab countries seem to follow a reverse 
of the pecking order model.  
 
Using firm-level panel data along similar lines, Dawood et al. (2011) observed a low 
debt-equity ratio among Egyptian listed firms. In addition to this, the firms also 
showed a preference for equity over debt for financing new investments. Dawood et 
al. (2011) argued that managers see the use of debt today as a risk of raising further 
debt tomorrow and therefore resort to equity financing rather than debt financing. 
                                            
27
 Interest payment is forbidden under Islamic doctrine. 
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Low usage of debt finance provides unused debt capacity that could be depended on 
in case the need arises in future. Dawood et al. (2011) further argued that unlike the 
developed economies, the bond markets in most less developed economies including 
Egypt are not well developed. This, according to them, account for the low leverage 
ratios among Egyptian firms.  
 
3.17.3. Prior Studies in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
So far in SSA, there has been relatively little empirical work conducted in testing the 
applicability of capital structural theories. Some of the studies from SSA are 
considered below. In Nigeria, Salawu (2006) examined the capital structural 
practices of the Nigerian banking industry by sending questionnaires to 25 financial 
managers. His results revealed the important of tax, profitability, growth and 
ownership structure in the determination of the banks’ capital structure. However, a 
major limitation with Salawu’s study is the limited sample size. The study lacks 
robustness and appears to be over ambitious in its claims as the results obtained may 
not be a representative of all the banking institutions in Nigeria. A much larger 
sample size will be needed to validate Salawu’s argument. Whatever the case may 
be, this study is among the limited number of studies from SSA that focus on the 
determinants of capital structure of the banking industry. 
 
Yartey (2006) also attempted to assess the financing policies of firms in Ghana by 
replicating Singh’s (1995) methodology of company accounts. He concluded that the 
average listed company in Ghana finances its long-term assets primarily from an 
external source, with less dependence on internally generated funds. The results 
established the importance of Ghanaian stock market as a significant source of 
finance for listed Ghanaian firms.  
Boateng (2004) also explored the capital structural determinants of international joint 
ventures in Ghana. His results indicated that firms in the construction, textile and 
mining sectors employ higher leverage than their counterparts in the Agriculture 
sectors, food processing industry, financial and transport sectors. Firms in 
construction, textile and mining sectors tend to have large asset bases that serve as 
collateral for loans. Thus, this might have accounted for the high leverage levels 
among firms in these industries. 
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Doku, Adjasi and Sarpong-Kumankuma (2011) also examined the development of  
the financial market in Ghana and its influence on the capital structure of listed firms 
by using a panel data framework involving 21 listed firms from the Ghana stock 
exchange, with the data covering 1995 to 2005. Their study revealed equity and debt 
financing as a crucial complements. It is sufficient to state that although their 
research is recent and therefore seems to provide new evidence regarding the 
financing behaviour among the listed firms in Ghana, one should however be careful 
with the degree to which the outcome of this research can be accepted. The study 
cannot be generalised as the true reflection of the financing pattern among the listed 
firms in Ghana due to the sample size employed in the study. The explanation for 
this lies in the fact that the limited sample size of firms employed in this study 
undermines the statistical significance of the results and the credibility of the 
inferences. Indeed, a better study would examine a large, randomly selected sample 
of listed firms rather than a handful of firms used by Doku et al. (2011). 
 
Ramlall (2009) examined the capital structure of Mauritius firms. He looked at 395 
non-listed firms, excluding financial companies. Ramlall noted a negative 
relationship between leverage and firm’s size. The relationship between asset 
tangibility and leverage was however noted to be positive. In addition, Ramlall’s 
results provides further evidence for the existence of the modified pecking order 
theory whereby short-term debt precedes long-term debt. 
 
In conclusion, it must be emphasised that corporate financing policy has become a 
key area of concern in recent times, especially due to the latest financial crisis that 
led to massive government bailouts in some countries. It is however evident from 
literature that there are less rigorous empirical or academic studies on the subject 
from the perspective of SSA. It is important that the subject matter is looked into at a 
more comprehensive way. This underscores the importance of this research. 
 
In many respects, the present study differs from the few existing studies in the SSA 
in a number of ways. Firstly, to the best of my knowledge, no study from SSA has so 
far examined the effects of country-level factors (especially their moderating roles) 
on debt-equity choice across countries in SSA. Thus, this study is the first to 
consider that. Another differentiating objective of this thesis is to examine the effects 
of  the 2007/08 global financial crisis in debt-equity choice in SSA, an aspect which 
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is yet to attract the attention of researchers from SSA. Indeed, the pattern of 
corporate financing decision in SSA may have changed over the past few years due 
to the global financial crisis. However, the specific question of how the financing 
pattern has been affected by this global financial crisis has not yet received a clear 
answer. Thus, it is important that this issue is given an attention in this study. In 
addition, a number of studies (especially those conducted in the advance markets) 
have provided support for the existence of the pecking order model. This study is 
among the first studies to test the presence of the pecking order theory in SSA.  
 
 
3.18. Conclusion on Previous Studies of Capital Structure 
 
This section has presented some of the prior studies on capital structure practices 
among firms. In general, most of the studies are based on information obtained from 
developed economies (e.g. Joeveer, 2013; Beattie et al. 2006; Chen, 2004). Findings 
from less developed economies appeared quite recently. In the case of SSA, the 
available evidence suggests that research on capital structure tends to be somewhat 
fragmented and deeply limited. It is imperative to recognize the fact that developed 
economies are becoming increasingly important to investors in recent times as a 
result of the failure of the world’s major economies such the UK due to the financial 
crisis. Less developed market economies have been much more resilient to the recent 
global financial crisis (IMF, 2013; Allen and Giovannetti, 2011; Kiyota, 2009). 
Consequently, it is important to understand and appreciate the driving force behind 
the debt-equity choice of firms in these economies. This underlines the importance 
of this study from the context of SSA. So far, literature reviewed points out that not 
much study has been conducted on capital structure practices of firms in SSA. This 
study therefore adds to the few existing studies in the context of less developed 
market economies in general and SSA in particular. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Conceptual Models and Empirical Hypotheses 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter focuses on the development of theoretical models that determine the 
capital structure of firms. The first part of this chapter re-examines the trade off and 
the pecking order theories of capital structure as the key theories that underpin the 
current study. Next, the theoretical connections between firm-level factors and 
capital structure are presented. Third, the hypotheses pertaining  to the moderating 
effects of firm size on the relationship between other firm-level factors and leverage 
are examined. The fourth part of this chapter examines the moderating role of the 
asset tangibility on the relationship between earnings volatility and leverage. In the 
fifth part, the moderating effects of rule of law on the relationship between tax, asset 
tangibility and leverage are also examined. Finally, a summary and a conclusion of 
the chapter are presented. 
 
4.2. Theoretical Underpinnings 
 
The M&M (1958) study on capital structure set in motion the development of 
various theoretical works on capital structure. M&M based their well-known 
irrelevance theory on a number of assumptions including no taxes; no transaction 
costs; no default risk; both investors and firms can borrow at the same interest rate; 
and perfect and a frictionless market. Some debt obligations including financial 
distress and bankruptcy costs are ignored by M&M’s irrelevance theory. Therefore, 
in their subsequent work, M&M (1963) relaxed some of their earlier assumptions to 
reflect the fact that the corporate tax system gives tax relief on interest payments. 
The irrelevance theory inspired subsequent theories of capital structure. A review of 
the literature on capital structure (e.g. Sheikh and Wang, 2011; Frank and Goyal, 
2009; Cheng and Shiu, 2007; Tong and Green, 2005; Chen, 2004; Deesomsak et al. 
2004) identifies two main theories, which are often adopted by researchers interested 
in examining the determinants of debt-equity choice of firms. These theories are the 
trade-off theory and the pecking order theory. Under the trade-off theory, firms 
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choose their capital structure by trading off the benefits of using debt against its cost. 
The benefits of the use of debt include tax savings and the reduction in terms of 
agency costs of equity derived from excess cash flow. The costs of debt on the other 
hand include higher interest rates and potential financial distress, which may occur 
when too much debt is used by the firm (Matee, Poutziouris and Ivanov, 2013).  
 
The next theory (i.e. the pecking order theory) emanates from the work of Myers 
(1984) and this theory is as a result of asymmetric information. Asymmetric 
information is a situation where managers of firms have more information than 
others (e.g. shareholders or the public) about a firm in terms of investment 
opportunities, the rate of internal cash flow and the future landscape of the firm. In 
other words, firm managers tend to have superior information compared to 
shareholders and outsiders. Consequently, the cost involved in issuing new securities 
becomes a critical factor and it goes above a discussion of the cost and benefits 
associated with the use of debt. This asymmetric information generates a hierarchy 
of cost regarding the use of external financing (Matee et al. 2013; Tong and Green, 
2005). Under the pecking order theory therefore, a hierarchy of financing sources is 
used where internal finance (i.e. retained earnings or excess liquid asset) is used as 
the first financing source. Where the internal funds are insufficient to meet the firm’s 
need, an external source of funds that minimises the additional cost of information 
asymmetry is then used. In this case, debt is used. Equity is chosen as a last resort. 
Baskin (1989) observed that in comparison of different sources of funds, equity 
entails a larger information asymmetry cost and therefore is of less interest to firms 
given the cost involved in its issuance. Thus, the pecking order theory posits a 
unique optimal capital structure to which all firms gravitate in the long-run (Tong 
and Green, 2005). 
 
The above theoretical perspectives have influenced most of the studies on capital 
structure. As pointed out in Chapter 3, empirical literature on capital structure 
identifies a number of firm-level variables that influence capital structure and the 
two main theoretical perspectives of capital structure (i.e. the trade-off and the 
pecking order theories) provide almost opposite explanations on how each of these 
determinants influences the debt-equity choice decision. Against this background, I 
examine four separate but interrelated models in this thesis. In the sections that 
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follow, each of these conceptual models is considered and the various hypotheses are 
formulated. 
 
4.3. Firm–level factors and capital structure 
Notable scholarly works on capital structure (e.g. Joeveer, 2013; Gungoraydinoglu 
and Oztekin, 2011; Sheikh and Wang, 2011; Huang and Song, 2006; Chen, 2004; 
Wald, 1999; Rajan and Zingles 1995; Barclay and Smith, 1996) identify a number of 
firm-specific attributes that underline the debt-equity choice of firms. This section 
sets up the various hypotheses regarding firm-level factors and capital structure.    
 
4.3.1. Profitability (PR)  and leverage (LEV) 
 
Myers’ (1984) pecking order theory posits that there is a negative relationship 
between profitability and leverage, since firms with high profit are expected to make 
use of less debt for their investment activities. Myer and Majluf (1984) argue that 
because of the presence of informational asymmetry between firm managers and 
investors, a hierarchy of financing decisions exist among firms. Thus, firms prefer to 
use their internals earnings for any investment activity rather than employing debt, to 
avoid potential dilution of ownership and control. Following this argument, a firm 
will resort to external debt only when internal earnings are insufficient for 
investment activities. Where external capital is needed, firm managers will rely on 
debt capital before relying on equity capital. Several empirical studies (e.g. Zou and 
Xiao, 2006; Chen and Strange, 2005; Hall et al. 2004; Cassar and Holmes, 2003; 
Fama and French, 2002; Myers, 2001; Wiwattanakantang, 1999; Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers, 1999; Barton, Ned and Sundaram, 1989; Titman and Wessels, 1988) have 
shown a negative relationship between profitability and leverage. Indeed, debt 
interest payments reduce profit. Previous studies from the context of developing 
economies (e.g. Abor 2008, Ramlall, 2009: Yartey, 2011) have noted a negative 
relationship between profitability and leverage. A high level of profit could also 
indicate a signal of quality and therefore profitable firms will take on less debt to 
distinguish themselves from lower quality firms (Schoubben and Hulle, 2004). 
Following from the above theoretical stance, it is predicted that:  
 
H1: There will be a negative relationship between profitability and leverage. 
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4.3.2. Earnings volatility (VT)  and leverage (LEV) 
Earnings volatility is another firm level characteristic that fits in with the logic of the 
trade off theory of capital structure. Under the trade-off hypothesis, firms which have 
inconsistent earnings (a proxy for firm risk), have a greater risk of not being able to 
meet their debt commitments. Such firms are likely to encounter situations where 
their cash flow may be too low and therefore increasing the probability of failure to 
pay creditors and meet other financial commitments. In a situation where bankruptcy 
costs are higher, a rise in volatility of earnings leads to a decrease in a company’s 
debt ratio. De Angelo (1980) observed that the cost of debt is high for companies 
whose earnings are variable as a result of the fact that investors can predict with less 
accuracy their future earnings based on the information that is available publicly. 
Besides, under the pecking theory, earnings volatility also worsens the asymmetric 
information problem and therefore creditors are likely to protect themselves by 
strengthening the conditions surrounding debt acquisitions (Schoubben and Hulle, 
2004). Building on the above argument, Titman (1984) observed that stakeholders’ 
fear of bankruptcy places limitations on the amount of debt that a company may be 
willing to take on. In many instances, financial lenders are reluctant to extend any 
meaningful financial help to firms with high earnings volatility due to the fear of 
default. Thus, firms with high degree of risk are less likely to use debt 
(Wiwattanakantang, 1999; Johnson, 1997; Kim and Sorensen, 1986; Bradley, Jarrel 
and Kim, 1984). 
As a result of high level of environmental uncertainty in many developing countries 
(such as those in SSA), firms with inconsistent earnings are less likely to be 
attractive to financial lenders (in terms of granting financial assistance). Indeed, 
empirical studies (e.g. Abor, 2008) from some SSA countries have noted a negative 
relationship between earnings volatility and leverage. 
In the light of the above theoretical discussion, I hypothesize that:  
 
H2. Earnings volatility will be negatively related to leverage. 
 
4.3.3. Asset tangibility (TA) and leverage (LEV) 
  
Asset tangibility remains an important determinant of the capital structure of firms, 
especially in developing economies (e.g. SSA) where there are inadequate 
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institutional structures for protecting creditors’ rights. In such places therefore,  
tangible assets serve as collateral in the acquisition of debt. This argument suggests a 
positive relationship between tangibility and leverage. Indeed, both the trade-off 
theory and the pecking order theory agree on this positive relationship of asset 
tangibility on leverage. Bradley et al. (1984) observed that firms with more tangible 
assets are more likely to have higher financial leverage. This effect derived from the 
fact that lenders are more willing to lend to firms with tangible assets, as  these 
assets serve as a guarantee in case of possible liquidation of the firm.  
 
In general, asset tangibility provides more room for cheap borrowing and in the view 
of Wiwattanakantang (1999), firms with fewer tangible assets could be subjected to 
severe lending conditions. These restrictive conditions constrain the ability of such 
firms to borrow more or are forced to issue equity rather than debt (Scott, 1977). 
The importance of asset tangibility in the acquisition of loans in developing 
economies is evident in a number of empirical studies (e.g. Fosu, 2013; Sheikh and 
Wang, 2011; Viviani, 2008; Huang and Song, 2006 and Deesomsak et al, 2004). 
These studies point unambiguously to the positive asset tangibility-leverage 
relationship. Indeed, prior studies from the context of Ghana (e.g Abor, 2008) noted 
a positive relationship between asset structure and leverage. This supports the fact 
that because of weak creditors’ right in the country, tangible assets serve as a 
guarantee in debt acquisition.   
Based on the discussion above, I propose:  
 
H3. The relationship between asset tangibility and leverage is positive. 
 
4.3.4. Firm size (SZ) and leverage (LEV)  
 
Numerous empirical studies on capital structure (e.g. Voutsinas and Werner, 2011; 
Frank and Goyal, 2009; Zou and Xiao, 2006; Korajczyk and Levy, 2003) have 
identified firm size as a major component that affects the capital structure of firms. 
The trade-off theory observes that large firms are more diversified and have less 
volatile earnings than smaller firms. Therefore, larger firms have lower bankruptcy 
risk and lower bankruptcy cost. This condition allows large firms to take on more 
debt (Antoniou, Guney and Paudyal, 2002). In addition to this, empirical studies 
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argue that large firms have fewer information asymmetries. These conditions make it 
easier for large firms to access the credit market (Deesomak et al., 2004; Schoubben 
and Hulle, 2004). Considerable evidence exists from the context of SSA (e.g. Abor, 
2008; Salawu, 2006) that shows a positive firm size–leverage relationship. The 
preceding discussion leads to the next hypothesis: 
 
H4: Firm size is positively related to leverage. 
 
4.3.5. Firm growth(GR) and leverage (LEV) 
 
It is recognised in capital structure literature that there is a link between firm growth 
and leverage (e.g. Psillaki and Daskalakis, 2009; Cheng and Shiu, 2007; Chen, 
2004). The trade-off theory predicts a negative relationship between growth 
opportunities and leverage due to the fact that growth opportunities cannot be 
collateralised. Further, a growth opportunity could serve as alternative quality signal 
and therefore, in order to distinguish firms with high growth opportunity from those 
with less growth potential, high growth firms may take on less debt. Consequently, 
there will be a negative relationship between growth opportunities and leverage 
(Schoubben and Hulle, 2004). Firms with growth opportunities could be considered 
as risky by financial lenders and therefore face difficulties in raising debt finance 
(Psillaki and Daskalakis, 2009).Various empirical studies (e.g. Kayo and Kimura, 
2011; Rajan and Zingales, 1995) have predicted a negative relationship between 
growth opportunities and leverage. Indeed, empirical studies from some countries in 
SSA (e.g. Ramlall, 2009; Salawu, 2006) have revealed a negative relationship 
between growth and leverage. 
Thus, in the light of the above discussions, it is hypothesised that: 
 
H5: Firm growth opportunities are negatively related to leverage.  
 
4.3.6. Tax (TX) and leverage (LEV) 
 
The impact of tax on capital structure forms the main theme of M&M’s irrelevance 
theory of 1958. According to the irrelevance theory, companies that have large tax 
commitments make use of debt in order to gain advantage by the deductibility of 
interest payments. The tax advantage ensures that a firm’s tax commitment reduces 
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and thereby makes more profit available to shareholders. Therefore, a high tax rate 
serves as an incentive for firms to borrow more (Ross, Westerfield, Jordan and Firer, 
2001). The above argument is also in line with the logic of the trade-off theory. In 
line with this, a number of empirical studies (e.g. Frank and Goyal, 2003; Graham 
and Harvey, 2001), have found a positive relationship between tax and leverage. 
This demonstrates the important role of tax in corporate financing decisions. 
However, it is important to point out that studies that have found a positive 
relationship between tax and leverage have been primarily based within the context 
of developed economies where issues relating to tax form an important component in 
financing decisions. Similar to the argument of Julian and Ofori-Dankwa, (2013) and 
Robertson, (2009), capital structure decisions are likely to vary according to the level 
of economic and institutional development. Thus, the results of the tax-leverage 
relationship have not been subject to substantial testing in developing economies 
(e.g. SSA) where institutional conditions (e.g. weak regulatory environment, high 
level of corruption) could alter the direction of the tax-leverage relationship. 
Therefore, there is theoretical justification to think that institutional conditions could 
matter in the tax-leverage relationship (Julian and Ofori-Dankwa, 2013).   
 
Indeed, there are several reasons that one might expect tax-leverage implication for 
firms in developing economies to be different from those in developed economies. 
First, accounting and auditing standards in many developing countries, including 
those in SSA, tend to be relatively lax. This undoubtedly gives room for firms to 
manipulate their accounting records and therefore tax avoidance becomes more 
pervasive. Second, SSA is a region with a worldwide reputation for corruption and 
this tends to influence the behaviour of firms. For example, Tanzi (1998) argued that 
corruption reflects the massive impact of poor institutions. Bribery and corruption 
facilitates the evasion of tax and firms in developing economies will prefer to bribe 
tax administrators and therefore pay less tax. 
 
In sum, contrary to the extant literature, I argue that the institutional conditions in 
SSA, distinct from those in the developed economies, allow firms to marginalise 
their tax obligations. The above logic suggests that this contextual condition is likely 
to affect the relationship between tax and leverage. Indeed, studies done in some 
developing economies have demonstrated a negative significant relationship between 
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tax and leverage (Abor, 2008; De Jong, et al. 2008; Huang and Song, 2006). Thus, 
within the context of weak institutional environment, tax and leverage are more 
likely to demonstrate a negative relationship. This leads to the next hypothesis that: 
 
H6: For firms operating in SSA, the tax rate is inversely related to leverage. 
 
Based on the above hypotheses, the conceptual model for the analysis is summarised 
in Figure 4.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                              
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. 1: Conceptual model 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Leverage (LEV) 
H2: Earnings 
volatility (-) 
 
H5: Firm growth (-) 
 
H4: Firm size (+) 
 
H3: Asset tangibility
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H6: Tax (-) 
 
 
 
 
H1: Profitability (-) 
 
98 
 
4.4. The moderating role of firm size 
 
Various empirical contributions pertaining to the effects of firm-level factors are 
evident in both the context of the developed and less developed economies. The 
discussion above has focused exclusively on the direct impact of firm-level factors 
on leverage. A remarkable feature of almost all studies on capital structure (e.g. 
Mateev, Poutziouris and Ivanov, 2013; Sheikh and Wang, 2011; Psillaki and 
Daskalakis, 2009; De Jong, Kabir, and Nguyen, 2008; Zou and Xias, 2006; 
Deesomsak et al. 2004) is the assumption of a linear relationship (either positive or 
negative) between firm-level factors and leverage. There is indeed no evidence on 
the interaction among firm-level factors and leverage. In this part of the thesis, I 
argue that firm size matters in the relationship between other firm-level factors and 
leverage. Thus, the subsequent section examines the moderating role of firm size on 
the relationship between other firm-level factors and leverage. 
 
4.4.1. Firm size (SZ), profitability (PR) and leverage (LEV) 
 
Numerous scholarly works on the determinants of capital structure provide 
explanations of the role of firm profitability as a key explanatory factor in 
determining leverage levels of firms (e.g. Joeveer, 2013; Abor, 2008; Salawu, 2006; 
Zou and Xiao, 2006; Chen and Strange, 2005; Bhaduri, 2002; Myers, 2001). Based 
on the logic of the pecking order hypothesis, several empirical studies (Huang and 
Song, 2006; Hall et al. 2004; Fama and French, 2002) have suggested a negative 
relationship between profitability and leverage. The main argument emanating from 
these studies is that profitable firms are likely to have more retained earnings and are 
less likely to take on less debt. On the contrary, trade-off models provide a 
conflicting prediction and argue that firms with high profits require a greater tax 
shield and therefore use debt to protect their profits (Huang and Song, 2006; 
Bhaduri, 2002).  
 
Despite the various scholarly advances on the effects of profitability on leverage, the 
role of firm size in the relationship between profitability and leverage remains 
uninvestigated. Firm size is likely to have an impact on the profitability level of the 
firm. For instance, large firms may enjoy some advantage such as economies of scale 
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and large sales volume, which could enhance their profit levels and therefore reduces 
their dependency on debt capital. The bigger the size of the firm, the greater the 
amount of profitability and vice versa. Thus, the profitability-leverage relationship 
may be conditional on firm size. In the light of the above discussion, I propose that:  
 
H7: Firm size moderates the relationship between profitability and leverage so that 
the relationship is negative. 
 
4.4.2. Firm size (SZ), earnings volatility (VT),  and leverage (LEV) 
 
The effects of earnings volatility on leverage are evident in many empirical works 
(e.g. Cheng, Lee and Lee, 2009; Abor, 2008; Deesomsak et al, 2004; Wald, 1999; 
Wiwattanakantang, 1999; Bradley et al, 1984). The main theme emanating from 
these studies is that earnings volatility increases the possibility of financial distress, 
as firms may not be able to meet their debt obligations. Larger firms tend to have a 
bigger market size and many divisions in different sectors or countries that can 
compensate for each other. Therefore, larger firms should have less volatility in 
earnings than smaller firms which usually have a small market size. Thus, the 
earnings volatility-leverage relationship may be contingent on firm size. This 
discussion leads to the next hypothesis that:  
 
H8: The earnings volatility-leverage relationship is positive when moderated by firm 
size. 
 
4.4.3. Firm size (SZ), asset tangibility (TA),  and leverage (LEV) 
 
The importance of asset tangibility in the acquisition of debt is well documented in 
the literature from the context of developing economies (e.g. Fosu, 2013; Sheikh and 
Wang, 2011; Ramlall, 2009; Abor, 2008;  Viviani, 2008; Deeomsak et al, 2004; 
Wiwattanakantang, 1999). For large firms operating in less developed economies, 
empirical studies have always assumed a positive and significant relationship 
between asset tangibility and leverage. It also seems reasonable to argue that 
differences in size should matter in the asset tangibility-leverage relationship. One 
would expect that small firms should have less tangible assets to be used as a 
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collateral for debt acquisition (e.g. Abor, 2008). Large firms should therefore have a 
large asset base to serve as collateral (Cassar and Holmes, 2003). Thus, it seems 
reasonable to argue that firm size moderates the asset tangibility-leverage 
relationship. Following the above discussion, my next hypothesis is stated as 
follows:  
 
H9. The relationship between asset tangibility and leverage is moderated by firm 
size so that the relationship is positive. 
 
4.4.4. Firm size (SZ), Tax (TX), and leverage (LEV) 
 
Among other things, the current study enriches the notion of the firm tax-leverage 
relationship by addressing the question of whether the tax-leverage relationship is 
conditioned by the size of the firm within a less developed market environment such 
as SSA. Empirical test of theories of capital structure have predominantly assumed a 
positive relationship between tax and leverage (e.g. Frank and Goyal, 2003; Ross, 
Westerfield, Jordan and Firer, 2001; Graham and Harvey, 2001). The central 
argument of these studies is that a higher tax rate encourages firms to borrow more 
in order to take advantage of interest deductibility. While this argument might hold 
for firms operating in the developed world, the picture might be completely different 
for firms operating in less developed economies such as those in SSA.  
 
The variation in the level of economic and institutional development should shape 
the tax-leverage relationship. For firms operating in less developed economies, 
because of weak regulatory institutions (Julian and Ofori-Dankwa, 2013), firm size 
should matter in the tax-leverage relationship. For instance, large firms in less 
developed economies should be able to manipulate individuals and regulatory 
institutions in their favour. Specifically, large firms should be able to pay bigger 
bribes to reduce their tax liabilities better than small firms should. Besides, in 
developing countries such as those in SSA, network ties (e.g. business, social or 
political network ties) play numerous important roles in the activities of firms 
(Adomako and Danso, 2014; Boso, Story and Cadogan, 2013; Acquaah and Eshun, 
2010; Li, Wang and Zhous, 2008; Kuada and Buame, 2000; Ellis, 2000; 
Adjibolooso, 1995). Developing extensive social and political network ties with 
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politicians and bureaucrats is likely to affect the activities of the firms, including tax 
payments. Bigger firms are more likely to have bigger network ties than smaller 
firms. Thus, these conditions should be able to assist large firms to reduce their tax 
liability. One would therefore expect that small firms, which usually have no or 
limited network ties and an inability to pay larger bribes, would be subjected to a 
relatively large tax burden. The above argument leads to the next hypothesis that for 
firms operating in SSA: 
 
H10
28
. For firms operating in SSA, firm size moderates the association between tax 
and leverage so that the relationship is negative. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
28 It is important to note that all firms used in the current study are large firms 
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The conceptual model for the above hypotheses (i.e.  H7 – H10) is presented in 
Figure 4.2: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                           H (-) 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                       H8 (+) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                 H9 (+) 
  
 
 
 
                                                                                                          H10 (-) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Hypothesised paths 
 Non-hypothesised and control paths  
 
Figure 4. 2: Conceptual model 2 
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4.5. Earnings volatility (VT), asset tangibility (TA), and leverage 
(LEV) 
 
Research into corporate leverage determinants have made a significant contribution 
to our knowledge of the effects of earnings volatility (a proxy for risk) on leverage.  
Previous empirical studies (e.g. Wiwattanakantang, 1999; Johnson, 1997; Kim and 
Sorensen, 1986; Bradley, Jarrel and Kim, 1984) have identified earnings volatility to 
be negatively related to leverage. The central proposition of their argument is that 
earnings volatility demonstrates a firm’s possible inability to meet its debt 
commitments and therefore creditors are unwilling to lend to such firms. In the case 
of Ghana for instance, Abor, (2008) noted a negative relationship between earnings 
volatility (a proxy for risk) and long-term debt. This shows that firms with high level 
of risk use less debt to avoid accumulating financial risk. This line of argument lends 
support to the trade-off theory. However, empirical studies have not explicitly to 
consider the earnings volatility-leverage relationship when a firm has large tangible 
assets, which could be used as collateral to diminish the lender’s risk of suffering 
non-payment. In other words, since the asset structure of a firm is related to the 
concept of financial distress cost (Daskalakis and Psillaki, 2008), the earnings 
volatility-leverage relationship could be conditional on the collateral value of assets.  
Hence, a high level of asset tangibility is expected to moderate the earnings 
volatility–leverage relationship. 
Therefore, I propose that:  
 
H11. Asset tangibility moderates the relationship between earnings volatility and 
leverage so that the relationship is positive. 
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The above discussion can be represented in Figure 4.3. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 H11 (+) 
                                       
 
                                     Hypothesised path 
                                      Non-hypothesised control path 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. 3: Conceptual model 3 
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4.6. The moderating role of the regulatory environment (Rule of 
Law)  
 
The role of institutions in shaping both human and economic activities is evident in 
literature (Adomako and Danso, 2014; Wang, 2005; Co, 2004). The general idea 
stemming from these studies is the idea of embeddedness (Hollingworth, 2002). This 
concept suggest that firms are embedded within the broader external environment 
(Roxas, Lindsay, Ashill and Victorio, 2007). Northian economics identify two main 
types of institutions that form the broader external environment. These are formal 
institutions and informal institutions (North, 1990). 
 
Informal institutions include norms of behaviour, code of conduct and conventions 
that emanate from the way of life of the society (North, 1995). North (1995) further 
identified formal institutions to include the rule of law, property right protection 
regimes, political and economic freedoms, as well as corruption. Since firms are 
embedded within the broader social and economic spectrum, the institutional 
environment tends to influence the activities of these firms (Chiles, Bluedorn, and 
Gupta, 2007). For instance, empirical studies (e.g. Adomako and Danso, 2014; 
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes and Shleifer, 2004; Jonhson, McMillan and 
Woodddruff, 2002) posit that weak institutions in the form of the strength of legal 
enforcement, quality of commercial codes, extra-legal payments, administrative 
barriers and inadequate market supporting institutions constitute a barrier to the 
activities of firms. A typical example could be cited in the case of Ghana where 
excessive delays in court proceedings and the high cost of settling legal claims 
constrain the activities of firms in the country (Abor and Quartey, 2010). A recent 
World Bank report on doing business also identifies several institutional factors 
including a less reliable legal system and lack of consistency in enforcing 
agreements that constrain activities of firms in SSA (World Bank Doing Business, 
2013).       
 
A major institutional pillar is the regulatory environment that includes the extent to 
which rules and regulations are enforced. The regulatory environment could affect 
firms’ access to finance (e.g. Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2004; Levy, 
1993). The premise for this argument is that the regulatory environment enables as 
well as constrains firms’ operations and eventually firms’ ability to raise capital 
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needed for their operations. However, where regulations are too cumbersome, 
restrictive of business’ creativity and inefficient (in terms of cost), they are likely to 
limit the ability of firms to access capital. At the same time, where rules are poorly 
developed and enforced (as in the case of many countries in SSA), there is a danger 
of chaos, corruption and unproductive industrial practices, and the outcome is that 
business operations (including their access to finance) may be affected negatively. 
Thus, it would seem reasonable to argue that moderate (as opposed to low and high) 
levels of regulatory quality would be the ideal situation for firms’ access to finance. 
In the sections that follow, the moderating effects of the rule of law on the 
relationship between firm-level factors and leverage are examined.  
 
4.6.1. Rule of law (RL), asset tangibility (TA) and leverage (LEV) 
 
The prevailing social and economic environment in the form of the quality of rule of 
law is likely to exert significant influence on corporate decisions including their 
choice of capital. By rule of law, I mean the extent to which agents have confidence 
in and abide by the rule of society and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, the police and the court (World Bank, 2013). Thus, 
institutional variations are likely to explain the diversity found across firms in terms 
of their financing decisions. Indeed, various empirical studies on capital structure 
including Fosu, (2013), Gungoraydinoglu and Oztekin (2011), Deesomsak, Paudal 
and Pescetto (2004), Huang and Song, (2006) and Viviani (2008) Bradley, Jarrell 
and Kim (1984), have identified asset tangibility as important components in debt 
acquisition in countries with lower–quality institutions. In such countries, as a result 
of weak creditors rights and high defaults on debt contract, tangible assets are used 
as collateral in debt acquisition. Thus, it is reasonable to suggest that in countries 
with a strong rule of law, asset tangibility should be less important in debt 
acquisition. This leads to the next hypothesis that: 
 
H12. A strong rule of law moderates the association between asset tangibility and 
leverage so that the association is negative. 
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4.6.2. Rule of law (RL), tax (TX) and leverage (LEV) 
 
This thesis takes the key assumptions that the institutional environment in a country, 
that is made up of both formal and informal institutions, is likely to have a 
significant influence on the activities of firms. As noted above, the role of 
institutions in shaping economic activities has been given attention in the literature 
by a number of studies (e.g. Adomako and Danso, 2014; Levie and Autio, 2011; 
Wan, 2005; Co, 2004). In  a weaker institutional environment characterised by weak 
or no rule of law, there is a high incidence of bribery and corruption as there is little 
governmental presssure on firms and this facilitates tax evasion. Thus, tax should be 
of less concern to firms in their financing decisions.  Therefore, at a high level of 
rule of law, incidence of corruption and bribery is low and there is little chance for 
firms to evade compliance with the law (including payment of tax). Consequently, it 
is reasonable to posit that:  
 
H13.  With a strong  rule of law, the association between tax and leverage is 
positive. 
 
The discussion of the moderating role of rule of law can be represented in Figure 4.4. 
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Figure 4. 4: Conceptual model 4 
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4.7. Summary and Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, a discussion of the study’s formal hypotheses is presented. A wide 
range of theoretical perspectives such as the irrelevance theory, pecking order 
theory, the trade-off theory, the free cash flow theory and the market timing theory 
have been employed to access the factors that underline financing decisions of firms.  
 
Across these theoretical perspectives, research into capital structure divides into two 
broad scholarly perspectives: the trade off theory and the pecking order theory. 
Accordingly, the trade off and the pecking order theories are used as the key 
theoretical underpinnings for the various conceptual models presented in this 
chapter. Frameworks relating to various firm-level factors and leverage, the 
moderating role of firm size and asset tangibility are presented. Fundamentally, the 
relationship between tax and leverage has been found to be positive (Frank and 
Goyal, 2003; Graham and Harvey, 2001). However, drawing upon the institutional 
difference arguments of Julian and Ofori-Dankwa (2013), this tax-leverage 
relationship might not always apply.  
 
Also, firms do not operate in a vacuum and the nature of the environment could have 
impact on the activities of firms (Adomako and Danso, 2014). For instance, the 
extent to which rules and regulations are enforced in a society could influence the 
financing decisions of firms within that society. In other words, the quality of the 
regulatory environment could constrain as well as enhance the operations of firm 
(Gungoraydinoglu and Oztekin, 2011; North, 1994; North, 1990). Drawing upon this 
and to access it from the perspective of SSA, this chapter also explores the effects of 
rule of law as a key factor that influence financing decisions of firms. To illustrate 
this intuition, I examine how a strong rule of law moderates the tax-leverage and 
tangibility-leverage relationships. By rule of law, I mean the extent to which agents 
have confidence in and abide by the rule of society and in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, the police and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence (World Bank, 2013).      
In order to achieve the objectives of this study, it is important that the right 
methodological process is adopted. Thus, the next part of this study sets out the 
methodological procedures regarding the gathering and analysing of data.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Research Procedures 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
This research examines the dimensions of capital structure of firms in eight countries 
in SSA by using both primary and secondary data. The specific research questions 
the study seeks to answer are:  
1. How do firms in Ghana make their financing decisions? 
2. Has the recent global financial crisis had any impact on the debt-equity 
choice of companies in Ghana?   
3. What are the critical firm-level factors that affect debt-equity choice of 
companies in less developed market economies?  
4. Do country-level factors also affect capital structure practices of firms in 
developing economies?   
5. What are the moderating effects of firm size on the relationship between 
other firm-level factors and leverage?  
6. Does asset tangibility moderate earnings volatility-leverage relationship?  
7. Does rule of law moderate tax-leverage and asset tangibility-leverage 
relationships? 
8. Are the theoretical models that explain the debt-equity choice in the 
advanced markets also applicable in the context of SSA?  
 
In order to answer the above questions, it is important that appropriate data 
collection and analysis techniques are adopted. As such, this chapter outlines the 
research methodology procedures for this study. This chapter is organised into two 
main sections: the first part describes the general data collection procedures. Specific 
issues considered under the first part include the choice of methodology, sample 
selection, and detailed discussion of primary and secondary data collection 
procedures.  The second part of this chapter focuses on the methods of data analysis. 
Since two sets of data are employed in this study, (i.e. primary data obtained using 
questionnaire and secondary data obtained from Datastream and the World Bank 
111 
 
global databases), the methods of data analysis section is further divided into two 
main sections. The first section looks at the analysis of the primary data and the 
second section discusses the analysis procedure of the secondary data. 
 
 
5.2. The Research Design 
 
Research methodology plays a fundamental role in solving any particular research 
problem. Using the appropriate research design helps the researcher to deal with the 
research question in efficient and effective manner. In other words, the research 
design provides the researcher with a road map for the achievement of the objectives 
of the research by ensuring that any evidence that is collected is appropriate for 
theory testing (Rindfleisch, Malter, Ganesan and Moorman, 2008). Using an 
inappropriate design can therefore lead to wrong research findings. As a 
consequence, in any piece of research, efforts must be made to identify the right 
method to arrive at a logical conclusion.   
 
Bryman (1984) identified two main methods of data collection used in empirical 
studies and these are quantitative and qualitative methods. Quantitative methods are 
characterised by the use of hypothesis testing and fixed measurements, which is less 
flexible; while qualitative methods on the other hand are interpretative techniques 
that seek to discover rather than verify and may provide bases for further studies 
(Bryman, 1984; Thomas, 2003). Myers (1997) observed that qualitative research 
methods provide the opportunity to understand the people being studied from the 
social-cultural background within which they live. Thus, this method can be used in 
studying issues such as people’s behaviour, beliefs, experiences and other aspects of 
culture. Thomas (2003) observed that quantitative research involves the use of 
numbers and statistical methods while qualitative methods involve studying things in 
their natural setting and try to make sense out of this based on the meaning people 
bring to them.  
 
Several research designs or strategies could be used under both quantitative and 
qualitative research methods. As identified by Kerlinger (1973), a number of 
research strategies could be used when examining the relationship between 
organisational variables and these include cross-sectional and longitudinal designs. A 
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cross-sectional design involves the collection of data on more than one case at a 
single point in time to make inferences about a population. In contrast with cross-
sectional design, longitudinal design is an extension of the cross-sectional approach 
in terms of duration for collecting the data and it involves the collection of data that 
spans over a longer period on a sample of a population (Bryman 2004; Rindfleisch, 
Malter, Ganesan, Moorma, 2008). Indeed, both cross-sectional (e.g. using 
questionnaire) and longitudinal designs (also referred to as panel data) are often used 
in finance research.   
 
Despite the numerous advantages associated with these research designs, the choice 
of any research design or process should be informed by the objectives of the 
research in question as outlined by Creswell (2009). Considering the aim and 
purpose of this research, which aims at investigating the capital structure of firms in 
SSA and since this involved the use of both research questionnaire and panel data, 
both cross-sectional and longitudinal designs were adopted for the study. The 
usefulness of combining both cross sectional and longitudinal (panel) designs is well 
documented in the literature. According to Rindfleisch et al. (2008), combining the 
two research designs helps the researcher in addressing some critical issues including 
non-response bias, reliability assessment and construct validation. Consequently, 
combining the two research designs provides a better understanding of the research 
problem than using a single research design. For this research, the purpose of 
combining the two designs is to help the researcher collect different but integrated 
data which will help in providing a holistic view of the situation under consideration.  
In addition to this, in this present study, the research questions and hypothesis set 
require different data sets in finding answers to the individual research question and 
hypothesis. Table 4.1 presents the different data sources used in answering each of 
the research questions outlined. 
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Table 5. 1: Research Design Matrix 
 
Research Questions 
Type of 
Design 
Source/Instrument 
How do firms in Ghana make their financing 
decisions? 
  
Cross-
sectional and 
Longitudinal 
(panel) 
Primary and 
Secondary Sources 
Has the recent global financial crisis had any 
impact on the debt-equity choice of companies 
in developing economies such as those in 
Ghana?  
Cross-
sectional  
Primary Source 
What are the critical firm-level factors that 
affect the debt-equity choice of companies in 
less developed economies?  
Cross-
sectional and 
Longitudinal 
(Panel) 
Primary and 
Secondary Sources 
  
Beyond this, do country-level factors also 
affect capital structure practices of firms in 
developing economies? 
Cross-
sectional and 
Longitudinal 
 
Primary and 
Secondary Sources 
 
Are there any moderating effects of firm size 
on the relationship between other firm-level 
factors and leverage? 
Longitudinal 
(panel) 
Secondary Source 
Does asset tangibility moderate the earnings 
volatility-leverage relationship? 
Longitudinal 
(panel) 
Secondary Source 
Does rule of law moderate the tax-leverage and 
asset tangibility leverage relationships?   
 
  Longitudinal 
(panel) 
 
Primary and 
Secondary Sources 
 
Are the theoretical models that explain the 
debt-equity choice in advanced markets also 
applicable in the context of SSA?  
Cross-
sectional and 
Longitudinal 
(panel) 
 
Primary and 
Secondary Sources 
 
 
 
5.3. Population and Sample Choice 
 
Based on the purpose of the study, the target population for the study include all 
firms in countries within the SSA sub-region. Since this study uses two sources of 
data (i.e. primary data from 119 firms in Ghana and secondary data from 359 firms 
in eight SSA countries including Ghana), the sample of firms can therefore be 
categorised into two. These are  
1. Primary sample choice  
2. Secondary sample choice 
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5.3.1. Primary Sample choice 
 
Unlike secondary data, primary data are less open to public scrutiny and there could 
also be a high cost involved in gathering the data. Still, a key aspect of the use of 
primary data is that the data collection procedure could be designed to suit the 
objectives of the research in question. In other words, the researcher has in mind 
specific research aims, which influence his choice of appropriate primary data 
collection method and sample. As such, the information gathered is tailored 
specifically to find answers to the aforementioned research problem and questions. 
This is an advantage over secondary data, which may have been collected for other 
purposes and for that matter may not meet the objectives of the research under 
consideration (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2007).  
 
The primary data for this study were collected from firms in Ghana through the use 
of questionnaires. Initially, the focus of this study was to be based on one country in 
SSA that has a relatively developed industrial base to facilitate the data collection 
process. Apart from this, the country was expected to have a relatively stable 
political and peaceful environment. This is also important since I decided to travel to 
the country to gather the data myself instead of using any other means. Based on 
these criteria, the focus was placed on Ghana. This is because the country is seen as 
one of the few developing economies in SSA with a relatively developed industrial 
base. Besides, the Ghanaian economy has been experiencing significant growth (an 
average GDP growth of 6.0% since the year 2002) and it is regarded as one of the 
fast growing economies in the world (World Bank, 2012). In addition, the country is 
regarded as one of the few developing countries that have robust democracies 
(World Bank, 2011). These promising economic conditions and the personal 
connections I have in the country facilitated the data collection process. 
 
Since other countries in SSA also have their data on the Datastream global dataset, a 
decision was made that all firms from SSA with sufficient data on the Datastream 
should also be included in this study. 
 
The target companies for the primary data included all firms on the database of the 
Ghana Register General department (the equivalent of Companies House). These 
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firms were targeted to ensure that credible information was obtained, as they are 
obliged by law to keep proper records. It was also required that the sampled firms 
showed variations with respect to their economic activity. This was to ensure that the 
selected firms were not limited to only one specific industry or sector of the 
Ghanaian economy but rather across the three main sectors of the Ghanaian 
economy. The purpose of doing this was to enable me to collect different but 
interrelated data from different firms with the three sectors. These sectors are the 
primary sector (i.e. those firms engaged in the production of raw materials and basic 
foods), the secondary sector (i.e. manufacturing, processing and construction) and  
the tertiary sector (i.e. service).  
 
The selection of the sample for this study was done in two phases. In phase one, 
3201 companies that were drawn from the Register General department database 
were grouped into ten based on the regions within which the firm is located, after 
which a stratified random sampling technique was used in selecting 50 firms each 
from the categories. In the second phase of the selection process, I  made contact 
with the selected firms and out of the 500 firms that were contacted, 231 firms 
(46.2%) agreed to participate in the study. Although the number of firms that 
consented to take part in the study was less than the anticipated 50% rate, these firms 
were drawn from seven regions and the three sectors of the economy making the 
sample representative of the population.  
 
5.3.2. Questionnaires 
 
Having chosen to rely on cross-sectional data (in addition to panel data) for this 
study, it was imperative to choose a feasible cross-sectional data (primary data) 
collection approach. Several data collection methods are available for primary data 
collection. These include face-to–face interviews, telephone interview, online 
questionnaires, and mail/personally delivered questionnaires. In relation to the 
objective of this study, each of these methods of data collection is evaluated in the 
paragraphs that follow.  
First, telephone interviews were deemed an inappropriate method for the current 
study given the nature of the information that was required from the respondents. For 
instance, respondents were required to provide some financial accounts information, 
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which could not have been done easily on the telephone. Given this limitation, it is, 
therefore, not surprising to find that finance researchers rarely use this method for 
the collection of survey data. 
In addition, face-to-face interview was not adopted for this study in that it was 
considered inappropriate in terms of time. Since the study requires data from a large 
number of firms across the whole of Ghana, it would have been very difficult to 
conduct face-to-face interviews due to the limited period that was available for the 
data collection. In addition to this, since the researcher was interested in collecting 
enough data from a large number of firms to have an in-depth understanding of the 
problem under consideration, the use of face-to-face interviews would not have 
provided the type of information needed. Notwithstanding the advantages associated 
with online/email
29
 method including less paper work, the ease of reaching a large 
number of respondents at the same time and the ease of transferring the data gathered 
on to a spreadsheet for analysis, this method was not chosen for a number of reasons. 
First, due to the risk of virus infection, many firms have strict policies against 
accepting emails with attachments. Besides, according to Weible and Wallace 
(1998), the email or online method is a less efficient method of data collection due to 
the amount of time and resources involved in creating, distributing, and collecting 
the data online.  
  
Given the limitation associated with the methods of data collection mentioned above, 
a questionnaire was chosen as the appropriate method for this study. According to 
Churchill (1995), using the questionnaire also ensures that the responses were 
gathered in a standardised manner, as the researcher’s opinion did not influence the 
respondents in responding to the questions in any particular ways.  In enhancing the 
validity of the data collected using the questionnaire, the primary data gathered for 
this study was cross-checked with data obtained from the Datastream global 
database. This was crucial in helping to assess the validity and reliability of the two 
data sets used in this study. The subsequent section explains how the questionnaire 
was designed and administered in gathering the information needed for this thesis. 
 
                                            
29 This method involves emailing the questionnaire to the respondents or sending a web link containing the 
questionnaire.  
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5.3.3. Designing the Questionnaire 
 
The designing of the research instrument plays an integral role in enhancing the 
validity and reliability of the study results. Although the use of questionnaires has 
become one of the common methods of data collection in most research studies (e.g. 
Adomako and Danso, 2014; Acquah, 2007; Beattie et al. 2006; Boateng, 2004; 
Edgar, 1991), it is necessary for the researcher to ensure that it is valid, reliable and 
unambiguous so that the results can be trusted (Creswell, 2009). In enhancing the 
validity and reliability of the instrument used in this present study, psychometric 
procedures suggested by the literature including De Vellis (2003) and Churchill 
(1979) were followed in the design of the questionnaire for this study. Based on the 
recommendation of Churchill (1979), Figure 4.1 shows the questionnaire 
development procedure followed in the current study.  
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 Figure 5. 1: Questionnaire Development procedure 
 
 
 
 
Step1: 
Specification of the type of information needed 
Step 2: 
Determination of the type of questionnaire and method of 
administration 
Step 3:  
Using existing literature on finance, the content of individual questions 
are determined 
Step 4: 
The form of response to each question is determined 
Step 5 
The wording of each question is determined 
Step 6 
The sequence of the questions is determined 
Step 7 
The physical characteristics of the questionnaire are determined 
Step 8 
Steps 1-7 are re-examined and revised where necessary 
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5.3.4. Type of information sought   
 
In line with the objectives of the current study, the existing literature was studied to 
locate the information needed to measure the constructs of interest. The designing of 
the questionnaire was informed by the ones used in similar studies by; 
1. Brounen  Jong and Koedijk (2006) who investigated the capital policies of 
four major European countries (i.e. Germany, France, Netherlands and the 
UK), 
2.  Beattie et al. (2006) who also studied the financial practices of firms in UK,  
3. Fan and So (2004) in their study of the financial decisions of managers in 
Hong Kong, 
4. Graham and Harvey (2001) which involves a study of 392 chief financial 
officers about capital structure, capital budgeting and cost of capital, 
5. Edgar (1991) who also investigated the capital structure policy of small high 
growing corporations in the US; with special changes to suit the objectives of 
this thesis, 
 
Using appropriately designed questionnaires is another important aspect of any piece 
of research that relies on them. In order words, the questionnaires should be well 
designed in such a way that they meet the objectives of the research. It is also 
important to observe that a well developed questionnaire plays a significant role in 
the reduction of measurement error. In using questionnaires, Saunders et al. (2007) 
observed that a number of factors should be taken into consideration. These include 
the characteristics of the respondents, the type and number of questions one needs to 
ask to obtain the required data, as well as the sample size required for analysis, 
taking into consideration the expected response rate. These factors were carefully 
considered in the design of the questionnaire for the current study.  
 
The layout of the questions was also another important aspect that was considered.  
Saunders et al. (2007) contended that the layout of self-administered questionnaires 
needs to be clear and attractive, as this is important in encouraging the respondent to 
fill them in and at the same time, it should not appear too lengthy. Following these 
suggestions, the layout of the questionnaires for this study was designed to 
encourage responses from the respondents. The questionnaire had thirty-two 
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questions in all and was divided into three main segments. The first segment had a 
total of 13 items and questions focused on aspects including the job title of the 
respondent, gender, age and educational background of CEO, type of industry, and 
whether the company is listed or unlisted and ownership and control. The second 
section had 15 questions in total and the questions focused on the viewpoints that 
guide firms in their financing decisions. The third and final part had four questions 
and looked at firm-level factors relating to capital structure and the effects of the 
2007/08 financial crisis. 
 
5.3.5. Response Format 
 
Various questionnaire response formats could be identified in the literature. Among 
these are open-ended questions, close-ended questions, dichotomous questions and 
multidichotomous questions (Churchill 1995). Out of the total 32 questions in the 
questionnaire, 28 of them were close-ended questions. The remaining four were 
open-ended and they required respondents to provide some short information. With 
the close-ended questions, the respondents were given a number of options to choose 
from. The advantages of using these types of questions over open ended questions
30
 
are that they are less time-consuming to respond to and also facilitate coding and 
subsequent analysis. It also reduces the possibility of misinterpretation of the 
questions on behalf of the respondents (Gilbert, 2002). In addition, close-ended 
questionnaires are considered a faster and less expensive data collecting procedure 
than other ways of gathering data (De Vellis, 2003). Indeed, the close ended-
questions were deemed more appropriate, especially when responses had to be 
compared across multiple respondents in Ghana. As suggested by Gilbert (2002), a 
category of ‘other’ was also provided for those who could not find a suitable pre-
coded response.   
 
5.3.6. Measurement Scale 
 
Another vital issue that was considered in the development of this questionnaire was 
the type of measurement scale to use. The main objective of the use of the survey 
                                            
30 With open ended questions, respondents have no options to choose from but are rather required to give their 
responses in whatever form they desire. 
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questionnaire in the current research was to access the opinion of firms regarding 
their financing decision. Thus, it was important that an appropriate measurement 
scale was used in capturing the information required. Indeed, different measurement 
scales are used in business and social science research. These measurement scales 
include nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio scales. With the nominal scale, 
individual responses are categorised based on some characteristics without any order 
or structure. Also, with the ordinal scale, responses are ranked based on preference. 
The interval scale is a type of scale where responses are ranked into different 
numbers based on differences in the degree of order. The ratio scale combines the 
characteristics of all the other three measurement scales and this measurement scale 
is not often available in social research. Nominal and interval scales are 
predominately used in finance research in that these scales allow non-parametric and 
parametric statistical techniques to be conducted. Considering the nature of the 
responses that were required in the current study, nominal and interval scales were 
therefore used.   
 
The next stage following the choice of the measurement scale was to decide the 
scaling technique to use. Different scaling techniques are used in the social science 
research. Among these techniques are the Semantic differential technique, the Likert 
scale, the Stapel scale, the Numerical scale and Constant-sum scale. Tull and 
Hawkins (1984) observed that the Likert scale and Semantic differential scales are 
the most commonly used scaling techniques in research. Considering the above 
argument and also based on the nature of the responses that was required as well as 
the characteristics of the respondents, a 5-point Likert scale was predominantly used 
in the questionnaire where respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which a 
series of statements applied to their financing decisions. Although Nworgu (1991) 
argued that a 5-point Likert scale gives room for no responses, the 5–point Likert 
type response format was adopted because it is considered to be generally most 
effective and easier to comprehend from the respondent’s point of view and it is also 
extremely popular for measuring attitudes (Zikmund, 2003; Holmes, 1974). A copy 
of the questionnaire used in this study is found in Appendix 1 of this thesis. Table 
5.2 shows how the questions from the questionnaire linked to the literature. 
122 
 
Table 5. 2 : Questions from the questionnaire linked to literature 
 
General Questions: Q1. Job title of Respondent        Q7. Economic Activity of firm. 
                                Q2. Permission                            Q8. Stock market Listing 
                                Q31. Company Account information 
 
Subject 
 
Main Question 
 
Literature 
 
 
Characteristics of 
CEO 
Q3-Q6. Indicate the 
gender, age, level of 
education of the CEO and 
the no. of yrs since 
becoming CEO. 
Older CEOs are likely to choose 
lower leverage and having an MBA 
is associated with more leverage 
(See  Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; 
Frank and Goyal, 2009) 
 
 
 
Multinationality 
Q9. Indicate your firm’s 
association with any firm 
situated outside Ghana 
Multinational firms are likely to 
have more debt due to the minimal 
level of risk perceived by lenders 
and large asset base (see Ramirez 
and Kwok 2010; Bradley et al., 
1984) 
 
 
Government 
Ownership 
Q10-Q11. Does the Ghana 
Gov’t own shares in your 
firm and the percentage (if 
any). 
The Government owning a large 
percentage of the equity  could be a 
positive indication to financial 
lenders of the company’s 
guaranteed solvency (see 
Wiwattanakantang (1999), by Zou 
and Xiao, (2006) 
 
Managerial 
Ownership 
and 
Control 
Q12-Q13.Indicate whether 
any of those in 
management hold shares 
in your company and the 
percentage. 
Firms with one owner  may not be 
willing to share control rights with 
others and  therefore rely heavily on 
debt rather than  equity to avoid the 
dilution of control ( See Cespedes 
et al. 2010; Boateng 2004; 
Wiwattanakantang 1999) 
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Table 5.2 (Cont.) 
 
Subject 
 
Main Question 
 
Literature 
 
 
Sources of Finance 
Q14. Indicate your main 
source of finance 
Firms in countries with poor 
institutions have limited access to 
external finance. (See Beck et al. 
2002). 
 
Relationship with 
Banks 
Q15. How many banks 
does your firm have bank 
accounts with? 
Firms with multiple sources of 
financial services are less likely to 
receive credit from potential 
lenders (See Cole, 1998) 
 
Problems of 
financing 
Q16-Q17.Indicate the 
problems your company 
faces in securing funds 
from banks/lenders. 
Firms in developing economies 
fail to progress due to the issue of 
financing (See Salawu, 2006) 
 
 
Pecking Order 
Theory (POT) 
Q18. Ranking of retained 
earnings, debt/loans and 
equity finance in order of 
preference 
It is argued that in financing 
activities, firms initially depend on 
internally generated funds, 
followed by straight debt and 
finally new issue of equity (See 
Myers, 1984; Fama and French, 
2002; Dawood, et al., 2011)  
 
 
 
POT 
Q19. Indicate the factors 
that influence firms in 
choosing equity finance. 
High transaction cost and loss of 
control through share dilution  are 
among the factors that firms take 
into account in issuing equity 
finance (see Kjellman and Hansen, 
1995 and  Myers and Majluf 1984) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
124 
 
Table 5.2. (Cont.) 
 
Subject 
 
Main Question 
 
Literature 
 
 
 
POT 
Q20. Indicate the  factors that 
influence firms in choosing 
debt finance 
To prevent loss of control, firms may 
depend on debt rather than issues of 
new equity. Other factors that 
influence firms in choosing debt 
finance include tax advantages and 
prevention of dilution of control   
(see Ang and Jung, 1993, Fama and 
French, 2002  and Kjellman and 
Hansen, 1995) 
 
 
Short 
and 
Long term debt 
Q21. Indicate the factors that 
influence your firm in 
choosing long and short-term 
debt. 
Firms may borrow short term when 
they expect the long-term interest 
rate to reduce. Also, financial 
managers may match the maturity of  
asset with liabilities (See Bancel and 
Mittoo, 2004)  
 
POT 
Q22. In financing new 
investment opportunities, 
indicate why you may prefer 
retained earnings 
Firms prefer retained earnings 
because it is cheaper and also prevent 
the dilution of control (see Ang and 
Jung, 1993 and Kjellman and 
Hansen, 1995) 
 
Target Capital 
Structure 
Q23-25. Indicate if your 
company has a target capital 
structure, the percentage of 
target debt and what/who 
influences the setting of the 
target. 
Trade–off theories are built on the 
notion of target capital structure 
which balances the cost and benefits 
associated with debt and equity (See 
MandM, 1963) 
 
Spare 
Borrowing 
Q26-28. Indicate if your 
company has a spare 
borrowing capacity, its type 
and the reason for the spare 
capacity. 
The existence of spare borrowing 
capacity ensure that special projects 
and unexpected opportunities are 
seized (See Myers and Majluf 1984; 
Allen, 2000)  
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Table 5.2. (Cont.) 
 
Subject 
 
Main Question 
 
Literature 
 
 
Financial 
Crisis 
Q29. Indicate the effects of 
the recent (2007/08) 
financial crisis. 
The recent financial crisis 
constrained the availability 
of credits to firms in less 
developed economies. (see 
Clarke, Cull and Kisunko, 
2012) 
 
 
Firm’s 
Size 
Q30. Provide the number 
of employees of the 
company  
The larger the firm, the less 
likely it is to default and also 
there is less variability in 
earnings and therefore 
expected to use more debt 
than smaller firms (see Frank 
and Goyal, 2003; Wald, 
1999; Cheng and Shiu 2007) 
 
 
 
5.3.7. Content Validity of the Questionnaire 
 
The evaluation of the face validity
31
 of the questionnaire is a useful assessment 
procedures in questionnaire design (Netemeyer, Bearden and Sharma 2003). Hair, 
Anderson, Tathum, Black (2006) observed that the face validity of a measure must 
be established prior to any theoretical assessment, especially where measures are 
borrowed from previous studies and transferred into a new context. This is because 
an understanding of the content of a measure or construct is important if statistical 
measures are to be correctly specified (Hardesty and Bearden, 2004). The face 
validity also ensures that the questionnaire contains all the information it is supposed 
to contain.  
 
As suggested by Nunnally and Bernstein (1994), the questionnaire for the current 
study was sent to three academics in the UK who were knowledgeable in the field of 
finance, questionnaire design and also experienced in conducting research in SSA. 
                                            
31 Face validity is the extent to which at the face value, the questions measure what they purport to measure 
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These individuals were asked to comment on the content validity of the 
questionnaires and the physical look of the entire questionnaire. This procedure was 
important in ensuring that the questions were appropriate in answering the research 
objectives. These individuals examined the appropriateness of the questionnaire in 
measuring the research objectives. All the three academics responded positively 
about the appropriateness of the questionnaire in answering the research question. 
However, because the questionnaire required companies to provide their financial 
information, these academics were doubtful as whether the companies would be 
prepared to provide all the information needed if I were not there personally. The 
concern raised necessitated that I deliver the questionnaires to the respondents 
myself instead of sending them through the post or via the email.  
 
5.3.8. Choice of Respondents   
 
 As observed by De Vellis (2003), the source of information is important for the 
accuracy of any piece of research. This is because using an inappropriate source of 
information leads to inaccurate results and casts doubt over the integrity of the 
results obtained (Dillman, 2000). Consequently, the conclusion reached cannot be 
generalised to the intended population. As outlined in the objectives of this research, 
it was important that detailed information on the financial activities of all firms 
studied was provided. From this perspective, it was important that this study 
obtained the information required from the right informants. Informants who were 
most likely to be knowledgeable about the firm’s financial practices and therefore 
should be able to provide accurate information on the key constructs of interest of 
the current study were contacted. Previous studies  (e.g. Beattie et al., 2006; Fan and 
So, 2004; Graham and Harvey, 2001) have used various respondents including 
owners, CEOs, finance managers, and accountants. With their involvement in the 
financial operations of their firms, information from these respondents is more 
reliable than from other individuals within the firm. Consequently, in line with the 
purpose of the current study and existing literature, the above individuals were 
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chosen as key informants in the current study. The advantage of using these multiple 
informants was to reduce common method variance
32
 (Acquaah, 2007).  
 
5.3.9. Pilot Testing of the Questionnaire 
  
In using a questionnaire as instrument of survey, it is imperative that the 
questionnaire is pre-tested for reliability and to ensure that any omissions and 
mistakes can be spotted and dealt with appropriately. The pilot testing also ensures 
that the questions achieve the desired quality of measurement as observed by 
Tuckman (1999). The pilot testing enables the researcher to ascertain whether the 
respondents understand, interpret and respond to the questions well or not. As noted 
by Saunder et al. (2007), the pilot testing of the questionnaires enables the researcher 
to assess the validity of the questions and the reliability of the data intended to be 
collected. Remenyi, Williams, Money and Swartz (1998) observed that successful 
pre-testing gives the opportunity to measure various aspects of the questionnaire. 
These aspects include the clarity of the various questions, the covering letter, the 
quality of evidence and their suitability to use in statistical tests, the time taken to 
complete the questionnaire, the possible response rate, the cost involved in  
administering the questionnaire, the relevance and irrelevance of questions and 
whether any key issue has been overlooked.  
 
As the research on financing decisions of firms in Ghana has received little attention 
so far, a pilot study was therefore important in helping to shape the entire 
questionnaire for the final survey. As such, in addition to the comments received 
from the three experts mentioned above, the questionnaire was further pre-tested 
with a selected group of firms in Ghana. In December 2012, the questionnaire for 
this study were sent out to firms to identify any problem associated with it. The pre-
testing procedure adopted in this study involved contacting 20 firms in Ghana via 
telephone to solicit their willingness to take part in the pre-testing procedure. 12 of 
the firms that were contacted agreed to participate in the pre-testing procedure. The 
questionnaires were sent out to these 12 firms to complete them. Nine questionnaires 
(i.e. representing 75 percent) were returned with no major concerns raised. This gave 
                                            
32 ‘Common method bias describes the amount of spurious correlation between variables that is created by using 
the same source and creates false internal consistency , that is, an apparent correlation among variables generated 
by their common source’ (Chang, Witteloostuijn and Eden, 2010).  
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an idea of the expected response rate and also showed the appropriateness of the 
questions. A reliability analysis of the pre-tested questionnaires revealed a 
Cronbach’s Alpha value33 of 0.873. Out of the nine questionnaires, two of them 
expressed concern about the length of the questionnaire and its effects on the entire 
response rate. With this concern, some changes and adjustments were made to ensure 
that the questions were more concise, whilst at the same time ensuring that the 
quality of the information sought was not compromised. In addition, some of the 
questions were spaced to enhance easy reading. The three firms that failed to respond 
to the questionnaires indicated that they were not willing to disclose any information 
relating to their financial practices to any third party. In all, the pilot test only led to 
minor modification of the entire questionnaire.  
 
5.3.10. Administering the Questionnaires 
 
Between February and March 2013, 231 questionnaires with covering letters and 
survey information sheets were personally delivered to 231 companies in Ghana.   
Each questionnaire was also accompanied with the full contact details of the thesis 
supervisors, thus lending credibility to the research. The questionnaires were 
personally collected within five weeks. One week after the respondents had been 
given the questionnaires, all the firms were contacted by phone to remind them of 
the collection date. This reminder was important in persuading those who had not 
filled out the questionnaires to get them ready for the collection date and also to 
check if they needed any further clarifications. I also visited some of the firms 
personally to remind them of the collection date. All these actions were taken to 
enhance the response rate. In the process of distributing the questionnaires, 
respondents were continually reminded about the need to provide accurate answers 
to the questions asked. This was important to ensure the accuracy and the reliability 
of the results obtained.  
 
In terms of delivering the questionnaires to the respondents, there were other ways 
that the questionnaires could have been sent out to the respondents, for instance, by 
                                            
33
 The Cronbach’s Alpha value is used as the estimate of a reliability of a set of items and this value was 
obtained by running a Cronbach’s alpha test in SPSS. As a commonly accepted rule of thumb, a Cronbach’s 
alpha value of 0.7 and above shows high reliability of test scores. 
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email, fax or using the post. However, I decided to personally deliver the 
questionnaires to the respondents for two reasons: 
1. First, the absence of reliable postal and other communication services in 
Ghana made the use of this method the best and efficient option in the current 
research. The use of this method helped to ensure that the questionnaires 
were delivered to the right respondents.   
2. In addition to the above, this procedure allowed clarification of issues where 
necessary. Because I had face-to-face contact with the respondents, it allowed 
respondents to seek further explanation of any issues they were not clear 
with. This helped to increase the response rate and also encouraged prompt 
feedback from some of the respondents.  
Additionally, it is important to state that in the current study, a few questionnaires 
were delivered via email as a result of a request of some respondents. 
 
5.3.11. Covering Letter and Survey Information Sheet 
  
To adequately evaluate the reliability and validity of measures, Spector (1992) 
argues that a sample of between 100 and 200 firms are needed in a piece of research. 
Accordingly, it was critical that certain measures were adopted to ensure that a 
certain number of responses were obtained for the current study. Therefore, as a way 
of keeping the response rate high, the use of a covering letter was vital to request the 
commitment and co-operation of the respondents (Churchill, 2005; Dillman, 2000). 
Saunders et al. (2007) observed that covering letters used in research provide the 
opportunity to convince the prospective respondents to take part in the research.  
Following this argument, each questionnaire was accompanied by one covering 
letter. The use of the covering letter helped to increase the credibility of the study. 
As suggested by a number of researchers including Tuckman (1999), Mitchell and 
Jolley (2010), De Vaus (2002) and Connaway and Powel (2010), the covering letter 
used in this research included the following information: 
 An introduction of the researcher 
 The nature, aims and the usefulness of the study so as to dispel any fear that 
participation can have a detrimental effect on their privacy 
  The relevance of the responses 
 A request for cooperation from the respondents 
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 An assurance of  confidentiality and anonymity 
 An offer of the results to those firms which might be interested. This in 
particular was to serve as a form of incentive to encourage the respondents to 
fill out the questionnaires.  
A copy of the covering letter (together with the questionnaire) is included in 
Appendix 1 of this thesis. In addition to the cover letter, a participant information 
sheet accompanied each questionnaire. The information on this sheet included the 
aims and implications of the research, what participants would be required to do with 
the survey, whether it was compulsory to take part in the research, the risk involved 
in taking part in the research, how the information gathered would be stored and how 
the findings from the research would be disseminated. A copy of the participant 
information sheet is included in Appendix 2 of this thesis.    
 
5.3.12. Confidentiality and Anonymity 
 
Connaway and Powel (2010) observed that the assurance of confidentiality and 
anonymity is one of the useful ways of increasing the response rate. The absence of 
this will give rise to respondents giving dishonest answers, and in some cases the 
respondents will not even be willing to fill out the questionnaires at all. This 
underlines the importance of maintaining respondents’ confidentiality and 
anonymity. In both the covering letter and the participant information sheet, the 
respondents were assured that responses will be kept strictly anonymous and in 
complete confidence, and that under no circumstance will their individual identities 
be revealed to any third party and that any information gathered will be solely used 
for this research. This was important in ensuring sincere responses. Additionally, in 
order to ensure that the information from the respondents is securely stored, the 
coded responses were securely stored on the University of York’s secure server and 
the paper form was kept under lock and key in one of the cabinets of the PhD room 
at the York Management School.    
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5.3.13. Ethical Considerations 
 
Head (2009) observed that giving financial incentives to her participants had a 
positive influence on participation and response.  She however argued that paying 
these participants had some practical, ethical and methodological issues, thus making 
her study unethical. Thus, in trying to minimise this challenge, I ensured that no 
monetary incentive was given to the respondents but the respondents were offered a 
non-monetary incentive by offering them the research findings (e.g. Acquaah, 2007). 
In the cover letter, I stated that those interested in the research findings should 
provide their details at the back of the questionnaire for the findings to be sent to 
them. Out of the total 119 responses received, only one company requested the 
results. 
 
Still on the issue of ethics, approval was sought from the ethics committee of the 
University of York before the questionnaires were sent out to the respondents. This 
was important to ensure that all the statutory requirements of using questionnaires 
are observed. A copy of the ethics submission form can be found in Appendix 3 of 
this thesis. 
 
5.3.14. Challenges Encountered in Administering the Questionnaires  
 
A number of challenges were encountered in the process of administering the 
questionnaire. The covering letter and the survey information sheet that were 
attached to the questionnaire explicitly assured the participants of the anonymity and 
confidentiality of their responses. However, some of the firms visited were initially 
unwilling to accept the questionnaire, as they were concerned about the disclosure of 
their financial information. With this, I had to reassure the participants that there was 
no way any person apart from myself and my two supervisors will know of their 
responses. Even after given this assurance, some of the firms failed to complete the 
questionnaire after keeping the questionnaire for two weeks.  
 
In addition to this, there was the problem of some of the respondents understanding 
some of the terms in the questionnaire (e.g. target debt ratio). In such instances, I had 
to explain those terms/words to the respondents.  There was also a problem with the 
collection of the questionnaires from the participants. Each participant was given a 
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maximum of two weeks for the completion of the questionnaire. A week before the 
collection time, I contacted each participant and reminded him/her of the collection 
date. Still, some of the firms failed to get the questionnaire fully completed for 
collection at the agreed date. This took me extra time to go back to these participants 
for the completed questionnaires. Also, two financial managers requested that I offer 
them some monetary incentives before they would complete the questionnaire. I 
however considered this as unethical since such incentives might bias the data 
collection process. I rather assured them that copies of the research findings would 
be made available to them when ready. 
 
5.3.15. Reducing Drawbacks   
 
A number of shortcomings have been identified as being associated with the use of 
questionnaires in research. These include a low response and non-response bias, 
which could potentially compromise the choice of statistical technique used in the 
data analysis. Also, where there are major differences between non responding and 
responding informants, non-response bias is potentially introduced and could 
undermine the outcome of the statistical analysis and makes it inappropriate to 
generalise the results beyond the sample investigated. (Churchill 2005; Rindfleisch 
et al. 2008; Blair and Zinkhan 2002). Churchill (1995) also observed that the 
physical characteristics of a questionnaire can significantly affect respondents’ 
willingness to participate in a study. A poorly designed questionnaire is likely to 
convey to respondents that the research is unimportant, leading to a low response 
rate (De Vellis, 2003).  
 
Because of the issues mentioned above, a number of measures were adopted in the 
current study to reduce the adverse effects associated with the use of a questionnaire 
in this research. These measures include the use of a covering letter. Churchill 
(2005) suggested that using a good covering letter with a detailed explanation of the 
reason for the research increases the response rate. As such, this measure was 
adopted to help increase the response rate. In addition to this, the layout of the 
questionnaire was made as attractive as possible, with simple and interesting 
questions at the beginning and more sensitive questions at the end of the 
questionnaire. De Vellis (2003) observed that lengthy questionnaires could place an 
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increased burden on respondents because of the amount of time they need to 
complete the questionnaire and this could eventually lead to a low response rate. As 
such, the questionnaire used in the study was not made too lengthy to discourage 
prospective respondents from answering them. At the same time, it was ensured that 
the information gathered was comprehensive enough to aid various statistical 
analyses. In addition to this, good quality office paper was used for the printing of 
the questionnaire and each questionnaire was clearly printed. Besides, self-addressed 
return envelopes were provided to firms that insisted on sending their response 
through the post, instead of being collected personally. To further increase the 
response rate, respondents were assured of a copy of the results of this study. All 
these measures were adopted to reduce any drawbacks associated with the used of 
questionnaire. 
 
5.4. Secondary Data   
 
Besides the use of primary data to examine the financial practices of firms in Ghana, 
this study also examined the firm-level determinants of capital structure of firms 
from eight countries in SSA (i.e. Botswana, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, 
Mauritius, South Africa and Zambia). In addition, the study seeks to examine how 
institutional structures impact on the debt-equity choice of firms in SSA. In order to 
achieve this, appropriate secondary data was collected from various relevant sources. 
Thus, this section describes the various sources of secondary data used. 
 
5.4.1. Sources of Secondary Data 
 
The secondary data was obtained from two major sources: the World Bank and the 
Datastream global database. In the first place, the financial data for 359
34
 firms in 
eight SSA countries (including Ghana) was obtained from Datastream. A sample 
period of 2002-2011 was used for the selection of the firms. The selection of this 
time-period was based on the availability of enough firm-level data. The basis for 
selecting these firms was that each firm was required to have at least four years of 
available data over the study period. Thus, the final sample consisted of 359 firms 
                                            
34 I excluded data from financial and insurance firms, as well as utility companies since these firms are usually 
heavily regulated by governments and therefore tend to have capital structure dissimilar from other firms in the 
corporate sector. 
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with 2658 as the total number of observations. To facilitate the analysis of the data 
gathered, all financial data were converted from the various local currencies into the 
US dollars. The conversion of the data to a common currency (i.e. US dollars) 
helped to provide a common base for the analysis and comparison of the 
information. The conversion of the data from the various local currencies was also 
important in ensuring that the result from this study are comparable to other studies. 
 
Apart from the use of Datastream for firm-level data, additional country-level data 
including information on levels of inflation, GDP, stock market capitalisation,  levels 
of corruption, and rule of law were collected from the World Bank database. The 
geographical breakdown of the firm-level
35
 observations used in this study is shown 
in Figure 5.2   
 
 
Figure 5. 2: Geographical breakdown of observations 
 
 
5.5. Dependent Variable and the Independent Variables Used 
  
The main independent variable tested in this thesis is leverage. Rajan and Zingales 
(1995) posit that there are several ways by which leverage can be defined or 
measured and the objective of the analysis dictates the measure to adopt. For 
instance, leverage can be measured as total debt to total equity (Dawood et al. 2011), 
book value of long-term debt over total asset (De Jong et al. 2008) and ratio of total 
                                            
35 The geographical breakdown of firms is as follows: Botswana = 17; Ghana = 32; Ivory Coast= 32; Kenya = 27; 
Mauritius = 38; Nigeria = 70; South Africa = 127; Zambia = 16.  
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debt to total assets (Mateev, Poutziouris and Ivanov, 2013). For the purpose of this 
study, leverage is defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets. Previous empirical 
findings in the context of both developed and developing economies guided the 
choice of this definition. A summary of all the variables tested in this study and their 
measurements are provided in Table 5.3.    
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Table 5. 3: Variables and their Measurements 
 
Dependent 
variable 
Measurement Literature 
 
Leverage (LEV)
36
 
 
Ratio of total debt to 
total assets 
Mateev, Poutziouris and Ivanov 
(2013);  Delcoure (2007) 
Tang and Jang (2007); Onaolapo and 
Kajola (2012) 
 
Profitability (PR) 
 
 
Ratio of operating 
income to total assets 
Abor (2008); Huang, and Song (2006); 
Gungoraydinoglu and Oztekin (2011); 
Kayo and Kimura, (2011); Deesomsak 
et al. (2004); Cheng and Shiu  (2007); 
Dawood et al. (2011). 
Volatility (VT) Ratio of standard 
deviation of operating 
income  to total assets 
De Jong et al. (2008) 
 
Tangibility (TA) 
 
Ratio of fixed asset to 
total assets 
 
Abor (2008); Huang and Song, (2006); 
Gungoraydinoglu  and Oztekin (2011); 
Kayo and Kimura, (2011); Deesomsak 
et al. (2004); ChengandShiu  (2007) 
 
 
Size (SZ) 
 
 
 
Log of total assets 
Chen (2004); De Jong et al. (2008); 
Deesomsak et al. (2004); Dawood et 
al. (2011), Cassar and Holmes (2003); 
Ramlall (2009); Abor (2008) 
 
Growth (GR) 
 
 
Ratio of sales growth to 
total assets growth 
 
Sharif, Naeem  and Khan (2012) 
Sheikh and Wang (2011). 
 
Tax     (TX) 
 
 
Ratio of tax paid to net 
profit before tax 
 
Gungoraydinoglu and Oztekin, (2011) 
Stock  market 
Development 
(SM) 
 
Ratio of stock market 
capitalization to GDP 
Jong, A. et al., (2008); Kayo and 
Kimura (2011) 
Corruption (CP) Corruption perception 
Index 
Transparency International (2012), 
Jeoveer (2013).  
Inflation (IN) Annual rate of inflation 
 
Gungoraydinoglu and Oztekin  (2011) 
 
Rule of Law (RL) 
The extent to which 
agents have confidence 
in and abide by rules of 
the society 
 
World Bank (2013) 
 
Economic 
development (ED) 
 
GDP as a proxy for 
economic development 
 
 
Cheng and Shiu  (2007) 
                                            
36 Leverage is the dependent variable and all the other variables are independent/exogenous variables 
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5.6. Data Analysis   
 
In any research, using an appropriate data analysis method is essential to get 
statistically reliable results. Thus, this study adopted appropriate data analysis 
techniques to analyse both primary and secondary data to achieve the research 
objectives set out in Chapter One. Following the purpose of the study and previous 
studies including Beattie et al. (2006), Graham and Harvey (2001) and Kayo and 
Kimura (2011), this study adopts various statistical procedures in order to achieve its 
aims and find answers to the research questions raised. In analysing the data, three 
different pieces of statistical software were used, depending on their relevance and 
appropriateness and these are: STATA, Origin and SPSS. Details of the various 
analyses, as well as the discussions of the results and their implications are provided 
in the relevant chapters. Because this study makes use of both primary and secondary 
data, the analysis of the data was grouped into two as discussed briefly below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. 3: Data Analysis Procedure 
 
5.6.1. Analysis of Primary Data 
 
In analysing the primary data, all the copies of the questionnaire were examined for 
accuracy and completeness after which the questionnaires were serially numbered, 
coded and fed into the SPSS and Origin software packages. A reliability test was 
then conducted to assess the reliability of the measurement scales used in the study. 
Details of this are provided in Chapter Six of this thesis. A non-response bias was 
Data Analysis of the Primary and Secondary Data 
Primary Data Analysis 
 prepare the Data 
 explore the data 
 analyse the data 
 represent the results 
  
- 
Secondary Data Analysis 
 prepare the data 
 explore the data 
 analyse the data 
 represent the results 
Draw conclusion from the two datasets 
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also assessed in determining whether non-response could be a major problem in 
interpreting the outcome of this survey. At the first stage of the analysis, descriptive 
analysis procedures were adopted to describe the characteristics of the data collected. 
Various statistical tests were then used in the analysis of the primary data. Details of 
the various statistical analyses of the primary data are provided in Chapter 6. 
 
5.6.2. Analysis of Secondary Data 
 
Apart from the primary data, secondary data were also collected in order to achieve 
the objectives of this study. A number of analytical tasks were adopted in dealing 
with the secondary data. As highlighted above, in the first stage, I converted the data 
from the various local currencies to US dollars. This was important so as to provide 
a common platform for comparing the data. The data were then transposed and fed 
into the STATA software. Various variables
37
 were then generated. Several 
statistical methods and estimations were used in analysing the secondary data. In the 
first place, summary descriptive statistics were calculated in order to ascertain the 
distribution (normality or otherwise) of the variables-both dependent and 
independent variables. Further, to estimate the effects of the explanatory variable on 
leverage, panel estimation models were adopted. These regressions include the 
ordinary least square and tobit regression models. The adoption of the panel data 
approach was due to the panel characteristic of the data and also in line with 
previous scholarly works on capital structure (e.g. Fosu, 2013; Kayo and Kimura, 
2011; Sheikh and Wang, 2011; Huang and Song, 2006; Chen, 2004). The advantage 
of the panel data methodology over other methods is that this method allows one to 
control for unobserved variables such as disparities in business practices across 
entities. The general form of the regression model used is indicated as;  
 
Υi,t = α + βΧi,t + ei,t                                                                                                                                   (1) 
 
The double subscript attached to the variables differentiates the regression equation 
from ordinary time-series regressions or cross-sectional regressions. The subscript i 
represents the cross-sectional dimension and t time-series dimension. Further, Υ in 
the equation represents the dependent variable, β denotes the coefficients, Χ denotes 
                                            
37
 Details of the variables can be found in Table 4.3 
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the explanatory variables (which have already been explained in Table 4.4 above) in 
the estimation model, α is the constant and finally e is assumed to be randomly a 
distributed error term. For specification and distinctive purposes, the general 
regression model used is divided into two in order to have firm-specific and 
interaction model equations. The first regression model only looks at the effects of 
firm-level factors on leverage. The second regression model combines both 
conventional firm-level factors, as well as the interaction terms
38
 in the regression 
analysis. Therefore, the model for the firm-level determinants of leverage is 
specified as 
 
LEVi,t = β0 + β1PRi,t + β2VTi,t + β3TAi,t  + β4SZi,t+ β5GRi,t + β6TXi,t  + ei,t         (2) 
 
Where : 
 
LEVi,t = total debt/ total asset for firm i in period t 
 
PRi,t = ratio of operating income to total asset for firm i in period t 
 
VTi,t =  standard deviation of operating income/ total asset for firm i in  
              period t 
 
TAi,t  = fixed asset/ total asset for firm i in period t 
 
SZi,t  = log of total asset  for firm i  in period t 
 
GRi,t = sales growth/ total asset growth for firm i  in period t 
 
TXi,t = tax paid/ net profit before tax for firm i  in period t 
   e =   the randomly distributed error term. 
In addition, in testing the conceptual framework
39
 2, 3 and 4, the regression model 
specification was set as follows: 
 
                                            
38 More information about the interactive terms is provided below. 
39 Details of the various frameworks are provided in Chapter 4. 
140 
 
Υi,t = α +βWi,t +βΧi,t  βZi,t+ ei,t                                                                            (3) 
 
Where : 
Y i = Leverage measure for firm i in period t 
 
W i= Conventional firm-level factors for firm i in period t (i.e. profitability, asset 
tangibility, firm size, growth, volatility and tax) 
 
X i =Non- conventional variables for country i in period t (i.e. stock market 
capitalization, Banking sector development, economic development and inflation) 
which are used as control variables 
  
Z i = Interaction terms for firm i in period t 
 
5.6.3. Creation of interaction terms 
 
In the moderating effects of firm size, asset tangibility and rule of law models, a 
number of multiplicative interaction variables were created based on the objectives 
of the study. Existing literature guided the procedures used in the creation of the 
interaction terms. The procedure used by Adomako and Danso (2014); Boso et al. 
(2013); Cadogan, Diamantopoulos and Siguaw (2002) and Ping, (1995) were 
adopted in generating the interaction variables. That is, in creating the interaction 
variables, the moderating variables were multiplied by other variables of interest and 
their products were residual-centred. For instance, a construct representing the 
interaction of firm size (SZ) and tax (TX) was created by multiplying the two 
variables (i.e. SZ x TX). The indicators SZ and TX are then regressed on to SZ x TX 
(i.e. the interaction variable). The residual is then saved and used in the regression. 
 
Besides, as indicated in the model specification for conceptual frameworks or 
models 2, 3 and 4, a number of control non-hypothesised variables were included in 
the regression analysis. In line with the purpose of this research and with existing 
literature (e.g. Boso, et al. 2013; Krishman and Teo 2012), the control variables were 
used in models 2, 3 and 4 to account for factors other the theoretical constructs of 
interest that could explain variance in the independent variable (leverage).   
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5.6.4. Analytical Issues Addressed 
 
In testing relationships using the secondary data, certain information were not 
available (e.g. information on short and long-term debt) and this serves as a 
limitation to examine leverage in relation to long term and short term debt. However, 
using the Datastream and the World Bank as sources of original secondary data to 
measure the key variables for this study, the reliability of the data was tested by 
comparing the data from the eight countries used in the study on the assumption that 
the data from the eight countries should provide reliable and consistent information. 
Indeed, evidence obtained (e.g. Appendix 4) showed consistent information across 
the countries examined.  
In dealing with panel data, there are a number of analytical issues that could 
potentially affect the inferences drawn from the regression results. These include 
issues relating to multicollinearity, heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation and reverse 
causality. First, one of the major issues in multivariate statistical analysis is 
multicollinearity (Hair et al. 2006). According to Kline (1998), multicollinearity 
relates to a condition where there is a high correlation between independent variables 
in a regression model. This situation creates instability in the regression outcome. 
Thus, there is the need to control for this in the regression model. In testing for 
multicollinearity in the current analysis, a Pearson correlation matrix was examined. 
According to Hair et al (1998), the correlation between any two pair of independent 
variables should not be greater than 0.80. As indicated in Chapter 6, the bivariate 
correlations among the independent variables did not reveal any multicollinearity 
concern. Thus, multicollinearity was not an issue in interpreting the outcome of the 
regression analysis in conceptual model 1. 
 
In testing the hypothesis in conceptual models 2, 3 and 4, a number of multiplicative 
interactions were created due to the moderator variables. Due to the inclusion of the 
interaction terms in the regression estimates, multicollinearity became an issue. In 
order to reduce the threat of multicollinearity, all the variables involved in the 
interaction terms were residually centred (Little, Bovaird and Widaman, 2006). 
These residually centred variables were then used in the regression analysis. In 
dealing with possible heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within firms, all the 
regressions were made robust and used the cluster (firm) option. Following 
142 
 
Deesomsak et al. (2004), the explanatory variables were lagged one period in order 
to isolate the analysis from the potential reverse causality between independent and 
dependent variables and to provide a more robust test of the theory. 
 
 
5.7. Chapter Summary 
 
In this chapter, I have given an account of the research methodology adopted in this 
study. The choice of methodology, data collection procedures, and various methods 
of data analyses are all considered under this chapter. Based on the purpose of this 
study, a quantitative methodology was used. In order to achieve the objectives of the 
study, both primary and secondary data were used. The primary data were obtained 
from 119 firms in Ghana and the secondary data used were obtained from firms in 
eight countries in SSA. The choice of Ghana was based on the relatively developed 
industrial base of the country. Also, the personal connection I have in the country 
facilitated the data collection. Questionnaires were used for gathering the primary 
data. In using the questionnaires, a number of procedures were followed to enhance 
the quality of the questionnaire and increase the response rate. First, the 
questionnaires were pre-tested to check the suitability of the questions in answering 
the research objectives and to correct any anomaly in the questions. Also, each 
questionnaire was accompanied with a covering letter and a participant information 
sheet. The cover letter assured the respondents of the confidentiality of their 
response. Due to the unreliable postal system in Ghana, all the questionnaires were 
personally delivered to the respondents and collected within 5 weeks. 
 
I encountered a few problems during the administration of the questionnaires and 
these problems are also highlighted in this chapter. The secondary data used in this 
study were also collected from Datastream and the World Bank databases. In 
selecting the firms for the secondary data, firms with less than 4 years of observation 
were excluded. A final sample of 359 firms from eight countries in SSA was used in 
the analysis. In addition to the above, this chapter has also highlighted various 
statistical tests adopted in the study. The definitions of various constructs of interest 
are also provided in this chapter. The objectives of the current study and existing 
literature guided the creation of the various interaction terms used. Since the study 
uses two different sets of data, I have classified the analysis into two main sections. 
143 
 
The first part of the analysis focuses on the primary data and the second part looks at 
the secondary data. Different statistical procedures were adopted the analysis of both 
the primary and the secondary data. In the next chapter, I look at the analysis of the 
primary data. 
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PART III: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION   
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Chapter 6 
 
Sources of Finance, Barriers and Factors Influencing 
Capital Structure. The Case of Ghana.   
 
 
6.1. Introduction  
 
A question of much interest in finance literature (e.g. Sheikh and Wang, 2011; Chen, 
2004; Beattie et al. 2006; Graham and Harvey, 2001) concerns the underlying factors 
that influence firms’ financing decisions. Since the ground breaking work of M and 
M in 1958, significant progress has been made in understanding the financing 
behaviour of firms. However, the diversity of firms’ financing behaviour cannot be 
easily explained by simply relying on secondary data or existing financial statements 
(Beattie et al. 2006). Previous scholarly studies on capital structure of firms have 
mainly been based on secondary data, which are limited in their ability to fully 
explain the reality on the ground (Beattie et al. 2006). This chapter of the thesis 
therefore focuses on the various issues that affect financing decisions of firms by 
using responses obtained from 119 firms in Ghana. Research questions that are 
answered in this chapter are highlighted in Table 6.1. Two main theories of capital 
structure are highlighted in the discussion under this chapter. These are the pecking 
order theory and the trade-off model. I begin this chapter by first looking at the 
response rate and CEOs’ characteristics of firms investigated. This is then followed 
by a discussion of key areas including the main sources of capital for firms in Ghana, 
factors affecting debt-equity choice, the pecking order theory, target debt setting, 
spare borrowing, and how the 2007/08 financial crisis has affected debt-equity 
choice among firms in Ghana. 
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Table 6. 1: Research Questions 
 
 
Subject 
 
Research Question 
 
Sources of finance 
 
Q1.What are Ghanaian firms’ sources of capital? 
 
Problems of financing 
 
Q2. What problems do Ghanaian firms face in 
securing funds from banks or financial lenders? 
 
 
 
Pecking Order Theory 
 
Q3. How do Ghanaian firms raise capital? 
 
Q4. What factors influence a company’s choice of 
equity finance?     
 
The Trade-off Theory 
 
Q5. What factors influence a company’s choice of 
debt finance?  
 
Short and Long term Debt 
 
Q6. What are the reasons for choosing short-term 
debt? 
 
Spare Borrowing 
Capacity 
 
Q7. Is there any significant difference in the choice of 
bank loan, overdrafts, and other sources of funds as 
spare borrowing capacity? 
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6.2. Response Rate and Reliability 
 
Table 6. 2: Breakdown of Firms 
 
Sector 
 
Number of Distributed 
Questionnaires 
Total Number of Returned 
Questionnaires 
Primary 
 
77 33 
Secondary 
 
77 36 
Tertiary 
 
77 50 
Total 231 119 
The primary sector (i.e. basic production) includes agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining and extraction of gas and 
oil. The secondary sector (i.e. production of goods) also includes industries, construction and craft. The tertiary 
(i.e. services) include trade, transport, information and communication, education, health, banks and culture. 
 
One hundred and nineteen completed questionnaires were received for this study. 
This represents a response rate of 51.5 percent. The breakdown of the response rate 
is shown in Table 6.3 
 
Table 6. 3: The breakdown of response rate 
 
 
Sector 
 
Response Rate (%) 
 
 
Primary 
 
 
43 
 
 
Secondary 
 
 
47 
 
 
Tertiary 
 
 
65 
 
 
The breakdown of the response rate indicates that majority of the firms investigated 
are concentrated in the tertiary sector of the Ghanaian economy. A reliability 
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analysis of the questionnaire revealed a Cronbach’s Alpha value40 of 0.936. This 
means that the instrument used was highly reliable as argued by Huck (2000). 
Out of the 112 firms that did not respond to the questionnaire, 65 of them 
(representing 58.04 percent) indicated that they could not take part in the survey due 
to their company’s policy. No reason was received from the remaining 47 companies 
(i.e. 41.96 percent) for not taking part in the survey. Despite the small sample size, 
the received questionnaires came from across the country with at least 10 from each 
of the seven regions in the country. Drawing the data across seven regions in the 
country strengthen the generalizability of the findings. The current response rate is 
satisfactory as compared to prior survey research on capital structure determinants.  
 
For instance, Graham and Harvey (2001) conducted financial studies and received a 
response from 392 firms out of 4587 distributed. This represents a rate of 9%. 
Similarly, Norton (1989) who evaluated the financial practices of Fortune 500 firms 
in the US received responses from 98 firms, representing 21% of the entire 
questionnaire distributed. Also, Bancel and Mitto (2004) studied a similar theme and 
received a response rate of 12 % (i.e. 87 firms across 26 European countries). Thus, 
considering the absolute number of the questionnaires and the response rate in 
previous studies, a response rate of 51.5 % and absolute number of 119 
questionnaires is satisfactory and also provides a reasonable approximation of the 
characteristics of firms in Ghana. Despite the satisfactory response rate, it was still 
deemed appropriate to explore whether non-response could be an issue in 
interpreting the outcome of these results. On the basis that late respondents are 
similar in characteristics to non-respondents (Oppenheim, 1966), I  compared the 
responses from the early respondents to the late respondents on a number of key 
variables by using the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test to see whether any significant 
difference exists between these two groups of respondents. The test revealed no 
significant difference between the responses from early and late respondents. Thus, 
non-response was not a major concern in interpreting the outcome of the current 
study.  
 
 
                                            
40
 The Cronbach’s Alpha value is used as an estimate of a reliability of a set of items and this value was obtained 
by running a Cronbach’s alpha test in SPSS. As a commonly accepted rule of thumb, a Cronbach’s alpha value of 
0.7 and above shows high reliability of test scores. 
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6.3. Background Characteristics  
 
6.3.1. Job Titles of Respondents 
 
To ascertain the job titles of the respondents, the first question in the questionnaire 
was used in soliciting this information. Figure 6.1 provides a summary of the job 
titles of the respondents. 
 
 
Figure 6. 1: Job Titles of respondents 
 
The suitability of the individual respondents affects the validity of the responses 
obtained. Individual respondents were required to be knowledgeable in the issues 
under investigation to enable them provide valid responses. As this study is on the 
financing decision of firms, it was required that respondents had considerable 
experience and knowledge of their firms’ financing decisions. The analysis of the 
data obtained, as is evident from Figure 6.1, shows that the majority of those who 
responded to the questionnaire were people knowledgeable in the financing decisions 
of their firms, thus ensuring the validity of the responses obtained. This increased the 
confidence in the data obtained. 
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6.3.2. Gender of CEOs of Investigated Firms 
 
 
Figure 6. 2: Gender of CEOs of investigated firms 
 
Figure 6.2 provides the breakdown of gender of CEOs of firms investigated. The 
figure indicates males dominated CEO positions among sample firms.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. 3: Age of CEOs 
 
The age of a CEO of a firm is likely to predict the corporate financing decisions of 
firms they manage. Older CEOs could have previous records of accomplishment that 
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could influence them in making certaining financing decisions compared to younger 
CEOs (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003). Therefore, in order to ascertain the relationship 
between CEOs age and their firms’ financing decisions, firms were asked to provide 
the age of their CEOs. This survey revealed that majority (i.e. 70.6 percent) of the 
CEOs of firms investigated were below 55 years.  
 
6.3.4. Educational Background CEOs  
 
Educational backgrounds of CEOs are likely to influence debt-equity choice of firms 
they manage (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Malmendier and Tate, 2005). As such, 
respondents were asked to provide information about the educational background of 
their CEOs, and Figure 6.4 provides a summary of the educational backgrounds of 
these CEOs. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. 4: Educational Background of CEOs 
 
Figure 6.4 indicates that majority of the surveyed firms had CEOs with postgraduate 
academic qualifications. 
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6.4. Results and Analysis   
 
6.4.1. Alternative Financing Sources 
 
Research Question 1: What are Ghanaian firms’ sources of capital? 
 
In order to ascertain the main sources of capital for firms in Ghana, all the 
respondents were asked to rate the extent to which different sources of capital was 
important to their firms by ranking the set of factors below. The result of this is 
shown in Table 6. 4. 
 
Table 6. 4: Sources of Finance 
 
Sources of 
finance 
Mean 
 
SD Std Error 
Mean 
T-values Sig. (2 tail) 
Retained earnings 4.61 .665 .061 26.458 .000 
Banks and other 
lenders 
3.56 1.369 .126 4.485 .000 
New equity issue 2.29 1.502 .138 -5.187 .000 
Informal sources 2.21 1.413 .130 -6.096 .000 
Affiliated 
companies 
1.89 1.370 .126 -8.830 .000 
Insurance 
companies 
1.87 1.171 .107 -10.567 .000 
Leasing 
companies 
1.86 1.188 .109 -10.493 .000 
Hire purchase 1.79 1.149 .105 -12.10 .000 
Bonds 1.63 1.134 .104 -13.177 .000 
Venture capitalists 1.59 1.069 .098 -14.408 .000 
Note: The above sources of capital were ranked using a 5-point Likert scale (1- the least important source and 5 – 
most important source).  The table is ordered by mean rank and the t-values are versus a Ho value of 3. 
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Findings as reported in Table 6.4 indicate that retained earnings and loans from 
banks and other lenders are the two most important sources of funds for firms 
studied. Firms in Ghana have limited access to other forms of finance. The role of 
leasing companies, venture capitalist, and the bond market in Ghana in terms of 
providing funds for firms remains narrow, underdeveloped and are considered as the 
least important sources of funds for firms in Ghana. Consequently, firms in Ghana 
have limited access to long-term finance needed for meaningful investments. As 
highlighted by Mu et al. (2013), the average market capitalization (as a percentage of 
GDP) of bond market in SSA from 2001 to 2010 stood at 1.12 per cent. This 
suggests that firms in SSA have limited access to different forms of finance.   In line 
with the above findings, Bloom, Mahajan, Mckenzie and Reborts (2010) noted that 
firms in less developed countries are more likely to report access to finance as a 
major constraint. According to the World Bank Enterprise Survey (2011), firms in 
SSA finance roughly 80% of their investment activities from retained earnings. This 
indeed highlights the importance of retained earnings, as a source of funds for firms 
in SSA. This demonstrates that developing alternative sources of funds is vital for 
firms in SSA. This is particularly crucial for firms that do not have enough retained 
earnings but have a huge investment opportunities to embark upon. The current 
finding is in line with empirical evidence reported in other developing economies 
(e.g. Fan and So, 2004). 
 
6.4.2. Problems of Acquiring funds from lenders 
 
Research Question 2: What problems do Ghanaian firms face in securing funds from 
banks and other lenders? 
 
Problems that affect firms in securing funds from lenders were also explored in this 
research. Respondents were asked to rate a number of problems that their firms face 
in securing debt. The result of this is shown in Table 6.5. 
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Table 6. 5: Barriers of Securing Funds 
 
Barriers Mean SD Std.Error 
Mean 
T=Values Sig.(2 
tailed) 
Interest rate 4.29 .997 .090 14.445 .000 
Length of time 
for processing 
the loan  
 
3.81 
 
1.174 
 
.108 
 
7.498 
 
.000 
Collateral issue 3.40 1.492 .137 2.949 .004 
High 
transaction cost 
 
3.03 
 
1.314 
 
.120 
 
.279 
 
.781 
Company’s 
size 
 
2.63 
 
1.567 
 
.144 
 
-2.574 
 
.011 
Track records 2.31 1.345 .123 -5.588 .000 
Note: The above factors were scored using a 5-point Likert scale (1- not at all a problem and 5 – a serious 
problem). The table is ordered by mean rank and the t-values are versus a Ho value of 3. 
 
Table 6.5 suggests that the high interest rate remains the main barrier of firms in 
securing loans from financial lenders. In SSA, many countries including Ghana 
suffer from a high rate of inflation. Although Ghana has made substantial progress in 
reducing its inflation, this situation still persists. For instance, as of December 2011, 
the inflation rate in Ghana was 12.50%
41
 (World Bank, 2013) and that of June 2014 
was 15.00% (Bank of Ghana, 2014). High inflation leads to a high lending rate.
42
 
With the high interest rate, the ability of firms to contract a substantial loan could be 
limited, as firms could eventually find it difficult to repay these loans. For instance, 
according to the Bank of Ghana (2012), the cost of borrowing for firms in Ghana 
ranges from 25% to 40 %. With this high lending rate, the capacity for the private 
sector to borrow and expand are limited. Consequently, the ability of the sector to 
promote the creation of employment is hindered. 
 
Another prevailing constraint regarding securing funds by firms in Ghana is the issue 
of collateral. Lenders usually impose high collateral requirements in their contractual 
                                            
41
 The comparable figures for the UK and US were 2.3% and 2.7% respectively. 
42
 The relationship between the lending interest rate and inflation has already been explained in 
chapter 2 using the Fisher equation. 
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agreements. Where borrowers are unable to meet the collateral requirements of 
lenders, there is the tendency to go for short-term credit, which do not usually attract 
a high collateral requirement. In such a situation, firms tend to find it difficult in 
getting medium to long-term credit that is usually required for fixed asset purchase. 
The current outcome is in line with the scholarly work by Cheng and Shiu (2007), 
who claimed that collateral in the form of an asset base is crucial in the acquisition of 
long-term debt, especially in countries where there is an absence of good creditor 
protection. The presence of collateral provides an assurance of repayment to lenders. 
It is therefore not surprising that collateral is one of the demands of lenders when 
firms are acquiring finance from lenders in Ghana. Indeed, previous empirical 
studies in the context of SSA (e.g. Ramlall, 2009; Abor, 2008) have noted the 
importance of asset tangibility in debt acquisition and that firms that do not have 
adequate assets are less likely to be granted financial assistance by lenders. This is 
particularly a challenge for firms with growth opportunities but do not have the 
assets based to be used as a collateral in debt acquisition. This current result is in line 
with other empirical works. For instance, Wiwattanakantang (1999) observed that 
firms that are unable to provide collateral when borrowing could be subjected to 
more onerous conditions than firms that provide collateral.  
 
The size of the company was not a major barrier for acquiring funds from lenders in 
Ghana. Previous empirical studies (e.g. Diamond, 1989) have  observed that newly 
established firms usually do not have an extensive credit history (records of 
accomplishment) which facilitates debt acquisition. Consequently, firms that have 
not been in business for long find it difficult to acquire debt financing. In the current 
study however, inadequate record of accomplishment was not found to be a major 
problem. Established reputation was not an issue for firms in Ghana. One 
explanation for this is the strategic measures of the Ghanaian government that 
encourage financial institutions to lend to businesses of all sizes with growth 
potential so that such firms will be enriched with resources to grow and create jobs. 
A typical example is the Stanbic/AGRA loan guarantee programme that was initiated 
in 2010. This is particularly good news for newly established firms in Ghana, which 
may not have acquired any records of accomplishment but could still have access to 
loans from lenders.  
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6.4.3. Raising of Capital 
Research Question 3: How do Ghanaian firms raise capital? 
 
To evaluate finance preferences, respondents were asked to score three financing 
choices. Table 6.6 therefore shows the ranking of different financing alternatives.  
 
Table 6. 6: Raising of Capital 
 
Type of Finance Mean SD Std. Error 
Mean 
T-Values 
 
Retained*** 
earnings 
 
4.48 
 
.999 
 
.092 
 
16.155 
 
Debt/loans*** 
 
3.34 
 
1.361 
 
.125 
 
2.694 
 
 
Equity finance 
 
 
3.11 
 
 
1.413 
 
 
.130 
 
 
.843 
Note: The above financing choices were scored on a Likert scale from 1 (least preferred) to 5 (most preferred) 
The table is ordered by mean rank and the t-values are versus a Ho value of 3. The significance level denotes 
whether the mean response is significantly different from the test value (i.e. 3) in a 2-tail test. *** (significant at 
1%) and ** (significant at 5%). 
 
The central argument in Myers’ (1984) pecking order theory is that in raising capital 
for investment, firms initially rely on internally generated funds (retained earnings), 
followed by debt and equity being the last resort. In other words, there is a hierarchy 
of financing preference and that there is no well defined target of debt and equity 
finance. The relative cost of each financing source is determined by the degree of 
asymmetry information. Table 6.6 suggests that retained earnings was the most 
preferred financing alternative, followed by debt/loans. Equity was the least 
preferred form of finance. Indeed, as an equity market becomes developed, equity 
finance becomes an important source of capital for firms (Bloom, et al. 2010). Given 
the fact that the equity market in Ghana is less developed, it is not a surprise that 
equity finance was the least preferred form of finance. Prior empirical evidence 
suggests that retained earnings remains the most important source of funds for firms 
in SSA. For instance, according to World Bank Enterprise Survey (2011), firms in 
SSA finance about 80 percent of their investment activities from retained earnings. 
Given the limited sources of different forms of finance in SSA (e.g. Mu et al. 2013), 
it is therefore not surprising that  retained earnings remains the most important 
sources of funds for firms in Ghana. 
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This priority of financing alternatives reported above suggests that the pecking order 
principle is used by firms in Ghana. The significant difference in mean rank between 
retained earnings (i.e. mean = 4.48) and debt/loans (mean = 3.38) is not surprising in 
that given the 2007/08 financial crisis, firms’ access to external finance could have 
been constrained. Overall, the current results confirm the results of a study in the UK 
by Beattie et al. (2006) that also observed that firms raise their capital by relying on 
retained earnings, followed by debt capital and finally equity finance.   
In addition to the above, respondents were provided with another question related to 
the pecking order theory. Here, respondents were asked to rank a number of factors 
that might influence them in using retained earnings other than any other type of 
finance for financing a new investment opportunity. The results of this is presented 
in Table 6.7. 
 
Table 6. 7: Factors influencing choice of retained earnings 
 
Reason Mean SD Std. Error 
Mean 
T-values Sig. (2 
tail) 
Retained earnings cheaper 
than outside debt 
 
4.49 
 
.964 
 
.088 
 
16.826 
 
.000 
Retained earnings cheaper 
than new equity issue 
 
4.26 
 
1.101 
 
.101 
 
12.494 
 
.000 
To avoid dilution of 
control by issuing new 
shares 
 
3.69 
 
1.436 
 
.132 
 
5.233 
 
.000 
Difficulty of convincing 
lenders of profitability of 
new investment 
 
3.19 
 
1.257 
 
.115 
 
1.677 
 
.096 
To avoid scrutiny from 
lenders 
2.96 1.423  
.130 
-.322 .748 
To reduce the amount paid 
in dividends 
 
2.59 
 
1.464 
 
.134 
 
 
-3.069 
 
.003 
Note: The above reasons were scored using a 5-point Likert scale (1- least important reason and 5 – most 
important reason). The table is ordered by mean rank and the t-values are versus a Ho value of 3. 
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From Table 6.7, almost all the respondents agree that the major factor that influences 
firms in choosing retained earnings as against outside debt was the cost involved. 
Retained earnings is considered to be cheaper than other sources of funds and 
therefore firms have the tendency to use their internal funds to finance investment 
activities before resorting to funds from external sources. Available evidence from 
Ghana shows that cost of borrowing remains very high. For instance, according to 
the Bank of Ghana (2012), the cost of borrowing for firms in Ghana ranges from 
25% to 40 %. Thus, it is not surprising that retained earnings is preferred by firms in 
Ghana due to low level of cost associated with its usage. 
The current findings also suggest that the use of retained earnings as against external 
funds is driven by firms’ desire to prevent dilution of ownership control. This 
outcome is consistent with conclusion drawn by Kjellman and Hansen (1995) 
regarding retained earnings’ preference among Finnish firms.  
The sampled firms do not consider scrutiny from lenders (t-value =-.322) and 
dividend payments (t-value = -3.069) as issues influencing choice of retained 
earnings over debt financing for new investment opportunity.  
 
6.4.4. Factors Moderating Choice of Equity Finance 
 
Research Question 4: What factors influence firms’ choice of equity finance? 
 
To further test the pecking order theory, respondents were asked to score nine factors 
that moderate a firm’s equity choice. Table 6.8 provides a summary of the mean 
responses in order of importance. 
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Table 6. 8: Relative Importance of Factors in Choosing Equity Finance 
 
Factor Mean SD Std. Error 
Mean 
T-values Sig. (2 
tailed) 
Sufficiency of retained 
earnings 
4.09 1.164 .107 10.235 .000 
How easy it is to access 
loans 
3.57 1.344 .123 4.638 .000 
Loss of control through 
share dilution 
3.56 1.566 .144 
 
3.923 .000 
Equity being the least risky 
source of finance 
3.12 1.360 .125 .943 .347 
Effects on the total cost of 
capital 
2.82 1.315 .121 -1.534 .128 
Cost of issuing new equity 2.69 1.460 .134 -2.323 .022 
Maintaining target 
debt/equity ratio 
2.63 1.227 .113 -3.287 .001 
To get a better impression 
about our company than 
using debt 
2.39 1.427 .131 -4.690 .000 
Maintaining the same level 
of equity as other firms in 
the same industry 
2.15 1.226 .112 -7.554 .000 
Note: The above factors were scored using a 5- point Likert scale with 1 (not at all strong) to 5 (very strong) 
The table is ordered by mean rank and the t-values are versus a Ho value of 3. 
 
From Table 6.8, the results show that the important factor in determining equity level 
is the sufficiency of retained earnings. Loss of control through share dilution was 
also found among the three top factors in making equity decision. The correlation 
between ‘managerial shareholding’ and ‘loss of control through shareholding’ is 
quite high (0.7). This outcome supports other empirical studies from the context of 
SSA. For instance, Abor, (2008) and Boateng (2004) noted that managements’ desire 
to maintain control of their firms will ensure that in making capital structure 
decisions, debt is favoured against equity, even if the cost does not favour the use of 
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debt, to avoid any influence from the equity investors. Similarly, the current study is 
in line with Wiwattanakantang (1999), who maintained that the owner-managers of 
family businesses would not be willing to issue equity and therefore depend on debt 
for all business operations in order to prevent the dilution of the families’ controlling 
power. This result also highlights that firms in Ghana consider the following factors 
as unimportant in choosing the amount of equity to use. These factors are  
a. maintaining target debt/equity ratio, 
b. firms receiving better impression for using equity rather than debt 
c. maintaining the same level of equity as firms in the same industry.  
 
6.4.5. Factors Moderating Choice of Debt Finance 
 
Research Question 5: What factors influence firms’ choice of debt finance? 
 
I test the trade-off theory by inquiring about the importance of certain factors. Here, 
respondents were asked to score a set of ten factors considered by them in choosing 
debt finance. Table 6.9 provides a summary of these factors. 
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Table 6. 9: Relative importance of factors in choosing Debt Finance 
 
Factor Mean SD Std. Error 
Mean 
T- 
values 
Sig (2-
tailed) 
Risk of becoming insolvent 
(Bankruptcy) 
4.33 1.328 .122 10.903 .000 
Long term survival of  the 
company 
4.32 1.402 .129 10.267 .000 
Sufficiency of retained 
Earnings 
4.23 1.487 .136 9.001 .000 
Low interest rate (Cost of 
Capital) 
3.95 1.460 .134 7.093 .000 
Company's relationship with 
Banks/Lenders 
3.87 1.449 .133 6.515 .000 
Tax savings on interest 
expense 
3.66 1.348 .124 5.371 .000 
Cost of securing debt finance 
(Transaction cost) 
3.58 1.538 .141 4.114 .000 
Effects on total cost of capital 3.33 1.568 .144 2.280 .024 
Maintaining level of debt as 
firms in the same industry 
2.92 1.639 .150 -.559 .577 
To discourage possible 
takeover 
2.66 1.852 .170 -1.980 .050 
Note: The above factors were scored using a 5- point Likert scale with 1 (not at all strong) to 5 (very strong). The 
table is ordered by mean rank and the t-values are versus a Ho value of 3 
 
Table 6.9 demonstrates that the top three factors in determining the appropriate level 
of debt were risk of becoming insolvent (bankruptcy), long term survival of the firm 
and sufficiency of retained earnings. The most important factor among these factors 
was risk of becoming insolvent (bankruptcy). Excess use of debt threatens the 
survivability of firms (see Titman, 1984). One explanation of this is that creditors 
will have a firm declared bankrupt if it is not able to meet its debt obligations. In 
view of this, firms are mindful of it in making debt decisions. The findings of this 
study support Beattie et al. (2006) who indicated that ensuring the long-term 
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survivability of firms was the most important factor influencing the choice of 
appropriate amount of debt for firms in the UK.  
  
Under the trade-off hypothesis, tax savings on interest expenses feature highly in 
debt level decisions of firms (Frank and Goyal, 2003; Ross et al. 2001). In the 
current study however, this factor was not extremely important in debt level 
decisions among firms in Ghana. The most plausible explanation is that weak 
institutional structures (e.g. Ghana Revenue Authority) create an avenue for firms to 
evade or marginalise their tax liabilities. Thus, tax becomes less concern to firms in 
their financing decision. This observation is entirely consistent with the observation 
reported in chapter of this thesis. In addition, empirical studied from the context of 
SSA noted a similar relationship between tax and capital structure. For instance 
using secondary data, Abor (2008) noted a negative relationship between tax and 
leverage. 
 
The least crucial factor in determining the appropriate level of debt (as noted in 
Table 6.9) was to discourage takeovers. One important implication of this is that 
takeovers were not perceived as a threat for firms in Ghana. In other words, firms 
were less likely to be taken over and consequently, they do not give much attention 
to the takeover threat in determining the level of debt to employ. The current results 
also suggest that maintaining comparability with other firms in the same industry 
was not considered an important factor by firms in Ghana. Other scholarly works 
have noted similar result. For instance, Fan and So (2004) observed a similar result 
among firms in  Hong Kong. 
 
Closely related to the above factors is the issue of target capital structure. The trade-
off hypothesis advocates a target capital structure at which the cost and benefits 
associated with the use of debt financing are balanced (Jensen, 1986). In the current 
study therefore, respondents were asked to indicate whether their firms seek to 
maintain a target capital structure by using approximately a constant proportion of 
equity and debt finance. 46% of the firms indicated that they maintain a target capital 
structure, with the rest (i.e. 54%) maintaining no target capital structure. Figure 6.5 
below provides a breakdown of the target amount of debt employed by firms 
investigated. 
 
163 
 
 
Figure 6. 5: Target Amount of Debt 
 
For companies that maintain a target capital structure, 59% indicated a target debt 
range of 1-25 %, 30% indicated a target debt range of 26- 50%, and 8% indicated a 
target debt range of 51 – 75 %. Only 3% of firms indicated a target debt range of 76 
– 100%. From the current study, the proportion having a target capital structure in 
Ghana is lower than what is reported in the UK by Beattie et al. (2006) and in 
Malaysia by Nor et al. (2012).   
 
The natural progression at this stage is to investigate those responsible for setting the 
target debt ratios. A well-known area in capital structure examines whether debt-
equity levels are internally or externally determined. Whilst many studies (e.g. Abor, 
2008, Delcoure, 2007; Cheng and Shiu, 2007, Deesomsak, et al. 2004; Cheng and 
Shiu,  2007; Sheikh and Wang, 2011) agree that both internal and external factors are 
important in deciding the capital structure of firms, there is disagreement as to which 
of these factors is most important in setting debt levels. Consequently using a 5-point 
Likert scale, respondents were asked to indicate those influential factors in setting 
the target debt ratios of their firms. Table 6.10 provides a summary of the factors 
influential in setting the target debt ratio. 
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Table 6. 10: Target Debt Setting 
 
Factors Mean SD Std Error 
Mean 
T-Values Sig. (2 
tailed) 
Company’s Senior 
Management 
4.45 1.171 .151 9.595 .000 
Shareholders 2.82 1.621 .209 -.876 .384 
Financial Lenders 2.68 1.372 .177 -1.788 .079 
Major Creditors 2.62 1.316 .170 -2.256 .028 
Debt Ratios of other firms 
in the same industry 
1.95 1.268 .164 -6.415 .000 
 
Ghana Government 1.45 1.016 .131 -11.822 .000 
Note: Respondents scored the above factors using a 5-point Likert scale with 1- being the least important factor 
to 5-being the most important factor. The table is ordered by mean rank and the t-values are versus a Ho value of 
3 
 
Table 6.10 suggests that out of the six factors, only companys‘ senior management 
was important in setting the target capital structure. This indicates that  capital 
structures are more internally driven than externally driven.  Debt ratios of firms in 
similar industries and the Ghanaian government were unimportant in influencing the 
setting of capital structure targets. The current outcome is in line with other 
empirical studies. For instance, Beattie et al. (2008) noted that in UK senior 
management in firms was the most important  factor in setting the target capital 
structure. 
 
6.4.6. Choice of Short-term Debt 
 
Research Question 6: What are the reasons for choosing short-term debt? 
 
In a separate question, respondents were asked to rank some factors that influence 
their choice of short-term debt. The result is presented in Table 6.11. 
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Table 6. 11: Choice between short and long-term debt 
 
Factor Mean SD Std. Error 
Mean 
T-
Values 
Sig. (2 
tailed) 
We borrow short term 
when short term interest is 
low 
 
4.04 
 
1.458 
 
.134 
 
7.797 
 
.000 
 
We borrow short term 
when waiting for long 
term interest to decline 
 
 
3.85 
 
 
1.505 
 
 
.138 
 
 
6.152 
 
 
.000 
 
Matching the maturity 
with the life of the asset 
 
 
3.66 
 
 
1.510 
 
 
.138 
 
 
4.737 
 
 
.000 
 
We borrow short term 
when we expect our credit 
rating to improve 
 
 
3.26 
 
 
1.649 
 
 
.151 
 
 
1.723 
 
 
.087 
Note: The above reasons were scored using a 5-point Likert scale (1- not at all strong and 5 – very strong). The 
table is ordered by mean rank and the t-values are versus a Ho value of 3. 
 
Of the four different factors offered, the results show that the most favoured reason 
for borrowing short-term is when short-term interest rate is low ( = 4.04). This 
means that firms will issue long-term debt if the short-term interest rate is higher 
than that of the long-term. Looking at the high cost of borrowing in Ghana (Bank of 
Ghana, 2012), it is therefore not a surprise that interest rate is the key element 
considered in short-term borrowing. Another important factor that derives the choice 
of short-term debt was the timing of the interest rate. The results show that firms 
borrow short-term when they expect long-term interest rates to reduce. This shows 
the importance of timing in issuing short-term debt. The issue of credit rating is a 
less important consideration in issuing debt ( = 3.26). 
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6.4.7. Spare Borrowing Capacity 
 
Research question 7: Is there any significant difference in the choice of bank loan, 
overdrafts and other sources of  funds as  spare borrowing capacity? 
 
The pecking order logic of Myers and Majluf (1984) suggests that firms are likely to 
maintain spare borrowing capacity to avoid the need to external funds. The existence 
of spare borrowing capacity ensures that special projects and unexpected 
opportunities are seized (Myers and Majluf 1984; Allen, 2000). In this study 
therefore, respondents were asked to answer a number of questions relating to spare 
borrowing capacity. Out of the 119 firms surveyed, 43.7% acknowledged a policy 
for maintaining a spare borrowing capacity. The majority of the firms investigated 
(i.e 56.3%) do not maintain any spare borrowing capacity (financial slack). In the 
absence of spare borrowing capacity and inadequate retained earnings, such firms 
could find it difficult to meet any unplanned cost or opportunity. The observation 
here is that the figure of 43.7% of firms maintaining spare borrowing capacity  is 
lower than what is reported in the UK by Beattie et al. (2006)
43
.   
 
The next question relating spare borrowing capacity seeks to find out the sources of 
spare borrowing capacity. Table 6.12 provides a summary of the t-tests of the 
various spare borrowing capacities of firms investigated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
43
 In  Beattie et al. (2006), 59% of the UK firms investigated acknowledged a policy for maintaining a spare 
borrowing capacity.   
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Table 6. 12: Sources of Spare Borrowing Capacity 
 
Sources Mean SD T-Values Std. Error 
Mean 
Sig.(2 
tailed 
Bank loan 3.81 1.049 5.554 .145 .000 
Overdraft 3.29 1.177 1.767 .163 .083 
Leasing companies 2.15 1.161 -5.255 .161 .000 
Venture capitalists 1.87 1.299 -6.299 .180 .000 
Insurance firms 1.87 1.067 -7.668 .148 .000 
Hire purchase 1.83 1.184 -7.147 .164 .000 
Informal sources 1.79 1.226 -7.125 .170 .000 
Affiliated firms 1.71 1.210 -7.678 .168 .000 
Bonds 1.69 1.197 -7.878 .166 .000 
Note: The above factors were scored using a 5- point Likert scale with 1 (not at all important) to 5 (very 
important). The table is ordered by mean rank and the t-values are versus a Ho value of 3. 
 
From Table 6.12, the study indicates that bank loan and overdraft remains the only 
source of financial slack for firms in Ghana. As indicated by Figure 6.6, a further 
statistical test (i.e. Mann-Whitley U test, P=0.0007) shows that there is a statistical 
difference between bank loan and overdraft and that firms in Ghana are more likely 
to use bank loans as a spare borrowing capacity than bank overdrafts. The current 
result however contradicts Beattie et al. (2006) who noted that firms in the UK are 
more likely to use overdraft facility as the most important source of slack than other 
sources. Unlike in the developed economies such as the UK where firms have 
diverse sources of financial slack including unsecured loans, hire purchase and 
leasing (Beattie, 2006), the overall evidence obtained from this study indicates that 
access to spare borrowing for firms in Ghana remains very limited. This is not 
surprising, giving the fact that the financial system in Ghana is not substantially 
developed and for that matter, access to different forms of financial facilities is 
limited (World Bank, 2013).   
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To gain further insight into the spare borrowing capacity, respondents were asked to 
score four reasons for maintaining spare borrowing capacity using a 5 point Likert 
scale. The results of this is presented in Table 6.13. 
 
 
Table 6. 13: Reasons for Spare Borrowing Capacity 
 
Reason for spare 
borrowing 
capacity 
Mean SD Std. Error 
Mean 
T-Value Sig. (2 
tailed) 
Unexpected 
opportunity 
3.92 1.281 .178 5.196 .000 
Reserved for crisis 3.87 1.268 .176 4.920 .000 
Special projects 3.40 1.225 .170 2.377 .021 
To take over other 
firms 
1.83 1.167 .162 -7.249 .000 
Note: The above factors were scored using a 5- point Likert scale with 1 (least important reason) to 5 (most 
important reason). The table is ordered by mean rank and the t-values are versus a Ho value of 3. 
 Figure 6.6: Spare borrowing for loans and overdraft 
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The results of this study indicates that the most important reasons  for maintaining  
spare borrowing capacity are for unexpected opportunity, reserved for crisis and for 
special projects with mean ratings of 3.92, 3.87 and 3.40 respectively. In constrast to 
this however, this study finds no support for maintaining a spare borrowing capacity 
as a result of possible takeover opportunities. Limited takeover opportunities in 
Ghana could account for this.  
 
6.4.8.  Effects of 2007/08 Financial Crisis on Financing Choices 
 
The global economic downturn, which originated in the advanced economies, had its 
impacts on developing countries as well. However, these impacts varied widely 
across different economies on different aspects including the financing decisions of 
firms. It therefore seems important to understand how this crisis affected the 
financing decisions of firms in detail for policy reasons. Thus, the next area of 
analysis relates to the effects of the 2007/08 financial crisis. Here, respondents were 
asked to indicate how the financial crisis has constrained the availability of both 
equity and debt finance by ranking five set of questions using a 5-point Likert scale. 
The results of this are presented in table 6.14 
 
Table 6. 14: Financial Crisis and Capital Structure Decisions 
 
Effects Mean SD Std. Error 
Mean 
T-
Values 
Sig. (2 
tailed) 
Made it difficult to secure 
loans from lenders 
3.97 1.298 .119 8.190 .000 
Constrained  availability 
of equity capital 
3.17 1.469 .135 1.248 .214 
Affected the preference of 
equity over debt 
3.16 1.461 .134 1.192 .236 
Decreased the dependency 
on debt finance 
3.01 1.435 .132 .064 .949 
Constrained funds from 
informal source 
2.82 1.587 .146 -1.213 .228 
Note: The above factors were scored using a 5- point Likert scale with 1 (strong disagree) to 5 (very strong agree) 
The table is ordered by mean rank and the t-values are versus a Ho value of 3. 
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Table 6.14 shows that the only major problem faced by firms as a result of the 
2007/08 financial crisis
44
 was the difficulty in securing funds from lenders
45
. This 
result reflects the fact that  as many firms around the world suffered badly during the 
financial crisis, lenders therefore considered the prevailing economic conditions and 
were careful in granting financial assistance to firms due to the high bankruptcy risk. 
Interestingly, no evidence was found that the 2007/08 financial crisis restricted 
firms’ access to funds from informal sources. With a t-value of -1.213, a significant 
majority (66.4 %) do not believe that the financial crisis constrained the availability 
of funds from the informal sources. 
To test whether firms in different sectors have different perceptions of the difficulty 
in securing funds from financial lenders, a mean test of the equality of their 
responses was performed. The results as shown in Table 6.15 indicate that firms in 
the secondary sector of the Ghanaian economy had the greatest difficulty in securing 
funds from lenders. Surprisingly, firms in the service sector experienced the least 
difficulty in securing funds.  
 
Table 6. 15: Test of Differences Across Sectors 
 
Sector Mean Std. Deviation 
 
Primary 
 
3.88 
 
1.244 
 
Secondary 
 
4.28 
 
1.386 
 
Tertiary 
 
3.82 
 
1.257 
 
Total 
 
3.97 
 
1.298 
Note: In terms of the difficulty in securing funds due to the financial crisis, a further test was conducted to see 
which firms in the three main sectors of the Ghanaian economy was affected most. The mean differences are 
presented in the Table above. The table is ordered by mean values 
 
                                            
44
The financial crisis did not hit Ghana as hard as it did to major economies such as the UK and the US. Still,  
lenders in Ghana might  have been careful in issuing loans to firms since they were not quite sure of the 
consequences of the crisis on firms in the country.  
45
The financial system in SSA was indirectly affected by the financial crisis through international trade linkages 
and this detrimentally affected borrowers and led to an increase in the level of non-performing loans (EIB, 2013). 
. 
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The difficulty of the primary and the secondary sectors in securing debt finance 
could be as a result of the fact that these two sectors were more likely to use more 
debt in their capital structure and for that matter were much more likely to face 
difficulty in acquiring debt finance than firms that make less use of debt. A further 
test (as shown in Table 6.16) reveals that domestic firms were more likely to face 
difficulty in acquiring funds from lenders during the financial crisis than 
multinational firms. This could be attributed to the fact that multinational firms are 
much more likely to have large asset bases that could be used as collateral for debt 
than domestic firms. Therefore, in times of crisis, lenders are more likely to look 
more favourably at multinational firms than domestic firms.  
 
Table 6. 16: Test of Differences between Domestic and Multinational Firms 
 
 
Type of firm 
 
Mean 
 
Std. Deviation 
 
Domestic company 
 
4.09 
 
1.212 
 
Multinational company 
 
3.50 
 
1.532 
Note: The table above shows the differences in perception between domestic and multinational companies in 
terms of the effects of the financial crisis on the acquisition of loans from lenders. 
   
The next step of this analysis seeks to find out whether listed and unlisted firms were   
affected differently in terms of the difficulty in securing loans from lenders due to 
the financial crisis. The results show that unlisted firms (  
σ = 1.275) were more likely to face difficulties in acquiring funds as a results of the 
crisis than listed companies ( = 3.17, σ = 1.602). This result reflects the fact that 
listed firms were more likely to be considered favourably for debt acquisition during 
a period of credit constraint than unlisted firms. 
In general, the results indicate that the 2007/08 financial crisis unequally affected 
firms across industries as observed by Campello, Graham and Harvey (2010). 
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6.4.9. Ownership and leverage 
 
In the final part of the analysis, I examine whether firms with government 
shareholdings have higher leverage ratio than firms without government 
shareholdings. The mean value of leverage across these two groups indicate that 
firms with government shareholdings have leverage ratios slightly higher ( = 0.30) 
than their counterparts without government shareholdings ( = 0.21). One major 
characteristics of less developed economies (e.g. Ghana) is that politicians and 
governments have considerable control over allocation of resources, including 
financial resources (Acquaah and Eshun, 2010). Thus, firms with government 
shareholdings are more likely to have access to more financial resources than 
privately owned firms. Also, firms with government shareholdings are seen as 
guaranteed  to stay solvent (Huang and Song, 2002) by financial lenders and are 
therefore willing to lend more debt to such firms than privately owned firms. This 
could account for the higher leverage ratio among firms with government 
shareholdings. 
 
 
6.5. Summary and conclusion 
 
The primary objective of this chapter is to provide an account of a comprehensive 
survey that describes the current practice of corporate finance among firms in Ghana. 
Prior empirical studies from Ghana have mainly relied on secondary data, which are 
limited in their ability to fully explain the diversity found in practice. To the best of 
my knowledge, this study is the first comprehensive that examines the financing 
behaviour of firms in Ghana by relying on a survey. The use of this survey method 
was to provide the opportunity to understand the diversity of financial practices of 
firms rather than relying on conclusions drawn from secondary data.  
A summary of the results are as follows; 
 Retained earnings and loans from banks and other lenders remain the two 
most important sources of funds for firms in Ghana. The role of hire 
purchasing, bond market and venture capitalists in the provision of funds for 
firms in Ghana remains very narrow and undeveloped. 
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 High interest rate, length of time and collateral issues are some of the 
fundamental problems confronting firms in acquiring funds from lenders in 
Ghana. 
 There is strong evidence that there is a hierarchy of financing sources and 
that retained earnings remain the most important source of funds for firms in 
Ghana. Equity remains less attractive to firms in Ghana given that it involves 
a higher issuance cost than the other funding sources. 
 The study finds evidence that sufficiency of retained earnings, how easy it is 
to access loans and loss of control through share dilution are the three most 
important criteria moderating the debt/equity decision. Bankruptcy risk and 
the survival of firm were rated as the two most important factors that 
influence the level of debt employed by firms in Ghana. The study suggests 
that maintaining the same level of debt as firms in the same industry and 
discouraging possible takeover are less important moderating factors in 
deciding the amount debt to be used by firms. This raises the possibility there 
is low inter-firm collaboration and a low level of takeover possibility in 
Ghana. The absence of inter-firm collaboration means that firms do not share 
information among one another. Thus, firms could find it difficult setting 
their debt levels based on other firms in the same industry. 
 In addition, the study finds support for maintaining target debt levels and that 
target debt levels are more internally driven than externally driven. However, 
firms in Ghana that do maintain target debt levels have lower targets than 
what is reported in the developed countries (e.g UK). 
 There is some evidence that firms in Ghana maintain spare borrowing 
capacity. Bank loans and overdrafts remain the main sources of spare 
borrowing capacity. However, the number of firms that maintain spare 
borrowing capacity in the current study is less than what is reported in the 
international literature (Beattie et al. 2006).  
 The current study also provides an early attempt to explain the effects of the 
2007/08 financial crisis on the financing decisions of firms. Evidence 
obtained shows that the crisis restricted loans from lenders. There is little 
evidence that the financial crisis restricted funds from informal sources. 
There is also strong evidence that domestic firms were more likely to find it 
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difficult to acquire funds than multinational firms during the crisis period, 
possibly because multinational firms have less risk of bankruptcy than 
domestic firms. 
 
Overall, in spite of the institutional differences between the developed economies 
and the developing ones such as Ghana, this study shows that there are strong 
resemblances between developed and developing economies when examining 
financing decisions among firms. There were however a few notable differences, 
especially regarding the different sources of funds and maintaining target debt levels. 
Indeed, the views expressed in the present survey are broadly similar to those 
reported in most regression-based studies of capital structure of firms. In addition to 
this, neither the trade-off nor the pecking order hypothesis dominate the diversity of 
financing decision-making observed among firms in Ghana. This indicates the 
complexity of the capital structure decision and that a single theory is not enough to 
explain it. While I have chosen to focus this survey on Ghana, an analysis of 
financing decisions across different countries within the SSA could also be useful in 
providing more detailed information about factors that explain the diversity of 
financing decisions across countries and also serve as a test of the robustness of the 
above findings.  
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Chapter 7 
 
Results of Estimation of Firm-level Factors 
 
7.1. Introduction 
 
 
This chapter discusses the estimation results obtained from the secondary data by 
examining the effects of firm-level factors on leverage. The chapter begins by 
looking at the hypotheses tested (five hypotheses are tested in this chapter). This is 
followed by descriptive statistics of both the independent and the dependent 
variables from all the eight countries involved in this study. This is then followed by 
various regression analyses and discussions. The final section of this chapter presents 
a summary of the results and the conclusion of the chapter.    
  
 
7.2. Hypotheses Tested 
 
Conceptually, the relationship between the various firm-level factors and leverage is 
reproduced  in Figure 7.1 and it corresponds to H1 to H6 (as shown in chapter 4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
176 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. 1: Conceptual model 1 
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Profitability 
 
Tangibility 
 
Firm growth 
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Table 7.1 provides  a summary  of the hypotheses tested under this chapter. 
 
Table 7. 1: Summary of Hypothesis 
 
 
Subject 
 
Hypothesis 
Profitability (PR) 
H1.There will be a negative relationship between 
profitability and leverage 
Volatility(VT) 
H2. There will be a negative relationship between 
earnings volatility and leverage  
Asset tangibility (TA) 
H3: There will be a positive relationship between 
asset tangibility and leverage 
Firm size (SZ) 
H4. The relationship between firm size and leverage 
will be positive 
Growth (GR) 
H5. The relationship between growth opportunity and 
leverage will be positive 
Tax rate (TX) 
H6. The relationship between tax rate and leverage 
will be negative 
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7.3. Summary Statistics of Firm-level Variables  
 
Details of cross-country statistics of leverage and other firm specific variables can be 
found in Appendix 4 of this thesis. 
 
 
Figure 7. 2: Cross-country summary of leverage 
  
 
 
 
Figure 7. 3: Cross-country summary of firm size 
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Figure 7. 4: Mean Values of ROA, PR, TA and TX 
  
 
Figures 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 present the descriptive statistics for both the dependent and 
the independent variables for all the countries under consideration. The information 
is confined to 359 companies from SSA. The variables presented above are as 
follow:  
i. LEV: Leverage defined as ratio of total debt to total asset.  
ii. ROA: return on assets defined as the ratio of earnings before interest and tax 
to total assets.  
iii. PR: Profitability defined as ratio of operating income to total assets.  
iv. VT: Volatility defined as ratio of standard deviation of operating income to 
total assets.  
v. TA: Asset tangibility defined as ratio of fixed asset to total asset.  
vi. SZ: Size is the log of total assets.  
vii. GR: Growth defined as ratio of sales growth to total assets growth and 
finally,  
viii. TX: Tax rate defined as the ratio of tax paid to the net profit before interest 
and tax. 
 
From the above figures, (i.e. Figures 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4) a few findings are worth 
noting. For the sample of 8 countries examined in this thesis, the mean (median) for 
the leverage is 16 (11) percent. Ivory Coast tends to have the lowest leverage ratio of 
8 (2) percent while Ghana has the highest ratio of 20 (12) percent. Generally, there is 
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an indication that total debt constitutes roughly one-fifth of the capital structure of 
the selected countries. Companies in these countries are mainly equity financed. The 
absence of bond markets in most of the countries under investigation may have 
contributed to their low usage of debt in their capital structure. Previous studies 
analyse leverage across a number of developing economies and tend to observe a 
lower leverage ratio which is in line with the current result. For instance, Jong et al. 
(2008) reported a mean value of 17 percent and 19 percent for Pakistan and 
Indonesia respectively.  
 
In relation to firm performance (ROA), South Africa and Zambia have the highest 
mean value of 14 percent. Firms in Ghana have the lowest ROA ratio of 5 percent. 
The mean of profitability is 9 percent. This suggests that firms in the SSA have 
relatively poor profitability during the test period (i.e 2002 - 2011). In terms of the 
level of economic development, South Africa and Nigeria are relatively more 
developed than the other countries in the SSA. However, a preliminary insight 
extracted from Figure 7.2 is that it is difficult to observe any clear relationship 
between these two countries’ level of development and their leverage levels. Both 
the relatively developed economies and those less developed have almost the same 
amount of leverage. This is however not to say that the country-level factors are 
insignificant. A further analysis is conducted below to examine the impact of certain 
country-level factors on leverage. It is also interesting to note that firms in Nigeria 
and South Africa had negative (contracting) growth opportunities during the test 
period.  
 
In addition to the above, there is also no clear relationship between the asset level 
and leverage. Firms with relatively large assets are expected to have a high leverage 
level. For instance, with the highest leverage ratio of 20 percent, Ghana would be 
expected to have the highest percent of assets. This is however not the case as 
indicated in Figure 7.4. On average, South African firms are the largest. 
 
A further analysis of leverage ratios across various years (as indicated by Figure 7.5) 
reveals that 2006 had the lowest leverage ratio. There is no evidence that there was a 
drop in the leverage ratio between 2007/08 when many western economies were 
experiencing economic decline. This could have been as a result of the low level of 
interaction between most African economies and the western world.  
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Figure 7. 5: Leverage Ratios 
 
 
 
7.4. Testing for Multicollinearity  
  
The issue of multicollinearity arises when two or more of the predictors in a regression 
model are moderately or highly correlated. The correlation matrix is presented in Table 7.2. 
 
 
 
Table 7. 2: Correlation coefficient matrix 
 
 
 
 
LEV 
 
PR 
 
VT 
 
TA 
 
SZ 
 
GR 
 
TX 
 
 
LEV 
 
1.0000 
      
 
PR 
 
-0.1115 
 
1.0000 
     
 
VT 
 
-0.0191 
 
-0.0141 
 
1.0000 
    
 
TA 
 
0.3017 
 
0.0942 
 
-0.0212 
 
1.0000 
   
 
SZ 
 
0.0334 
 
-0.0432 
 
-0.1019 
 
-0.0900 
 
1.0000 
  
 
GR 
 
-0.0085 
 
-0.0165 
 
-0.0002 
 
-0.0154 
 
-0.0238 
 
1.0000 
 
 
TX 
 
-0.1438 
 
0.1768 
 
-0.0104 
 
0.3192 
 
-01298 
 
-0.0128 
 
1.0000 
 
The correlation matrix indicates that none of the variables are highly correlated. This 
gives no cause for concern as far as the issue of multicollinearity among the 
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explanatory variables is concerned. Generally, the correlation between leverage and 
the firm-level characteristics are also in line with the various regression results 
reported below. For instance, the negative correlation between leverage and 
profitability indicates that profitable firms are likely to depend more on internal 
earnings.  
 
 
7.5. Regression Results for Firm-Level Factors 
 
Based on the assumption that there are no group or individual effects among the 
sampled firms (Sheikh and Wang, 2011), the OLS model is estimated and the results 
are presented in Table 7.3
46
. All regressions are made robust and use the cluster 
(firm) option
47
 to control for possible heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within 
firms. In addition to this and following previous scholarly works (e.g. Deesomsak et 
al. 2004; Acquaah, 2007), the explanatory variables are lagged one period in order to 
isolate the analysis from the potential reverse causality between independent and 
dependent variables and to provide a more robust test of the theory.  
 
 
Table 7. 3: Effects of the explanatory variables on LEV 
 
 PR VT TA SZ GR TX 
Coef -.2184*** -.1349** .1812*** .0046** -.1146 
 
-.5197*** 
Robt Std. 
Err. 
.0484 .571 .0140 .0018 .2689 .1981 
t -4.52 -2.36 12.92 2.52 -0.43 -2.62 
P>t 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.012 0.670 0.009 
Number of obs 
 =2268 
Prob > F 
  =  0.0000 
R-squared      
   =  0.1230 
Root MSE        
      = .1619 
 
Note: Leverage (LEV) defined as ratio of total debt to total assets; Profitability (PR) -  ratio of operating income 
to total assets; Volatility (VT)  -  ratio of standard deviation of operating income to total assets; Asset 
                                            
46
 On the basis that there are no differences (in terms of the level of economic development) across the selected 
countries, all the data gathered are put together in the regression analysis. Country by country analysis was not 
done due to the limited number of firm-level observations obtained from some of the countries under 
consideration. Breakdown of the firm-level observations are already presented in Figure 5.2 
47 Using only the robust option would produce standard errors that are asymptotically robust to 
heteroskedasticity, but not autocorrelation. 
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tangibility(TA)  as ratio of fixed asset to total assets; Size (SZ) is the log of total assets; Growth (GR) - is ratio of 
sales growth to total asset growth and finally, Tax rate (TX) -  ratio of tax paid to net profit before tax 
*significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level and ***significant at 1% level. 
 
 
The regression estimates presented in Table 7.3 show that all the explanatory 
variables with the exception of growth are significant in explaining a firm’s usage of 
leverage. Therefore, as a sensitivity check, the regression result is re-estimated by 
dropping the growth variable (GR). The results as presented in Table 7.4. indicates 
the elimination of the growth variable did not materially affect the previous findings 
reported in Table 7.3. 
 
Table 7. 4: Regression Analysis without Growth Variable 
 
 PR VT TA SZ TX 
Coef -.2253*** -.1416** .1786*** .0045** -.5414*** 
Robt Std Err .0490 .0571 .0141 .0018 .1977 
 t -4.60 -248 12.71 2.43 -2.74 
P>t 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.015 0.006 
Number of obs          
= 2268 
Prob > F 
=  0.0000 
R-squared 
=  0.1230 
Root MSE 
= .1626 
*significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level and ***significant at 1% level 
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A summary of the expected and the actual effects of the explanatory variables are 
provided in Table 7.5. 
 
Table 7. 5: Expected and Actual Effects of the Explanatory Variables 
 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Profitability 
(PR) 
Volatility 
(VT) 
Tangibility 
(TA) 
Size 
(SZ) 
Growth 
(GR) 
Tax 
(TX) 
Expected 
Effect 
 
─  
 
─ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
- 
Actual 
Effects 
 
─ 
 
─ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
─ 
 
- 
 
 
7.6. Discussion of Results 
7.6.1. Profitability (PR) and Leverage (LEV) 
 
Empirical findings obtained indicate that profitability (PR) has a negative and a 
statistically significant relationship on leverage (β= -.2184; t = -4.52). This indicates 
that profitable firms decrease their leverage levels. This relationship is in line with 
previous scholarly works (e.g. Chakraborty, 2010; Abor, 2008; Cheng and Shiu, 
2007; Fama and French, 2002; Booth et al. 2001; Wiwattanakantang, 1999; Shyam-
Sunder and Myers, 1999). Clearly, the result is consistent with the predictions of the 
pecking order model, which indicates that firms prefer internal sources of funding 
when profits are high to avoid new projects being mispriced or underinvestment 
problems. 
Other scholarly works (e.g.Schobben and Hulle, 2004) also interpret the negative 
relationship between profitability and leverage as a sign of quality, as profitability 
firms prefer to take on less debt than unprofitable firms, to distinguish themselves 
from lower quality firms. 
In addition to the above explanation, both the banking sector and the bond markets 
are very much underdeveloped in SSA. In such a situation, retained earnings become 
the preferred source of finance. Indeed, World Bank Enterprise Survey (2011) 
reports that about 80 percent of firms in SSA finance their investment activities with 
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internal/retained earnings. This condition also seems to explain the negative 
relationship between profitability and leverage reported above.  
This result contradicts the prediction of the static trade-off theory, which expects 
profitable firms to use more leverage so as to reduce their tax liabilities. 
 
7.6.2. Earnings Volatility (VT) and Leverage (LEV) 
 
The results of this study also indicate a negative and statistically significant 
relationship between earnings volatility and leverage (β= -.1349; t = -2.36). This 
outcome is in line with the trade-off hypothesis that argues that volatility of earnings 
is a sign of an inability of a firm to meet its debt commitments. Consequently, firms 
with high earnings volatility are less likely to be granted financial assistance by 
lenders due to the high risk of default (Bradley et al. 1984). A negative relationship 
is therefore expected between earnings volatility and leverage. Along similar lines, 
Abor (2008) noted that in Ghana, firms with high level of risk (volatility in earnings) 
may avoid accumulating more financial risk by using less long-term debt. Indeed, 
where firms with high earnings volatility are granted financial assistance, they could 
be subjected to onerous lending conditions (De Angelo, 1980). Various empirical 
studies have  shown a negative relationship between earnings volatility and leverage 
(e.g. Sheikh and Wang, 2011; Abor, 2008; De Jong et al. 2008; Zou and Xiao, 2006; 
Bradley et al. 1984). Indeed, these findings have been confirmed in the current study. 
This finding supports the theoretical argument put forward in Chapter 4.  
 
7.6.3. Asset Tangibility (TA) and Leverage (LEV). 
 
As regards the effects of tangibility on leverage, this study reveals a positive and a 
statistically significant relationship between leverage and asset tangibility (TA) 
among firms in SSA (β= .1812; t = 12.92). Asset tangibility is by far the most 
significant factor with a t-value of 12.92. This positive significant relationship can be 
explained by the fact that the tangibility of assets is an important element in raising 
debt capital in SSA. In other words, asset tangibility is an important element of 
credit policies among financial lenders. This may be as a result of the absence of 
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credit reference agencies
48
 in most of these SSA countries to provide information 
about the creditworthiness of firms and also the presence of weak creditors’ rights 
among many African countries. Consequently, financial lenders in SSA depend on 
the level of assets as an added security in granting financial assistance to firms. In 
order words, tangibility becomes a substitute for weak creditor rights (Fosu, 2013).  
Available evidence suggests that an average of 80 percent of loans that are granted to 
firms in SSA require the provision of collateral (World Bank Enterprise Survey, 
2011). Therefore, firms in SSA with viable growth opportunities but with less 
tangible assets may find it difficult to secure debt to finance their growth 
opportunities.  
Empirical studies in other less developed market economies have also noted a similar 
relationship between asset tangibility and leverage (e.g. Fosu, 2013, Sheikh and 
Wang 2011; Abor, 2008; Supanvanij, 2006; Boot et al. 2001 and Wiwattanakantang, 
1999). This outcome is in line with the trade-off theory in relation to financial 
distress and bankruptcy cost. For instance, Psillaki and Daskalakis (2009) noted that 
due to weak creditor rights in developing economies, creditors feel better protected 
with firms with tangible asset as such firms have smaller costs of financial distress 
than firms that depend on intangible assets. These findings support my theoretical 
argument. 
  
7.6.4. Firm Size (SZ) and Leverage (LEV). 
Next, it was hypothesised that firm size-leverage relationship should be positive. 
This relationship is supported as size-leverage relationship is positive and significant 
(at the 5% level). This result is in line with my prediction and the trade-off model 
that argues that larger firms should be able to take on more debt due to their ability 
to diversify risk as observed by Titman and Wessels (1988). Abor, (2008) also noted 
a similar result in Ghana. The current finding is also consistent with other findings 
from other less developed market economies (e.g. Booth et al. 2001 and 
Wiwattanakantang, 1999). 
                                            
48
 A company called Credit Reference Bureau Africa Group (which currently operates in 8 countries in Africa-
Ghana, Botswana, Zambia, Tanzania, Uganda, Egypt, Mauritius and Mozambique) has started providing some 
credit referencing/information about companies in these countries. However, this reference agency does not 
contain information about every single firm in the countries in which it operates. 
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7.6.5. Tax (TX) and Leverage (LEV) 
 
Based on the logic of the institutional difference hypothesis of Julian and Ofori-
Dankwa (2013), it was further hypothesised that tax is negatively related to leverage. 
This hypothesis is supported in that the relationship between tax and leverage is 
negative and significant (β= -.5197; t = -2.62). Indeed, a major characteristic of 
economies in SSA is the weak enforcement capacity of formal institutional structures 
(e.g. legal institutions). This encourages corruption and creates an avenue to evade 
compliance with the law. Thus, I find support for the notion that in less developed 
market economies (e.g. SSA) where there is bribery and corruption as a result of 
inefficient, weak and unpredictable regulatory institutional structures (Julian and 
Ofori-Dankwa 2013, Robertson 2009, and Tanzi 1998), such institutional conditions 
are likely to encourage firms to marginalise their tax liabilities. The above result 
lends support to my key theoretical argument that for firms operating in SSA tax is 
negatively related to leverage. The negative tax rate-leverage relationship obtained is 
in contrast with the many scholarly works from the context of developed economies 
that observed a positive relationship between tax rate and leverage. 
 
In short, the results of this empirical study suggest that firms in SSA show similar 
financing behaviour as observed for firms in other less developed market economies. 
Some of the insights from the capital structure theories derived from western settings 
are also applicable to firms in SSA.  
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7.7. Robustness Tests 
 
The following tests were conducted to check the sensitivity of the above results. 
Following Cheng and Shiu, (2007), a tobit analysis is performed and the result is 
presented below.  
 
 
 
Table 7. 6: Results of Tobit Regression 
 
 PR VT TA SZ TX 
Coef -.2614*** - 1.0762 *** .1997*** .0092** .6740** 
Robt Std. 
Err. 
.0735 .3756 .0309 .0036 .3002 
T -3.56 -2.86 6.45 2.55 2.24 
P>t 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.011 0.025 
       Number of obs          F(5,  2263)   
        =   2268                         = 17.29 
          Prob > F                      Pseudo R  
            =0.0000                       = -0.8223 
*significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level and ***significant at 1% level. 
 
It revealed that the signs of the coefficients for all the independent variables and their 
level of significance do not change much. All the five variables (i.e PR, VT, TA SZ 
and TX) reported as significant using the OLS are also significant under the tobit 
model. In addition, I verified the robustness of the results to an alternative definition 
of size (i.e. log of total sales). Overall, the significance of the variables changes very 
little. This indicates that the findings regarding the determinants of capital structure 
are robust for different models. 
 
7.8. Summary and Conclusion on Firm-Level Determinants 
 
Theories of capital structure have been tested in a single-country context (e.g. Sheikh 
and Wang; Chen, 2004; Bhaduri, 2002). In  this chapter of this thesis, I also examine    
determinants of capital structure of firms in eight countries within SSA. In all, data 
from 359 firms in eight countries in SSA are employed in this study. The results of 
this study provide insight into the capital structure practices of firms in SSA. First 
and foremost, the empirical evidence obtained indicates that firms in SSA tend to 
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keep to a lower leverage ratio
49
 than their counterparts in other less developed 
market economies.  
 
Furthermore, firm-specific factors such as profitability and tangibility have 
significant impacts on leverage and are also consistent with the predictions of 
conventional capital structure models (especially the pecking order and the trade-off 
models). In spite of the institutional differences that exist between the western world 
and SSA, the results of this study clearly indicate that some of the firm-level factors 
that are relevant in explaining capital structure in the western context are also 
relevant in SSA. Both the pecking–order and the trade-off models provide 
explanations for financing decisions among firms in SSA. Nevertheless, the current 
results indicate that neither of these two theories dominates the financing behaviour 
among firms in this region. The similarity in the firm-level determinants of capital 
structure observed could be attributed to some of the commonalities of institutional 
structures existing in both developed and less developed economies.  
 
A key finding for the current section is the effect of tax on leverage. Here, the result 
obtained broadly rejects earlier works suggesting that high tax has positive effects on 
leverage (e.g. Barakat and Roa, 2004; Ross et al, 2001). Indeed, the institutional 
settings in almost all African countries are characterised by less developed 
structures. This encourages corruption, and paves ways for firms to marginalise their 
tax obligations. Thus, the current result confirms the notion that differences in 
institutional conditions are likely to affect the direction of the relationship between 
tax and leverage (Julian and Ofori-Dankwa, 2013).  
By pooling together both firm and country-level variables, the next chapter examines 
the moderating role of firm size, asset tangibility and rule of law. 
 
 
 
 
                                            
49
 Due to unavailability of sufficient information, I was not able to decompose leverage into long-term and short-
term. This may be of particular interest in future analysis so as to provide a fuller understanding of capital 
structure of firms in SSA. 
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Chapter 8 
 
 
Country- Level Factors and Moderating Effects models 
 
 
8.1. Introduction 
 
The preceding chapter of this thesis looks at the effects of the conventional 
independent variables (i.e firm-level variables) on the debt-equity choice of firms in 
SSA. Empirical studies of the determinants of capital structure observed the 
importance of firm and country-level variables in determining firms’ capital structure 
(e.g. Joeveer, 2013; Kayo and Kimura, 2011; Gungoraydinoglu and Oztekin, 2011; 
De Jong et al. 2008; Deesomsak, 2004). However, a more detailed empirical analysis 
going beyond the traditional firm-country factor capital structure relationship should 
be of great importance to both academics and policy makers. This underlines the 
importance of this section of the thesis. Indeed, the possibilities of moderating 
effects on the relationship by some firm and country-specific factors remain under-
researched. Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to examine the moderating effects of 
certain firm and country level factors.  
The first part of this chapter examines the moderating role of firm size on the 
relationship between firm-level factors and leverage. The second part examines the 
moderating effects of asset tangibility on the relationship between earnings volatility 
and leverage. The third section of the chapter examines the moderating role of the 
rule of law. Finally, a summary and conclusion of this chapter are presented.  
 
 
8.2. Moderating Effect of firm size on the relationship between firm-
level Factors and Leverage 
 
By controlling for four country-level factors (i.e. institutional factors), all the firm-
level factors are then pooled together. The country-level factors are: 
i. Stock market development (SM): defined as ratio of stock market 
capitalization to GDP. 
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ii. Inflation (IN): the annual rate of inflation; 
iii.  economic development (ED). 
iv. GDP as a proxy for economic development and finally  
v. Level of corruption (CP): measured by the corruption perception index, 
which measures severity of information asymmetry.  
I control for these institutional factors because firms are embedded within broader 
social structures as argued by institutional theory (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012). 
Previous scholarly works (notably Joeveer, 2013; Kayo and Kimura, 2011; 
Gungoraydinoglu and Oztekin, 2011) suggest an association between these variables 
and leverage, especially when examining leverage levels across countries. For 
instance, corruption and economic development have been shown to be positively 
related to leverage (Joeveer, 2013). In addition, studies show stock market 
development to be negatively related to leverage (Kayo and Kimura, 2011). All the 
control variables used were taken from the World Bank database.   
 
8.3. Model Specification for the Moderating Effect of Firm size 
 
Figure 8.1 reproduces the conceptual framework that hypothesises the moderating 
effects of firm size. These moderating relationships correspond to H7 to H10 in 
chapter 4.   
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                                                                           H7 (-) 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                      H8 (+) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                H9 (+) 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                        H10 (-) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Hypothesised paths 
 Non-hypothesised and control paths  
  
Figure 8. 1: Conceptual Model of Moderating Effects of Firm-Size 
 
 
8.4. Size Moderating Effects Hypotheses to be tested 
 
As can be seen from Figure 8.1, thirteen independent variables are estimated. Out 
this number, four represent the hypothesised interaction terms. Table 8.1 therefore 
provides a summary of the hypotheses tested under this section. 
 
 
 
Leverage (LEV) 
Profitability (PR) 
 
Firm size (SZ) 
 
 
Tax rate (TX) 
 
Asset tangibility (TA) 
Earnings volatility 
(VT) 
Control for: 
-Inflation (IN) 
-Economic Development 
(ED) 
-Corruption (CP) 
-Stock Market Development 
(SM) 
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Table 8. 1: Size Moderating Effects 
 
Hypotheses Size Moderator Relationship 
 
H7 
 
Size (SZ) x Profitability (PR)                (-) Leverage (Lev) 
 
H8 
 
Size (SZ) x Volatility (VT)                 (+) Leverage (Lev) 
 
H9 
 
Size (SZ) x Tangibility (TA)               (+) Leverage (Lev) 
 
H10 
 
Size (SZ) x Tax (TX)                (-) Leverage (Lev) 
Note: SZxPR is expected to be negatively related to LEV; SZxVT is expected to be negatively related to LEV; 
SZxTA is expected to be positively related to LEV; SZxTX should be negatively related to LEV. 
 
 
8.5. Collinearity Diagnostic Test 
 
Existing literature (e.g. Boso, Story and Cadogan, 2013; Cadogan, Cui, Morgan and 
Story, 2006; Little, Bovaird and Widaman, 2006) suggests that the use of interaction 
terms in regression analysis usually creates collinearity problems. Therefore, using 
the variance inflation factor (VIF), I investigate whether the independent variables 
are likely to be subject to collinearity problems. The collinearity diagnostic test 
reveals a very high collinearity
50
 among the explanatory variables. Thus, following 
Little, Bovaird and Widaman (2006), a residual centering approach is used to reduce 
the impact of any potential multicollinearity problem on the results. Findings from 
the collinearity test following the residual centering approach are presented in Table 
8.2. As can be seen, all variables involved in interactions exhibit a low variance 
inflation factor (VIF), well below the recommended cut off of 10.00  (Baum, 2006). 
Thus, all the variables can be used to interpret the regression results. 
 
 
 
 
                                            
50
 Due to the interaction effect, some of the VIF were far above the recommended cut off of 10. 
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Table 8. 2: Collinearity Diagnostic Test 
 
Dependent Variable 
 = Leverage 
Collinearity Statistics 
VIF Tolerance 
Inflation (IN) 1.076 .929 
Stock Market Development (SM) 5.435 .184 
Economic Development (ED) 3.809 .263 
Corruption Level  (CP) 2.155 .464 
Profitability (PR) 1.123 .890 
Earnings Volatility (VT) 1.033 .968 
Asset Tangibility (TA) 1.293 .774 
Tax (TX) 1.324 .755 
Firm Size (SZ) 1.547 .646 
PR x SZ 1.096 .913 
VT x SZ 1.002 .998 
TA x SZ 1.551 .645 
TX x SZ 1.570 .637 
Note: The table present the results of a collinearity test. The results indicate that there is no issue of 
multicollinearity among the variables. 
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Table 8. 3: Regression Results.
51
 
 
  
Dependent variable = Leverage 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Standardized 
Coefficients 
t-values Standardized 
Coefficients 
t-values 
Constant  3.604  3.478 
 
Inflation (IN) 
 
.011 
 
.545 
 
.016 
 
.789 
Stock Market 
Development (SM) 
-.110 -2.353 -.107 -2.283 
Economic 
Development (ED) 
.106 2.698 .098 2.496 
Corruption Level (CP) .109 3.700 .105 3.571 
Profitability (PR) -.015 -.752 -.015 -.729 
Earnings Volatility 
(VT) 
-.187 -9.036 -.185 -8.715 
Asset Tangibility (TA) .284 12.891 .310 13.626 
Tax (TX) -.075 -3.314 -.053 -2.297 
Firm Size (SZ) .036 1.460 .031 1.264 
PR x SZ  .006 .266 
VT x SZ  .025 1.256 
TA x SZ  .107 4.285 
TX x SZ  -.113 -4.504 
Model fits   
R
2
 
Adj. R
2
 
∆R2 
Prob > F    
.131 
.127 
- 
0.000 
.142 
.137 
.011 
0.000 
Critical t-values for hypothesised paths = 1.282 (10%); 1.645 (5%) and 2.325 (1%); one-tailed test 
 
Note: Leverage (LEV) defined as ratio of total debt to total assets; Profitability (PR) defined as ratio of operating 
income to total assets; Volatility (VT) defined as ratio of standard deviation of operating income to total assets; 
Asset tangibility(TA)  is the  ratio of fixed assets to total assets; Size (SZ) is the log of total assets; Tax rate (TX) 
is ratio of tax paid to net profit before tax; Inflation (IN) is the annual rate of inflation; Gross domestic product as 
a proxy for Economic Development (ED); Corruption (CP) defined as the corruption perception index and finally 
Stock Market Development (SM) which is measured as the ratio of stock market capitalisation to GDP.  
 
 
                                            
51
 In a reduced model, I re-run the above results by keeping only those variables that are significant. I find 
similar results. 
196 
 
8.6. Results of Structural Relationship 
  
Two-step procedures were adopted in the evaluation of the structural models with 
interaction terms as indicated in Figure 8.1. The first step of this process involves the 
estimation of firm and country-level factors as predictors of leverage (i.e. model 1). 
The second stage involves the estimation of the interaction terms nested in the main 
effects model. Table 8.3 presents the results of panel estimates with both firm-level 
and county-specific effects. Overall, the results presented in Table 8.3 reveals similar 
relationships of leverage to the firm-level variables presented in Tables 7.3 and 7.4 
(i.e. in Chapter 7). The next section looks at the relationship between leverage and 
the country-level factors controlled for in Figure 8.1. 
 
8.6.1. Economic Development and Leverage 
 
The level of economic development (ED), as measured by the level GDP, has a 
positive relationship and significant effect on leverage (β= .098; t = 2.496).  The 
suggested explanation is that as the wealth increases, the country develops measures 
that foster better investors protection and this encourages more capital to be made 
available to firms by investors. In other words, the growth of an economy causes the 
availability of debt capital to increase. This leads to a positive relationship between 
level of economic development and leverage. Currently, most firms in SSA finance 
greater part their activities with internal earnings (World Bank Enterprise Survey, 
2011). This is as a result of the limited access to other forms of finance (e.g. bank 
loans and equity finance). Thus, enhancing economic development across countries 
in SSA will undoubtedly widen firms’ access to different forms of finance.  
This result is in line with other empirical studies that have also found a positive 
relationship between GDP growth rate and leverage. (e.g. Booth et al. 2001;  Jong et 
al. 2007).   
  
8.6.2. Level of Corruption and Leverage 
 
The level of corruption (as a measure of severity of asymmetric information arising 
from lack of corporate transparency) has a positive effect on leverage (β= .105; t = 
3.571).  This indicates that firms in countries with less corruption (i.e higher on the 
corruption perception index) would be expected to use more debt than firms in 
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countries with high corruption (i.e. lower on the corruption perception index). This 
indicates the existence of an asymmetric information problem among Sub-Saharan 
African countries (i.e. poor corporate transparency) that lowers the leverage level of 
firms in this region. The presence of the asymmetric information problem hinders 
investors’ evaluation of the companies and therefore reduces the credit level 
available to firms.  Indeed, previous scholar works (e.g. Lawal, 2007) suggest that 
corruption continues to be a major barrier to firms in SSA. According to TI (2012) 
report on corruption (as indicated in Figure 2.7), most countries in SSA surveyed 
scored below 50 on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean). The current 
result therefore suggests that reducing the level of corruption among countries in 
SSA will enhance the inflow of capital needed by the corporate sector.  This finding 
is consistent with a study of nine Eastern European countries by Joeveer (2013) who 
observed a statistically positive effect of corruption on leverage. 
 
8.6.3. Stock Market Development And Leverage 
The level of stock market development (SM) has a negative effect on leverage (β= -
.107; t = -2.283).  The finding explains that firms in countries with well developed 
stock markets would be expected to use less debt than firms in countries that have 
less developed stock markets. In other words, when a country’s stock market is well 
developed, firms have better access to equity capital and will therefore be expected 
to make use of more equity capital than debt capital, hence the negative relationship 
between stock market development and leverage. Indeed, stock markets in SSA 
remain underdeveloped with low liquidity levels by global standards (Irving, 2005). 
This condition discourages both foreign capital inflow and mobilisation of domestic 
funds for corporate investment and growth. Thus, developing the stock markets in 
SSA will help to diversify the financial markets within this region so that firms will 
not only have to rely on the traditional banking sector and their limited retained 
earnings as their major sources of finance, but also on the stock market as a way 
generating funds for corporate investment. 
Existing literature suggests a negative relationship between stock market 
development and leverage, which corroborates the current finding. For instance, 
Kayo and Kimura (2011) analysing the influence of macroeconomic variables on 
leverage found a negative relation between stock market development and leverage. 
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This is consistent with Demirguc-Kunt  and Maksimovic (2006) who in their 
analysis of data from 30 countries found a negative linear relationship between stock 
market development and leverage. 
 
8.6.4. Moderating Effects of Firm Size on other Firm-level Factors 
 
The preceding section has established some country–level factors in the 
determination of debt-equity choice. I now go a step further by considering in more 
detail the indirect effects of firm size (SZ) on leverage. Althoug prior studies (Frank 
and Goyal, 2009; Abor, 2008; Salawu, 2007; Wald, 1999) have taken an important 
step to show that firm size has influence on the capital structure decisions of firms. 
However, these studies have failed to explicitly show how firm level factors and 
leverage relationships could be explained by the size of the firm.  Here, I propose 
that firm size could have a moderating effect on other firm-level determinants of 
capital structure.  A summary of the results of the size moderator effects is presented 
in Table 8.4. 
 
Table 8. 4: A Summary of Size Moderating Predicted and Actual Effects 
 
Hypotheses Expected 
Relationships 
Standardised 
Parameters 
T-values 
a 
Comments 
 
H7 
 
(PR)x(SZ)          (-) Lev 
 
.006 
 
.266 
 
Not 
Supported 
 
H8 
 
(VT)x(SZ)          (+) Lev 
 
.025 
 
1.256 
 
Not 
Supported   
 
H9 
 
(TA)x(SZ)          (+) Lev 
 
.107 
 
4.285*** 
 
Supported 
(Strong) 
 
H10 
 
(TX)x(SZ)           (-) Lev 
 
-.113 
 
-4.504*** 
 
Supported 
(Strong) 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p <0.10. a= Critical t-values are 1.282, 1.645 and 2.325 for α = 0.10, α = 
0.05 and α = 0.01 respectively (one-tailed test as all hypotheses are one-directional). PR = 
profitability; VT = earnings volatility; TA = Asset tangibility; TX = Tax and SZ= firm size. 
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My findings regarding the moderating effects of firm size are mixed. From Table 
8.2, hypothesis 7 postulates that for large firms, the influence of profitability on 
leverage will be negative. Results of the hypothesis analysis reveals a very weak 
relationship between profitability-size interaction variable and leverage    (β=.006 ; t 
= .266). Thus, hypothesis 7 is not supported. As such, it is concluded that firm size 
(SZ) did not moderate the association between profitability (PR) and leverage 
(LEV). This means that firm size does not impact on the relationship between 
profitability and leverage. The plausible explanation of this is that profitability-
leverage relationship is not dependent on the specific size of the firm. Indeed, a 
myriad of theoretical and empirical evidence (e.g. Abor, 2008; Daskalakis and 
Psillaki, 2008) exist to show that profitability-leverage relationship for both small 
and large firms is negative. Thus, the profitability-leverage relationship is not 
conditioned by the size of the firm. 
Hypothesis 8 expects the volatility-size interaction variable to have positive effects 
on leverage. However, this hypothesis was weakly supported as the standardised 
parameter estimate for volatility-size interaction variable and leverage was positive 
and non-significant (β=.025; t = 1.256). Thus, firm size does not impact on the 
earnings volatility – leverage relationship. 
Hypothesis 9 posits a positive relationship between asset tangibility-size interaction 
variable and leverage. This hypothesis was supported as the results show a  
significant positive relationship between asset tangibility-size interaction variable 
and leverage (β=.107; t = 4.285). Thus, bigger firms should have a large asset base 
that should enable them to have access to more debt since the asset can be relied 
upon by financial lenders as collateral.    
It was postulated in hypothesis 10 that the relationship between tax-size interaction 
term and leverage should be negative. The results of the analysis reveals that this 
hypothesis was  strongly supported as  the tax-size interaction term  has a significant 
negative effect on leverage (β= -.113; t = -4.504). This does not support the 
prediction of the trade-off hypothesis that postulates a positive relationship between 
tax and leverage. A possible explanation of this is that the quality of the regulatory 
institutions in SSA is responsible for the direction of the relationship between tax 
and leverage, when moderated by firm size. In order words, as a result of the weak 
institutional structures existing in SSA (Julian and Ofori-Dankwa, 2013), leverage is 
not used as a tool to decrease tax commitment, as bribery and corruption allow firms 
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(especially, large firms) to evade tax compliance or reduce the amount of taxes paid. 
The weak regulatory environment facilitates the evasion of tax by large firms. In 
other words, the benefits of the weak regulatory environment accrue primarily to 
large firms. Small firms that are unable to pay bribes or do not have access to top 
officials to bribe them are usually subjected to heavy tax burdens, thus the negative 
and significant relationship between tax-size interaction term and leverage. 
  
8.7. Moderating effect of asset tangibility on earnings volatility- 
leverage relationship. 
 
In the previous section, I examined how firm size explains the relationship between 
profitability, earnings volatility, asset tangibility, tax and leverage. In this section, I 
propose how asset tangibility matters in the earnings volatility-leverage relationship. 
The conceptual framework that examines this relationship is reproduced in Figure 
8.2. This framework corresponds to H11 (as indicated in chapter 4). 
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                                     Hypothesised path 
                                      Non-hypothesised control path 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. 2: Conceptual model of Moderating Effect of Tangibility 
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Table 8. 5: Regression results for asset tangibility moderating effect 
 
  
Dependent variable = Leverage 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Standardized 
Coefficients 
t-values Standardized 
Coefficients 
t-values 
Control variables 
(country-level) 
    
Inflation (IN) .011 .545 -.002 -.226 
Stock market 
Development (SM) 
 
-.110 
 
-2.353 
 
-.003 
 
-2.701 
Economic Development 
(ED) 
 
.106 
 
2.698 
 
.101 
 
2.440 
 
Corruption (CP) 
 
.109 
 
3.700 
 
.065 
 
2.001 
Control variables (firm-
level) 
    
Profitability (PR) -.015 -.752 -.101 -1.281 
Earnings Volatility (VT) -.187 -9.036 -.160 -4.237 
Asset Tangibility (TA) .284 12.891 .280 9.113 
Tax (TX) -.075 -3.314 -.082 -3.732 
Firm Size (SZ) .036 1.460 .004 .226 
Hypothesised interaction 
path 
    
VT x TA  .104 2.511 
R- squared                                          0 .131      0.139 
Critical t-values are 1.282, 1.645 and 2.325 for α = 0.10, α = 0.05 and α = 0.01 respectively (one-tailed test as the 
hypothesis (i.e earnings volatility-asset tangibility interaction effect) is one-directional) 
 
One of the propositions of the trade-off theory is that earnings volatility is negatively 
related to leverage. Firms with inconsistent earnings (a proxy for firm risk) are 
thought to use less debt. This argument is confirmed in prior research (e.g. Abor, 
2008; Wiwattanakantang, 1999; De Angelo 1980). However, I believe that a key 
limitation of the above argument is that past studies (e.g. Abor, 2008; 
Wiwattanakantang, 1999; De Angelo 1980) have failed to consider the degree to 
which asset tangibility moderates the earnings volatility-leverage relationship. Such 
omission is significant given that asset tangibility is likely to have a huge impact on 
the capital structure decisions of firms, especially those in developing economies.  
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The key premise of my argument is that even if a firm has volatility in earnings, an 
important element which financial lenders need to consider in making a decision 
regarding lending to such a firm is the level of tangible assets of the firm. Thus, the 
novel argument in this part of the thesis is that the earnings volatility–leverage 
relationship is conditioned by the level of asset tangibility. The regression for this 
specification (following the residual centering approach
52
) yields a statistically 
significant positive coefficient (at 5%), as predicted (β=.104; t = 2.511). The overall 
result indicates that asset tangibility tends to mitigate the negative earnings 
volatility-leverage relationship. This finding shows that firms with earnings volatility 
could still have better access to debt under condition of tangible assets availability. 
In this respect, I draw an attention to the fact that earnings volatility alone should not 
be used as a basis for assessing the repayment capabilities of a firm, but an equally 
important element is the asset base of the firm. 
 
 
8.8. Moderating Effect of Rule of Law on the relationship between 
firm-level factors and Leverage. 
 
In the previous section, I laid out how asset tangibility matters in the relationship 
between earnings volatility and leverage. In this section, drawing upon the logic of 
institutional theory (North, 1995), I propose how rule of law matters too in capital 
structure of firms. Therefore, this section of the thesis examines the moderating 
effects of rule of law on the relationship between firm-specific factors and leverage. 
The next section examines the model specification for the moderating effects of rule 
of law.  
 
8.8.1. Model Specification for the Moderating Effect of Rule of Law 
 
The model for this analysis is presented in Figure 8.3. As indicated in chapter 4, this 
framework corresponds to H12 and H13. 
 
                                            
52 Following the residual centering approach, I tested for multicollinearity. The results obtained indicated that 
there was no problem with multicollinearity as none of the variance inflation factors obtained was greater than 
10. 
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Figure 8. 3: Rule of Law moderating effects 
 
The relationship representing rule of law (RL) moderating effects models are 
presented in Figure 8.3. Twelve independent variables were tested in this model. Out 
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the twelve variables, ten of them represent non-hypothesised control variables. These 
are rule of law (RL), Inflation (IN), Stock market development (SM), Level of 
economic development (ED), Profitability (PR), Earnings volatility (VOL), Asset 
tangibility (TAN), Tax (TX), Firm growth (GR) and Firm size (SZ). The two 
hypothesised paths are rule of law-asset tangibility interaction term (RL x TAN) and 
rule of law-tax interaction term (RL x TX). I follow Kayo and Kimura (2011) and 
Cadogan, Diamantopoulos and Siguaw (2002) in the creation of the interaction 
terms. Due to the inclusion of the interaction term in the regression estimate, 
multicollinearity becomes apparent. As argued by Little et al. (2006), a failure to 
orthogonise the exogenous and endogenous variables can lead to structural 
coefficient bias. Following this argument, all the variables involved in the creation of 
the interaction terms are residually centred. A series of hierarchical models were 
adopted to test the two  research hypotheses (i.e. H12 and H13). 
 
Model 1 (as presented in Table 8.7) involved the estimation of the non-hypothesised 
variables. In models 2 and 3, the regression model was estimated with the interaction 
terms nested in the main effect model. (i.e. both the hypothesised and non-
hypothesised control variables were put together in models 2 and 3). The extent to 
which the results were stable across different proxies was assessed by observing the 
variation in model fit and R
2 
change. Therefore, in model 2, I defined firm size as the 
log of total assets. In model 3, I redefined firm size as a number of full time 
employees. As demonstrated in Table 8.7, model 3 provides a better model fit and R
2 
change. Therefore, model 3 is used in the interpretation of the results. The growth 
variable appears insignificant in all the three models. Therefore, as a post hoc 
analysis, I re-run the regression analysis in model 4 by excluding the growth 
variable. Table 8.6 provides a summary of the hypotheses tested under this section. 
 
 
Table 8. 6: Rule of Law Moderating Effects Hypotheses to be tested 
 
Hypotheses Rule of Law Moderator Relationship 
H12 (RL) x (TAN)                   (-)    Leverage (Lev) 
H15 (RL) x (TX)                      (+)   Leverage (Lev) 
Note: RL =Rule of law; TA = Asset Tangibility; TX = Tax 
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Table 8. 7: Regression Results for Rule of Law Moderating Effects 
 
  
Dependent variable = leverage 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Control variables(country-
level) 
    
Inflation (IN) 0.054 0.023 0.085* 0.007 
Economic development(ED) 0.196*** 0.105* 0.155** 0.095* 
Stock market development 
(SM) 
-0.129** -0.180*** -0.055 -0.056 
Rule of law (RL) 0.133** 0.110* 0.142** 0.280*** 
 
Control variables(firm-level) 
    
Profitability (PR) -0.161*** -0.033 -0.202*** -0.212*** 
Firm size (SZ) 0.102* 0.110** 0.092* 0.098* 
Firm growth (GR) 0.002 0.013 0.033   
Earnings volatility (VOL) -0.219*** -0.203*** 0.229*** 0.171*** 
Asset tangibility (TAN) 0.122** 0.134** 0.192*** 0.151** 
Tax rate  (TX) -0.205*** -0.191*** -0.193*** -0.199*** 
 
Hypothesised  interaction 
variables 
    
H12: Rule of Law (RL) x 
Tangibility (TAN) 
 -0.169*** -0.182*** -0.195*** 
H13: Rule of Law (RL) x Tax 
(TX) 
 0.104* 0.141** 0.183*** 
Model fit     
R
2
 
Prob > F    
0.133 
  
0.152  
 0.000 
0.155   
 0.000 
0.156  
 0.000 
*significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level and ***significant at 1% level. Model 1 involved the 
estimation of the non-hypothesised variables. In models 2 and 3, the regression  model was estimated with the 
interaction terms nested in the main effect model.  In model 2, I defined firm size as the log of total asset. In 
model 3, I refined firm size as a number of full time employees.  As a post hoc analysis, I re-run the regression 
analysis in model 4 by excluding the growth variable.   
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Table 8. 8: A Summary of Rule of Law Moderating Predicted and Actual Effects 
 
Expected 
Relationships 
Standardised 
Parameters 
T-values 
a 
Comments 
 
(RL)x(TAN)          (-) Lev 
 
-.182 
 
-6.443 
 
Supported 
 
(RL)x(TX)          (+) Lev 
 
.141 
 
2.204 
 
Supported 
Critical t-values are 1.282, 1.645 and 2.325 for α = 0.10, α = 0.05 and α = 0.01 respectively (one-tailed test as all 
hypotheses are one-directional). 
 
 
The analyses of determinants of corporate leverage have mainly focused on the firm-
level factors. In this section of this thesis, my intuition is that corporate leverage is 
not only driven by a firm’s own characteristics but also the environment in which it 
operates. In other words, institutional factors matter in firm financing decision 
(Joeveer, 2013; Gungoraydinoglu and Oztekin, 2011). 
Thus, motivated by the fact that no study has so far examined the impact of rule of 
law on asset tangibility-leverage and tax-leverage relationships, this section of the 
thesis investigates the interrelationship among asset tangibility, tax rule of law and 
leverage. The main argument is that rule of law moderates the association between 
asset tangibility-leverage and tax-leverage relationships. Thus, a set of hypotheses 
were formulated to test this argument. Table 8.8 displays a summary of the model 
analysis.  
 
From Table 8.6, it was hypothesised that (i.e. H12) a strong rule of law should 
moderate the association between asset tangibility and leverage in such a way that 
such relationship is negative and significant. This relationship is also supported (β = 
-.182; t = -6.443). Prior studies including Fosu, (2013), Gungoraydinoglu and 
Oztekin, (2011), Deesomsak et al. (2004) Huang and Song, (2006) suggest that in 
less developed markets, asset tangibility is positively related to leverage. From the 
existing studies, the importance of asset tangibility in less developed economies is 
premised on the idea that because of weak creditor rights (due to weak regulatory 
environment including the rule of law), creditors feel better protected with firms that 
have tangible assets that serve as collateral in debt contracts. This is because such 
firms have a smaller cost of financial distress than firms that depend on intangible 
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assets (Psillaki and Daskalakis, 2009). Thus, with a strong rule of law, creditors will 
feel better protected and this reduces the guarantee that materialises in the form of 
collateral. Thus, a strong rule of law tends to weaken the highly positive influence of 
asset tangibility on leverage. 
 
Finally, it was argued in H13 that a positive relationship exist between the tax-rule of 
law interaction variable (TX x RL) and leverage (LEV). This hypothesis is supported 
in that the parameter for this estimate is positive and significant (β=.141; t = 2.204). 
This supports my theoretical argument that with a strong rule of law, there is less 
incidence of bribery and corruption as there is less room for firms to evade tax. Thus, 
firms with a large tax burden are encouraged to employ more debt in their capital 
structure due to the advantage in the deductibility of interest payments. Therefore, a 
high tax rate serves as an incentive for firms to borrow more (Ross, Westerfield, 
Jordan and Firer, 2001). In other words, I argue that at a high level of rule of law, 
firms ability to engage in bribery and corrupt practices are hampered and therefore 
firms that face high tax burdens are more likely to take on more debt to gain 
advantage in the deductibility of interest payments. In this way, I have applied 
institution-based theory to achieve a better understanding of how external factors are 
likely to contribute to the capital structure decisions of firms. 
In all, the above findings constitute new evidence on the importance of institutional 
factors in the capital structure decisions of firms. 
 
 
8.9. Summary and Conclusion   
 
Prior studies (e.g. Duku et al. 2011; Ramlall, 2009; Salawu, 2006; Yarkey, 2006) 
from SSA tend to only concentrate on firm-specific factors as the main determinants 
of capital structure of firms. In this chapter, I have demonstrated that firstly, country-
level factors can have direct effects on corporate leverage and secondly, firm-level 
factors can also influence corporate leverage indirectly through their impact on the 
effects of other firm-specific factors. Indeed, previous studies have not 
systematically investigated these indirect effects of firm-level factors on leverage. 
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This chapter has demonstrated the importance of institutional arrangements (i.e. 
country-level factors) in capital structure decisions. It is evident that some of the 
country-level factors have a strong relationship with leverage. Notably, the level of 
economic development (ED) and the level of corruption (CP) significantly affect 
leverage. For instance, as the wealth of a country increases, better protections are 
developed for debt holders, hence the positive relationship between economic 
developed (ED) and leverage. In addition, the positive and statistically significant 
relationship between corruption (CP) and leverage (LEV) indicates the existence of 
information asymmetry and therefore, debt holders are less likely to make more 
debts available to firms in countries with high level of corruption.  
 
The findings of this study emphasise the importance of country-level variables in the 
determination of capital structure of firms. The conclusion is that country-level 
factors matter in capital structure decisions of firms, especially when examining 
corporate financing decisions across countries. Also, utilising appropriate 
estimations, the study has demonstrated the indirect effects of firm-size (SZ) on 
leverage through its influence on other firm-level factors. The data provided mixed 
support to the four hypotheses tested in this chapter. Specifically, the results showed 
that firm size (SZ) moderates the relationship linking asset tangibility (TA) and 
leverage as well as tax (TX) and Leverage (LEV). 
 
Additionally, this chapter has a new evidence on rule of law-capital structure link by 
using data from SSA, an under-researched but economically emerging region. This 
chapter also makes another empirical contribution by demonstrating the impact of 
asset tangibility on earnings volatility-leverage relationship. Particularly, it shows 
that where a firm has an adequate amount of tangible assets as collateral, then 
earnings volatility should be of less concern to lenders. In addition to its significant 
direct impact on leverage, I have demonstrated the moderating role of rule of law. 
From Table 8.7 one of the key findings is that the rule of law decreases the effects of 
tangibility on leverage. In other words, in the absence of  an effectively enforced rule 
of law, the insider has much less of a reason to repay loans and therefore  the assets 
base becomes an assurance of repayment (Fosu, 2013). If the rule of law is strong, 
debt holders are likely to be better protected and therefore firms are likely to be 
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granted financial assistance without the need to provide asset as collateral 
(Wiwattanakantang, 1999, Fosu, 2013).  
 
The chapter has also demonstrated the importance of rule of law in the tax-leverage 
relationship. In the absence of the rule of law, firms manipulate the tax system in 
their favour. Thus, the presence of rule of law lowers the possibility of firms 
manipulating the tax system in their favour. Indeed, the current findings add an 
important perspective to the capital structure by incorporating the indirect role of 
firm size, asset tangibility and rule of law, an area that is largely unexplored. 
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Chapter 9 
 
 
 
 
Conclusions and Implications 
 
 
9.1. Introduction 
 
 
This chapter concludes this thesis by giving a summary of the research findings 
presented in Chapters Six to Eight and discusses how the study answers the research 
objectives posed in chapter 1. In addition to this, this chapter provides a summary of 
how the study contributes to knowledge in relation to the existing literature. This 
chapter is organised into six sub-sections. In the first sub-section, I re-visit the 
background and objectives of the study. The second sub-section provides a summary 
of the research methodology and the main findings of the study. The third sub-
section looks at how this study contributes to existing literature. The fourth section 
highlights the limitations of this study. The fifth section also focuses on implications 
of the research findings and highlights areas for further research. In the sixth and 
final section, I present a summary of this chapter itself. 
 
9.2. Revisiting the purposes of the study 
 
Undeniably, the success of every firm depends on (among other things) a sound 
financing decisions of that firm. Thus, a wrong capital structure decision can   
endanger the survival of that firm. This explains why the issue of capital structure 
has captured the attention of many scholars. While the development of capital 
structure theory has proceeded rapidly and numerous studies have made a significant 
contribution to the field of corporate finance in the past decade (e.g Joeveer, 2013; 
Sheikh and Wang, 2011; Viviani, 2008; Chen and Strange, 2005; Boateng, 2004; 
Fama and French, 2002; Wiwattanakantang, 1999), rigorous empirical research from 
developing economies has lagged behind. Most of the studies on capital structure 
have relied on data from developed economies where data availability is not a major 
issue.  In addition to this, earlier studies model the direct impact of firm and country-
level factors (i.e institutional factors) on the debt-equity choice and the moderating 
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roles of firm-specific factors are overlooked. Besides, empirical studies (e.g.Asongu, 
2013; Julian and Ofori-Dankwa, 2013; Lawal, 2007; Blundo, 2006; Ahunwan, 2002; 
De Sardan, 1999; Harsch, 1993; Gould and Mukendi, 1989; Gould, 1989) observed 
that SSA is characterised by bribery and corruption because of weak institutional 
structures including the rule of law. The weak institutional structures facilitate tax 
evasion by firms and make asset tangibility an important component in debt 
acquisition due to the high risk of default on debt contracts (Fosu, 2013; Sheikh and 
Wang, 2011). SSA is, therefore, a significant case to examine the impact of firm-
specific factors on leverage and the interrelationship between tax, asset tangibility, 
rule of law and leverage.  
 
Thus, drawing upon the arguments developed in capital structure theories (e.g 
Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf 1984; Taggart, 1977), institutional economics (e.g. 
Julian and Ofori-Darkwa, 2013; North, 1990) and using a unique dataset from firms 
in SSA, this study adds to the capital structure literature by combining both 
secondary data regression results and a survey instrument with a view to providing   
a comparison between practice and the existing theories of capital structure. This 
study therefore sets out to find answers to the following research objectives: 
2 To examine sources of finance, barriers and factors influencing capital 
structure of firms in Ghana.  
3 To examine both the firm-level and country-level determinants of capital 
structure. 
3. To examine the moderating effect of firm size on the relationship between 
other firm-level factors and leverage.   
4. To examine the moderating effect of assets tangibility on the relationship 
between earnings volatility and leverage. 
5. To examine the moderating role of  rule of law on the relationship between 
firm-specific factors and leverage. 
 
 
9.3. Summary of the findings 
 
Empirical studies of the firm financing decision have made significant contributions 
to the literature on capital structure, except for the fact that most of the existing 
evidence is grounded in data from the developed economies. In the current study, I 
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examine various dimensions of capital structure of firms by relying on data from 
firms in SSA. SSA represents a new setting for extending the knowledge of 
corporate financing decisions beyond the western economic context giving the fact 
that limited studies have so far concentrated on this aspect from this context. This 
limited amount of studies therefore permits a detail analysis of the issue. Premised 
on the insight of capital structure and institutional theories, the summary of the 
results obtained from the current study is provided below.  
 
First, with reference to the survey data (obtained from Ghana), the current study 
shows that retained earnings remains the major source of funds. The role of venture 
capitalists, bond markets, insurance firms and leasing firms  as  sources of funds for 
firms is completely underdeveloped. This gives a clear indication that firms’ access 
to different forms of finance is very limited. 
 
This study further suggests that high interest rates, length of the time in obtaining 
loans from lenders and collateral are the major issues that affect the acquisition of 
debt finance among firms in Ghana. Besides, the risk of becoming insolvent 
(bankruptcy) was found to be the most important factor moderating the choice of 
debt among firms. Consistent with the trade-off hypothesis, this study also shows 
that some of the firms in Ghana maintain a target debt-equity choice and that internal 
factors are the most influential in setting the target debt ratios. This finding signals 
that internal factors play important roles in shaping the capital structure decisions of 
firms (Beattie et al., 2006). 
 
Apart from the trade-off hypothesis indicated above, there is also an evidence of   the 
pecking order hypothesis as the results indicate that firms in Ghana raise capital by 
first relying on internal earnings, which is then followed by the use of debt finance 
and finally equity capital. I also found  that firms with government stake (shares) 
have leverage ratios higher than other firms. In terms of maintaining a target debt 
ratio, it was revealed that majority of the firms surveyed did not maintain any target 
debt ratio. This was not consistent with what is reported in the literature (e.g. Beattie 
et al. 2006). Other striking observations are that, due to the shallowness of the 
financial market in Ghana, bank loans and bank overdrafts remain the only spare 
borrowing facility used by firms in Ghana.  
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The study also highlights the impact of the financial crisis on financing decisions of 
firms. Indeed, the current study is one of the first attempts to provide evidence of the 
crisis from the context of Ghana. Evidence drawn from the survey indicates that the 
financial crisis made it difficult for firms to acquire debt capital and that unlisted 
firms were more likely to find it difficult in acquiring debt finance during the crisis 
period than listed firms.  
 
In addition to the survey evidence, this study shows that debt capital constitute 
roughly one-fifth of the total capital structure of firms in SSA and that firms in this 
region are mainly equity financed. This figure is considerably less than what is 
reported in the literature on firms in developed economies. Despite the slight 
differences in terms of the level of development among countries in SSA, this study 
did not find any significant difference in the levels of debt employed by firms across 
different countries within SSA. 
 
The role of firm-level factors (i.e. profitability, firm size, growth, asset tangibility, 
tax and earnings volatility) in determining the capital structure of firms is also 
highlighted in this study. In spite of the institutional differences that exist between 
the Western world and SSA, the results of this study indicate that some of the firm-
level factors that are relevant in explaining capital structure in the western context 
(e.g. profitability, firm size, earnings volatility) are also relevant in SSA.  
 
By far, assets tangibility remains the most important firm-level determinant of 
capital structure among the firms examined. No evidence was obtained that firm 
growth is an important determinant of the capital structure of firms in SSA. Both the 
pecking order and the trade-off models provide explanations for financing decisions 
among firms in SSA. Nevertheless, neither of these two theories dominates the 
financing behaviour among firms in this region.  
 
Furthermore, I have highlighted the role of institutional factors (i.e. country-level 
factors) in capital structure decisions. These factors include inflation, level of 
economic development, stock market development and the rule of law. The results 
obtained are line with the conceptualizations that country-level factors are also 
important in capital structure decisions of firms.  
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Theoretical and empirical studies on capital structure have predominantly focused on 
the linear relationship between various firm and country factors and leverage. Given 
the limited research on the moderating effects of firm and country level factors, in 
this thesis, I have examined the moderating role of firm size, asset tangibility and 
rule of law. Evidence obtained enriches the notion that these factors moderate other 
firm-level factors.  
 
 
9.4. Summary of the main contributions of the research 
 
Previous scholarly works, especially from the context of SSA (e.g. Doku et al., 2011; 
Ramlall, 2009; Yartey, 2006; Salawu, 2006) have typically analysed how various 
firm-level factors affect financing decisions of firms by relying on single country 
studies based on secondary data. However, we still have relatively little knowledge 
as to whether the reality on the ground is adequately explained by secondary data 
and the extent to which institutional factors affect financing decisions. This research 
thus addresses an important gap in the literature by simultaneously relying on both 
primary and secondary data to develop insights into the financing decisions of firms. 
in SSA. A summary of the specific contributions from the study are provided below: 
 
First, to the best of my knowledge, this study provides the most comprehensive 
analysis of capital structure decisions of firms, covering eight countries in SSA. To 
the best of my knowledge, this study is the first study that provides a unique 
perspective on the impact of the 2007/08 financial crisis on the capital decisions of 
firms with evidence from SSA. Even though the direct impact of the financial crisis 
on SSA economies were not pronounced as the case of developed economies such as 
the US and Europe (Allen and Giovannetti, 2011; Berman and Martin, 2011; IMF, 
2009), available evidence derived from the primary survey indicates that the crisis 
restricted the acquisition of debt finance from lenders in Ghana. My interpretation of 
this was that the global economic downturn led to a high level of uncertainty and 
therefore lenders had to cut down lending to reduce their exposure to non-payment 
risk.   
Second, my findings on the role of government ownership contributes a new 
dimension to the growing empirical literature on capital structure and opens a new 
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avenue for in-depth investigation into the importance of government ownership  in 
debt acquisition, especially for firms operating in less developed economies, where 
governments and political leaders have great control over major resources including 
financial resources.  
 
My third key finding relates to the tax-leverage relationship. Here, I find tax to be 
negatively related to leverage. Understood within the conceptual framework of this 
thesis, as noted above (i.e. in Chapter 4), I explain this by drawing on IDH and argue 
that the less developed institutional structure (e.g. weak regulatory structures) in 
SSA facilitates tax evasion. Thus, tax is less important in the capital structure 
decisions of firms in SSA than firms in countries with well-developed institutional 
structures. Indeed, within the domain of the capital structure literature, this is the first 
study to examine this. 
 
Next, findings on the moderating effects of firm size and asset tangibility contribute 
a new dimension to the capital structure literature, which has not been tested by 
previous researchers. Here, I begin by arguing that scholarly works always assume 
direct firm size-leverage and asset tangibility-leverage relationships. Extant studies 
have overlooked the indirect effects of firm size and asset tangibility on leverage.  In 
this case, I have conceptualised the effects of firm size and asset tangibility as 
moderators and not just direct effects.  
 
Another novel contribution relates to the role of rule of law in capital structure. I find 
that a strong of rule of law moderates the tax-leverage relationship in such a way that 
this relationship is positive and significant. I explain this by arguing that with a  
strong rule of law, there is less incidence of bribery and corruption, so less room for 
firms to evade tax. Thus, firms with a large tax burden are encouraged to employ 
more debt in their capital structure due to the advantage in the deductibility of 
interest payments. Therefore, a high tax rate serves as an incentive for firms to 
borrow more (Ross, Westerfield, Jordan and Firer, 2001). 
 
My final contribution stems from the moderating role of rule of law on asset 
tangibility and tax leverage relationship. I began by developing a theoretical basis for 
the moderating role of tax–leverage and asset tangibility-leverage relationships. The 
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key finding from this supports the notion that with a strong rule of law, asset 
tangibility is less important in debt acquisition. In addition to this, evidence obtained 
indicates that tax is an important element in capital structure decisions of firms under 
a strong rule of law. These findings provide further evidence that the capital structure 
of firms is conditioned by institutional structures and that institutional elements must 
be given critical attention in the capital structure literature. Indeed, previous works 
from the SSA (e.g. Doku et al., 2011; Ramlall, 2009; Abor, 2007; Yartey, 2006; 
Salawu, 2006) have typically overlooked this. 
   
9.5. Implications of the study   
 
This study extends the literature on financing decisions of firms by examining the 
dimensions of capital structure of firms in SSA. By integrating relevant insights from 
capital structure and institutional theories, the study outlines new and important 
propositions that have not yet been considered by prior research and therefore offers 
a number of implications. These implications are highlighted in the sections below.  
9.5.1. Level of debt of firms in SSA 
 
First, debt capital (as reported in Figure 7.2) constitutes less than one-fifth of the 
capital structure of firms in SSA. This figure is less than that in the literature for 
most of the economies in the Western world. In almost all the countries under 
observation, one striking characteristic is that alternatives to bank credit are few 
(IMF, 2013). Banks remain the major or even the only source of external debt, as 
bond and equity markets are completely undeveloped. The absence of well-
developed bond and equity markets in many of the countries under observation 
shows that access to long-term debt by firms is limited. This calls for the creation of 
more financing opportunities for firms in SSA. African governments and private 
organisations, as well as individuals, must show commitment towards establishing 
effective bond markets within the continent. This commitment should include 
measures that lead to a reduction in inflation and exchange rate risks to attract 
foreign investors.  
Other measures that could enhance firms’ access to funds include:  
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 The creation of an adequate and effective regulatory framework53 aimed at 
ensuring a smooth running of the overall financial system in SSA. The legal 
framework in SSA should be swift in dealing with issues that can endanger 
the credibility of the financial system and ease of doing business
54
 in 
general. This is particularly important in boosting the confidence of foreign 
investors in SSA.  
 
 Adequate resources must be devoted to the enhancement of automation and 
the technological capacity
55
 of the financial system in SSA. This is also 
important in improving the information flow to the public. Improving the 
information flow is particularly important in encouraging foreign investment 
in financial services. In this sense, more space could be given to western 
banks to help complement SSA governments’ efforts to bring in the 
necessary innovation required in the financial sector.  
 
 In addition, with the recent financial crisis restricting the availability of debt 
finance (as demonstrated in Chapter 6), efforts must be made by 
governments to encourage broader participation at all levels of the financial 
system by local firms. For instance, local firms that are listed on stock 
markets in SSA must be given attractive tax incentives. Similarly, 
bureaucratic procedures that firms go through as part of the listing processes 
must be eliminated. These are important in encouraging local resource 
mobilisation, particularly as external support of foreign inflows weakens due 
to the recent global financial crisis and other economic challenges.  
 
  Consideration should be giving to integrating the stock markets within SSA. 
This is important in reducing the country-specific risks and will help in 
reaping economies of scale especially in technical areas of the financial 
system. This sort of regional integration may be particularly vital for small 
                                            
53 IMF (2013) reports that none of the banking sector regulatory framework in East African countries is fully 
compliant with best international standards. 
54 The World Bank ‘Ease of Doing Business Report’ indicates that most of the countries in SSA were ranked 
very low on the Doing Business Index. A low ranking on the ‘Ease of Doing Business Index’ means the 
regulatory environment is less conducive to the starting and operation of a local firm (World Bank, 2013) 
55 A typical example of diffusion of modern technology into the financial system in SSA is the use of mobile-
based payment system in Kenya (i.e. M-PESA). This sort of technology could be extended across the whole of 
SSA. This is particularly useful for communities that do not have physical access to banks to conduct banking 
activities. 
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economies, whose commercial activities do not raise hopes for any 
meaningful local stock market, to also have access to stock markets. This 
kind of integration will however require closer cooperation among regulators 
across borders (obviously no easy task) in ensuring that appropriate human 
resources and policing facilities are put in place to monitor the system. 
Indeed, supervisory capacity among many SSA countries tends to be weak 
(IMF, 2013). The regional integration of stock markets within SSA will 
require that more resources be given to supervision activities across borders 
to ensure adequate protection of the system.  
 
 Further, efforts must be made to provide small firms with high growth 
potential the opportunity to raise long-term capital through the floating of 
shares. For instance, the establishment of an Alternative Investment Market 
(AIM) in SSA could provide huge opportunities for fast growing firms that 
do not meet the requirements to be floated on the main stock markets to have 
access to long–term capital with a lower regulatory burden. Currently, 
lending to such firms in SSA tends to be mainly short term in nature, with a 
high percentage of loans with a maturity period of less than a year (EIB, 
2013). This stifles long-term investment opportunities. Thus, providing 
opportunities for firms to raise long-term capital will free firms from the 
constraints experienced in undertaking long-term projects.    
 
 Another suggestion is that policy makers in SSA must endeavour to promote 
financial inclusion, whereby financial products and services (e.g. loans) are 
delivered at affordable costs to all firms (especially firms in rural 
communities, since rural communities constitute the greater share of Africa’s 
population)
56
. Financial inclusion empowers marginalised sectors of society 
to participate in business and economic activity (Cyn-Young, 2011). Further, 
efforts must be made to enhance public access to banking services (e.g. 
promotion on internet banking); provide adequate credit to firms in SSA, 
promote financial literacy for firms; and diversify financial services in SSA.  
 
                                            
56 Available evidence suggest that access to financial services remain very limited for rural areas in SSA (IMF, 
2013) 
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 Similarly, Islamic banking is another avenue for expanding financial facilities 
to firms in SSA. Indeed, Islamic banking has the potential to provide some 
of the financial resources that are required by firms in SSA. Whilst Islamic 
finance has gained ground in the financial landscape in some North African 
countries (notably Egypt), available evidence shows that in the case of SSA 
Islamic banking remains underdeveloped. For instance, empirical evidence 
obtained by Faye, Triki, Kangoye (2013) indicates that Islamic banking in 
SSA is still at its embryonic stages of development. To this end, institutional 
structures that are needed for the development and expansion of Islamic 
banking facilities must also be encouraged across all countries in SSA. 
  
9.5.2. Relationships between regulatory environment, asset tangibility and 
leverage 
 
Since tangibility is a substitute for weak creditor rights (Fosu, 2013; Psillaki and 
Daskalakis, 2009; Cheng and Shiu, 2007), the findings of this study indicates that 
firms in SSA with attractive investment opportunities but inadequate tangible assets 
may find it difficult to secure debt capital for executing such investments. According 
to EIB, (2013), banks in SSA often mention inadequate bankable projects as the 
main reasons for their high liquidity levels, whilst firms also complain of inadequate 
financial resources for investment projects. Thus, there is a kind of friction between 
the supply and demand of capital, which comes about because of collateral 
requirements in debt contracts. Consequently, policy has to address this issue by 
improving the regulatory environment among Sub-Saharan African countries. This 
will reduce the collateral requirements in negotiating debt contracts. This is 
important in increasing the flow of debt finance and reducing the cost of funds 
employed by firms in this region. Similarly, the banking regulatory framework in 
SSA must coerce commercial banks to lend a certain proportion of their portfolio to 
the corporate sector. 
 
9.5.3. Profitability and leverage 
 
The negative relationship between profitability and leverage could be attributed to 
the issue of information asymmetry, as described by Myer (1984).  Information 
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asymmetry affects firms’ ability to raise externals funds for investment, as it could 
lead to the tendency for new shares to be mispriced by firms. Therefore, to avoid the 
underinvestment problem, firms will rely on their retained earnings, leading to a 
negative relationship between profitability and leverage (Myers 1984; Myers and 
Majluf, 1984; Ryen et al. 1997). Consequently, governments and other stakeholders 
within SSA must put in place measures (e.g. law) that will encourage firms’ 
disclosure of information. Since information disclosure plays a role in determining 
the cost of capital, higher information disclosure is particularly important in reducing 
the overall cost of capital employed by firms (Lambert, Leuz, Verrecchia, 2007; 
Botosan, 1997; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991).  
 
9.5.4. Asset Tangibility as a moderator 
 
The moderating role of asset tangibility on the earnings volatility-leverage 
relationship also offers an implication in capital structure decisions. While scholarly 
enquiry into the determinants of capital structure has received great attention in the 
corporate finance literature (Sharif et al. 2012; Huang and Song, 2006; Chen, 2004; 
Deesomsak et al. 2004), empirical studies that examine the moderating role of asset 
tangibility in earnings volatility-leverage relationship are yet to catch the attention of 
scholars. Existing evidence demonstrates that firms that shows volatility in their 
earnings face a huge challenge in acquiring funds from lenders due to the perceived 
level of risk (Wiwattanakantang, 1999 and Johnson, 1997). However, results from 
the current study shows that asset tangibility moderates the negative earnings 
volatility-leverage relationship to become positive. This is an important finding for 
firms that want to acquire debt finance but have volatility in their earnings. Thus, in 
debt acquisition, volatility in earnings should not be used as a prime factor in 
denying firms access to debt.   
 
 
9.6. Delimitations and Direction for Further Research 
 
By integrating both firm-level and and country-level factors into capital structure 
decisions and by relying on the logic of capital structure theories, institutional 
theories, as well as IDH, this study examines the capital structure of firms in SSA 
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and therefore  develops  new insights into an area that has not been considered by 
prior research. By so doing, this study opens a new avenue for further research. This 
section of the thesis therefore discusses the various limitations of the current study 
and offers some useful suggestions for future research. The section is divided into 
two main sections. These are methodological issues and substantive issues. Each of 
these is considered below: 
 
9.6.1. Methodological Issues 
 
A potential limitation of this study is the number of countries used. The current study 
examined the dimensions of corporate financing decisions of firms in eight countries 
within the Sub-Saharan region using secondary data obtained from the Datastream 
global database. Further, the study obtained primary data from firms in Ghana. The 
selection of these countries was purely based on availability of data on the 
Datastream database. Thus, countries that do not provide their data to the Datastream 
database could not be included in this study. It important to emphasize that the 
primary data were gathered from a single country source. Ghana shares many 
characteristics with other developing countries including the level of banking sector 
development, inflation and other institutional arrangements. These characteristics 
offer a rich environment in which to test financing decisions of firms from the 
perspective of a developing economy. However, this also requires caution as 
generalisation beyond the Ghanaian context could be misleading. Of course, other 
developing countries may possess some unique institutional arrangements that could 
allow for additional insight into financing decisions of firms. Thus, future research 
could focus on gathering primary data across many countries to offer understanding 
of firms’ financing decisions across different economic settings.  
 
9.6.2. Substantive Issues 
There are a number of substantive issues that could be considered as part of the 
future research agenda. First, this study examines the conventional firm and country 
specific factors that underline the financing decisions of firms. However, as argued 
by Acquaah and Eshun (2010), in developing countries such as those in SSA, it is 
not what firm managers know alone that affects the activities of their firms, but also 
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whom these managers know. This suggests the importance of managerial network 
relationships, especially political network ties. In addition, network ties with 
community leaders and culture play a significant role. For instance, the cultures in 
SSA are highly collectivistic, with the extended family system, as well as the broader 
community performing a substantial role in the lives and activities of individuals and 
businesses (Acquaah, 2007). SSA is characterised by two parallel political systems and 
authorities. These are the formal political system of the modern nation state 
(democracy), and secondly, the traditional political systems that pre-date the modern 
nation state (traditional ruling).  
 
Indeed, community leaders including local chiefs, kings, and religious leaders possess 
influential powers in sharing resources including access to financial resources57. These 
community leaders also create, maintain, and enforce the social norms and values of 
their communities, including traditional religious rituals, thus developing a strong 
interpersonal bond among individuals in their communities (Acquaah, 2007). Thus, 
firms which develop network ties with community leaders are able to get access to 
resources and information as the community leaders endorse those firms and their 
activities and refer them to their communities. Thus, developing extensive network ties 
with community leaders such as opinion leaders, religious leaders and chiefs could be an 
influential factor in the acquisition of financial resources for the activities of firms. 
Consequently, future research could look at how political ties and community leadership 
ties could influence the financing decisions of firms.  
 
Further, researchers looking at corporate financing decisions could look at how 
characteristics (e.g. age, gender, educational background, beliefs, ethnic background) of 
firm managers matters in firm financing decisions. 
Another area that could be investigated in detail is comparing debt-equity decisions 
across various economic regions within the African continent. SSA was chosen as an 
appropriate testing ground for the current study due to the availability of adequate 
data to facilitate analysis. Therefore, it could be fruitful to see whether differences in  
regional economic factors could  significantly influence the debt-equity choice of 
firms. This approach would broaden the understanding of firms’ financing decisions 
across different regions within the African continent.  
                                            
57 In Ghana, rural banks are owned and managed by rural communities themselves. Therefore, firms in rural 
communities that align themselves with their community leaders are more likely to be looked at favourably in 
acquiring funds from the rural banks. 
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Another possible area of future research would be to compare the capitals structure 
decisions of English speaking countries in SSA with non-English speaking countries. 
Between these two groups of countries, there could be diversity along cultural and 
economic lines, which could influence the financing decisions of firms. Therefore, 
future research could help to establish what the similarities and differences, as well 
as what the useful lessons are. 
 
Scholarly works (Daskalakis and Psillaki, 2008) also observe that SMEs form the   
majority of firms in both developed and developing countries. Financing decisions of 
SMEs are likely to be different from other firms (Daskalakis and Psillaki, 2008). In 
the same vain, the impacts of the 2007/08 financial crisis on SMEs are likely to be 
different from that of other firms.  The analysis of the impact of the financial crisis 
on non-SMEs leaves an important question open: what are the impacts of the 
financial crisis on SMEs from the perspective of SSA?  Accordingly, additional data 
could be gathered from SMEs and compared to the results obtained from the current 
study. 
 
In addition to the above, the current study excludes data from financial and insurance 
institutions, as well as utility companies, which are usually heavily regulated by 
governments and therefore tend to have capital structures dissimilar from other firms 
in the corporate sector. As such, future studies could compares the differences in 
capital structure of firms by looking at the possible differences between these heavily 
regulated industries and other corporate bodies. 
  
 
9.7. Final Note 
 
In this chapter, I have provided a summary of the whole study conducted. The 
background and the objectives of the study have been highlighted. Issues considered 
include a summary of the research findings and the contribution of the study, as well 
as the delimitations. This chapter has also suggested avenues for further research. 
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In closing, this study has contributed to the field of corporate finance by looking at 
the financing decisions of firms, specifically those in the SSA. In addition to the use 
of secondary data from eight countries in SSA, the study has provided a 
comprehensive evidence of financing decisions of firms in Ghana, highlighting 
financing decisions of firms as well as some of the major challenges faced by firms 
in the acquisition of funds from lenders. Indeed, the current study is the first study to 
examine the financing decisions of firms from the perspective of SSA by relying on 
both primary data and secondary data, and incorporating the role of institutional 
elements in the financing decisions of firms in SSA.   
The choice of the research topic was necessitated by limited research evidence 
within the context of SSA. Instead of just replicating past scholarly findings in SSA, 
I have relied on both capital structure and institutional theories’ perspective to 
provide fresh empirical evidence on the financing decisions of firms. Overall, this 
study sheds light on capital structure decisions of firms and suggests a number of 
potentially fruitful lines of research, which should be of critical interest to scholars in 
different cultural settings. 
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Appendix 1: Covering letter and research questionnaire  
 
 
A SURVEY OF DIMENSIONS OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE OF COMPANIES IN 
GHANA 
 
 
  
Dear sir/madam, 
I am a PhD student at the York Management School in the UK and I am conducting research 
into the dimensions of capital structure of companies in Ghana. To help in this research, I 
would be very grateful if you could complete the questionnaire below. Your response is very 
important to the accuracy of this research. The questionnaire is designed in a way that it 
must be completed by someone who has a good knowledge about your company’s financial 
issues. 
You can be sure that no one except the researchers will ever know how you responded to 
these questions, as your response will be kept completely confidential. 
I deeply appreciate your co-operation, as without you I would not be able to conduct this 
research. If you are interested in receiving the report on the findings of this research, just 
write your name and address at the back of this questionnaire and I would be glad to send 
you the report when ready.  
Thank you very much for your participation in this research. 
Sincerely, 
Albert Danso. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Albert Danso (PhD Student) 
The York Management School 
University of  York,  York 
YO10 5GD 
Tel: +233241211831 (Gh) 
Email:ad853@york.ac.uk 
Dr. M. Moshfique and Dr. K. Anderson 
(Research Supervisors) 
The York Management School 
University of  York,  York 
YO10 5GD 
Tel: +441904325047/+441904325001 
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PART A: BACKGROUND INFORMATION. 
 
 
Q1. Please indicate your job title (Please 
tick) 
 
i  CEO  
ii General Manager  
iii Accountant/Accounts Officer  
iv Finance Manager  
v Any other (Please 
state)…………………….. 
 
 
Q2. Please have you received the permission from 
the appropriate authority to fill out this 
questionnaire?    (Please tick) 
                
i. Yes                 
ii. No                 
 
 
Q3. Please indicate the gender of the CEO   
of  
your company  (Please tick) 
 
i. Male  
ii. Female  
ii. Do not want to disclose  
 
 
Q4. Please indicate the age of the CEO of 
your  company (Please tick one) 
 
i. Less than 25 years  
ii. From 25  to  34  
iii. From 35 to 44  
iv. From 45 to 54  
v. 55 years and above  
vi. Do not want to disclose  
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Q5. Please indicate the highest educational  
qualification of the CEO of your company        
(Please tick one)  
 
i. Secondary school education  
ii. First degree  
iii. Masters degree  
iv. Doctoral degree  
v. Any other including professional qualification? 
(Please 
indicate)………………………………….. 
  
 
Q6. Please indicate the number of years 
your  CEO has been in office (Please tick 
one) 
 
i. Less than 5 years  
ii. From 5 to 9 years  
iii. 10 years and above  
 
 
Q7. Which of the following sector(s) best describes the  
 activities of your company? (Please tick) 
 
i.    Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing  
ii.   Mining and Quarrying  
iii.  Electricity, Gas, Steam and Air Conditioning  
iv. Building and Construction  
v.  Water Supply,  Sewerage, Waste Management and    
     Remediation activities 
 
vi. Transport and Storage (including  land and air 
transport    
     and  postal services)   
 
vii. Accommodation and Food  Services (including hotels,  
      hostels and restaurants)  
 
viii. Information and Communication  
ix. Financial and Insurance Services  
x. Real Estate Activities  
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xi. Professional, Scientific and Technical Activities (e.g. 
legal  
     and accounting services, architecture, technical testing    
     and  analyses, market research and veterinary) 
 
 
xii .Administrative and Support Services (e.g. rental and   
     leasing activities, employment agency, travel agency,    
     security and investigation activities, services to 
building   
     and landscape activities, office support and business  
     support activities) 
 
 
xiii. Education  
xiv. Human Health and Social Work Activities (e.g. 
hospitals  
       and care homes) 
 
xv. Arts, Entertainment and Creation (e.g. gambling,   
     betting and sports activities) 
 
 
xvi. Any other (Please specify)………………………… 
  
 
Q8. Is your company listed on a stock exchange?  
(Please tick) 
 
 
i. Listed company  
ii. Unlisted company  
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Q9. Please indicate if your company has any 
association/ partnership with any other company 
situated outside  Ghana that involves sharing any of 
the following (You may tick more than one). If none, 
go to question 10. 
 
i. Debt or equity capital  
ii. Technology  
iii. Raw materials  
iv. Management decisions  
v. Company’s policies  
vii. Brand name / patent/goodwill  
 
viii. Any other form of association? (Please 
state)……………… 
  
 
Q10. Does the government of Ghana own shares in 
your company? (Please tick) 
 
 
i. Yes  
ii. No (If  no, go to Q12)   
 
Q11. What is the percentage of shares held by the 
government? (Please tick) 
 
 
i.  Up to 25 percent  
ii. Between 25 and 50 percent  
iii. 50 percent and above  
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Q12. Please indicate if any of the following have 
shares in your company (You may tick more than 
one) 
If none, go to Q14. 
  
i. Chairman of the company  
ii. CEO  
iii. General Manager  
iv. Accounts Officer or Accountant  
v. Finance Manager/ Finance Director  
vii. Other (please state)  
 
Q13. Please indicate the total percentage of shares 
held by all those indicated in question 12 (Please 
tick) 
 
 
i.  Up to 25 %  
ii. Between 25 and 50 %  
iii. 50 % and above  
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PART B: SOURCES OF CAPITAL AND FINANCING DECISION 
 
Q14. Please indicate how important the 
following as your company’s  sources of finance  
(Please circle) 
  1= least 
important 
source 
5 = most 
important 
source 
i. Internal or retained earnings     1 2 3 4 5 
ii. Loans from banks and other lenders    1 2 3 4 5 
iii. Bonds   1 2 3 4 5 
 iv. Hire purchase   1 2 3 4 5 
v. Venture capitalist   1 2 3 4 5 
vi. New equity issue     1 2 3 4 5 
 vii. Insurance companies.     1 2 3 4 5 
viii. Affiliated companies or joint partners     1 2 3 4 5 
ix. Leasing companies     1 2 3 4 5 
x. Informal sources (e.g. family and friends)     1 2 3 4 5 
 
Q15. How many banks does your company have 
bank accounts with? (Please tick) 
 
i.   One   
ii. Two  
iii. Three  
iv.  Four  
v.  Five or more  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
235 
 
Q16. Please indicate the problem that you feel 
your company faces in securing funds from 
banks or financial lenders.  (Please circle) 
  1= not at     
all a 
problem 
5 =a 
serious 
problem 
i.  The length of time taken to obtain the loan     1 2 3 4 5 
ii.  High interest rate charged by lenders    1 2 3 4 5 
iii.  Collateral issues (e.g. inadequate asset)   1 2 3 4 5 
 iv.  Inadequate track records (e.g. credit history)   1 2 3 4 5 
v. High transaction cost    1 2 3 4 5 
vi.  The size of the company (e.g. lenders may not 
be willing to offer loans to small companies) 
    1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Q17. Apart from the problems indicated in question 16, are there any other problems 
that your   
          company faces in securing loans from banks and other financial lenders? (Please 
state)  
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………. 
 
 
Q18. In raising capital, please indicate your 
preference  
         (Please circle) 
  1= Least 
preferred 
5 =Most 
preferred 
i.  Retained earnings     1 2 3 4 5 
ii.  Debt/loans    1 2 3 4 5 
iii.  Equity finance   1 2 3 4 5 
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Q19. Please indicate how strongly the following 
factors   influence your company in choosing 
equity finance. (Please circle) 
  1= not at 
all strong 
5 = very 
strong 
i. The  cost of issuing new equity     1 2 3 4 5 
ii.  Loss of control through share dilution    1 2 3 4 5 
iii.  Effects on the total cost of capital   1 2 3 4 5 
  iv.  To maintain the same level of equity as other 
firms in the same industry 
  1 2 3 4 5 
v.  How easy it is to access loans   1 2 3 4 5 
vi.  Sufficiency  of retained earnings     1 2 3 4 5 
 vii.  Maintaining target debt/equity ratio     1 2 3 4 5 
viii.  Equity being the least risky source of finance     1 2 3 4 5 
ix.  To give a better impression about our 
company than using debt capital 
    1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Q20. Please indicate how strongly the following 
factors    influence your company in choosing 
debt finance       (Please circle). Go to question 22 
if your company   
does not use debt.  
  1= not at 
all strong 
5 = very 
strong 
i. Tax savings on interest expense     1 2 3 4 5 
ii. Risk of becoming insolvent (bankruptcy)    1 2 3 4 5 
iii. Cost of securing debt finance (transaction cost)   1 2 3 4 5 
  iv. Maintaining similar level of debt as firms in the 
same industry  
  1 2 3 4 5 
v. To discourage possible takeovers   1 2 3 4 5 
vi. Low interest rate (cost of capital)     1 2 3 4 5 
 vii. Sufficiency of retained earnings     1 2 3 4 5 
viii. Effects on the total cost of capital     1 2 3 4 5 
ix. Company’s relationship with banks/lenders     1 2 3 4 5 
 x. Long term survival of the company   1 2 3 4 5 
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Q21. Please indicate how the following factors 
affect your company’s choice between short and 
long-term debt   (Please circle).   
  1= not at 
all strong 
5 = very 
strong 
i. Matching the maturity of debt with the life of 
the asset 
    1 2 3 4 5 
ii. We issue short-term debt when short-term 
interests are low as compared to long-term 
rates. 
   1 2 3 4 5 
iii. We issue short-term when we are waiting for 
long-term market interest rate to decline.  
  1 2 3 4 5 
  
iv. 
We borrow short-term when we expect our 
credit rating to improve.  
  1 2 3 4 5 
 
Q22. In financing a new investment opportunity, 
please       indicate why you might prefer to use 
retained earnings compared to any other type of 
finance.             
(Please circle). 
  1= least 
important 
reason 
5 = most 
important 
reason 
i. The cost of retained earnings is cheaper than 
the cost of outside debt 
    1 2 3 4 5 
ii. The cost of retained earnings is cheaper the 
cost of new equity 
   1 2 3 4 5 
iii. The company does not want to pay too much 
in dividends 
  1 2 3 4 5 
  
iv. 
It is difficult to convince outsiders (e.g. 
lenders) of the profitability of new investment. 
  1 2 3 4 5 
v. The company does not want to dilute control 
by selling  shares to outsiders 
  1 2 3 4 5 
vi. The company wants to avoid increased 
scrutiny from lenders (e.g. banks) 
    1 2 3 4 5 
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Q23. does your company seeks to maintain a target 
capital    
structure by using approximately constant 
proportion  of equity and debt finance (Please tick). 
 
i.  No target (if no, go to  Q26)  
ii. Target  
 
Q24.What is your company’s target amount of debt?  
         (Please tick) 
 
I.     0 %  
II.  1-25 %  
III. 26 – 50%  
IV. 51- 75 %  
V. 76 – 100%  
 
Q25. What/who is influential in setting the 
target debt  
          ratios? (Please circle). 
  1= least 
influential 
5 = most 
influential 
i. Ghana government     1 2 3 4 5 
ii. Company’s senior management    1 2 3 4 5 
iii. Financial lenders   1 2 3 4 5 
  
iv. 
Major creditors   1 2 3 4 5 
v. Shareholders   1 2 3 4 5 
vi. Comparison with ratios of other firms in the 
same industry. 
    1 2 3 4 5 
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Q26. does your company have a policy of 
maintaining a    
spare borrowing capacity (Please tick one) 
 
i. Yes  
ii. No (if no, go to Q29)  
 
 
 
Q27.  How important are the following as 
sources of spare  
           borrowing capacity? (Please circle) 
  1= least 
important 
source 
5 = most 
important 
source 
i. Loans from banks and other lenders     1 2 3 4 5 
ii. Bonds    1 2 3 4 5 
iii. Hire purchase   1 2 3 4 5 
iv.  Venture capitalist   1 2 3 4 5 
v.        Insurance companies   1 2 3 4 5 
vi.     Overdrafts   1 2 3 4 5 
 vii. Affiliated companies or joint partners    1 2 3 4 5 
viii. Leasing companies   1 2 3 4 5 
ix. Informal sources (e.g. family and friends)     1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Q28.  Please indicate the reason for maintaining 
a spare   borrowing (Please circle) 
  1= least 
important 
reason 
5 = most 
important 
reason 
i. Special project     1 2 3 4 5 
ii. Unexpected opportunity    1 2 3 4 5 
iii. Reserved for crisis   1 2 3 4 5 
iv.  To take over other companies   1 2 3 4 5 
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PART C: THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND OTHER INFORMATION 
 
Q29. Indicate how the 2007/2008 financial 
crisis has  
affected the following  (Please tick) 
  1=strongly 
disagree 
5=strongly 
   agree  
i. Constrained the availability of equity capital     1 2 3 4 5 
ii. Made it difficult to secure loans from lenders    1 2 3 4 5 
iii. Affected the preference of equity over debt 
as a  
source of finance 
  1 2 3 4 5 
  
iv. 
Constrained the availability of funds from 
informal  
Sources (e.g. friends and family) 
  1 2 3 4 5 
v. Decreased the dependency on debt finance   1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Q30. Please state the number of  employees of your company at the end of the 
following financial  Years (Please write them in the spaces provided below) 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
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Q31. Please provide the following account information from 2002 to 2011. (You do not have to 
complete this question if you can provide me with your company’s published financial 
statement from 2002 to 2011. 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Total 
Revenue/sales 
          
Operating 
income 
          
 
Pre-tax profit 
          
Total value of 
assets 
          
Total value of 
fixed assets 
          
 
Total debt 
          
Total short 
term debt 
          
Total bank 
loan 
          
Equity capital           
Retained 
earnings 
          
 Total dividend 
paid 
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Q32. Please, if you have any comment about the nature of this questionnaire, indicate it 
in the space provided below 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
End of the questionnaire. Thank you for your time. 
 
 
Appendix 2: participant information sheet 
 
This research is being carried out as part of my PhD degree in Finance and Accounting at the 
University of York in the UK. 
The research is being supervised by Dr. Moshfique Uddin and Dr. Keith Anderson. 
 
A brief aim of the research:  
The research aims at examining the capital structure practices of firms in Ghana and to see 
whether capital structure theories that are applicable in the western world are also applicable 
in a developing country like Ghana. 
Implications of the research: 
This research is expected to make significant contribution to theory, practice and policy. 
First and foremost, the study will contribute to theory by deepening our understanding of the 
concept of capital structure in general and specifically from the context of Ghana. 
In terms of contribution to practice, the findings from this research will enable firms to 
appreciate the relationship between capital structure and the implications on the performance 
on their firms. 
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Also, the findings and recommendations from this research will serve as a learning base for 
finance practitioners and policy makers in the determination of acceptable debt-equity levels 
that firms must adopt. This may also influence the allocation of capital resource to this 
sector of the economy. 
 
What will I be asked to do? 
You will be asked to complete a short research questionnaire which should not take more 
than 30 minutes of your time. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
You are not obliged to take part in this survey. If you decide to take part and later you 
change your mind, you can withdraw at any time. You will not be required to provide any 
explanation if you decide to withdraw and the information you have provided will then be 
destroyed in front of you. 
 
What will happen to the information I will provide if I decide to take part in the 
survey? 
All the information that will be gathered from the companies taking part in the research will 
be put together as one and that no firm will be singled out in the analyses of the information. 
The data that will be collected will be kept in a safe which is password protected and will be 
destroyed in 2014 after the project by shredding. 
Please be assured that the storage and the usage of the data will comply fully with the UK’s 
Data Protection Act of 1998. 
 
Is there any risk of the research to the participants? 
There are no known risks to participants 
 
Will I be given any incentive for taking part in this research? 
Participants will not be provided with any monetary incentive for taken part in this survey. 
However, if you are interested in the findings, you may provide your contact details at the 
back of the questionnaire and a copy of the findings will be sent to you when ready.  
 
How will the findings be disseminated? 
The information from the survey will be used for my PhD thesis and also for publication of 
articles in journals. 
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What do if later I need any further information? 
If you any further information, you may contact the researcher at the address below: 
Albert Danso 
University of York Managemnt School 
York, English, YO10 5GD 
Email: ad853@york.ac.uk 
Tel: +233 20 8199205 (Ghana) 
        +44 07515806104 (UK) 
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Appendix 3: Ethics forms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ethic Submission form LITE 
 
 
To be used for: 
 
• Small scale evaluation and audit work 
• Non-invasive research 
• Not involving vulnerable groups e.g.  
o Children 
o Those with learning disabilities 
o People with mental impairment due to health or lifestyle 
o Those who are terminally ill  
o Recently bereaved 
o Those unable to consent to or understand the research 
o Where research concerns sensitive topics / illegal activities 
o Where deception is involved 
o Any research requiring a CRB check 
• Following initial evaluation you may be required to submit a Full application to 
ELMPS where ethical issues need more detailed consideration 
• It is up to the researcher to determine which form to complete at the outset. 
• NB If you are collecting data from NHS patients or staff, or Social Service users or 
staff, you will need to apply for approval through the Integrated Research 
Application System (IRAS) at https://www.myresearchproject.org.uk/Signin.aspx   
o If you are a staff member please fill in the IRAS form NOT this one and send 
your completed IRAS form to ELMPS for health and social services research. 
o Student applications for approval through IRAS should normally be pre-
reviewed by department ethics committees or ELMPS.  
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Completed forms should be sent to the Chair of the ELMPS as follows: 
 
1. one signed hard copy (to Caroline Hunter, York Law School, University of York, 
Law and Management Building, Freboys Lane, York YO10 5GD), and  
2. one electronic copy (email to: elmps-ethics-group@york.ac.uk ).   
 
Initial decisions will normally be made and communicated within two weeks of the 
Committee meeting.   
FOR OFFICE USE ONLY 
 
Case Reference Number:  
 
 
1
st
 ELMPS Reviewer: 
 
 
2
nd
 ELMPS Reviewer: 
 
3
rd
 ELMPS Reviewer: 
Date received: Date considered: Date approved: 
 
 
Compliance form signed? Y/N 
 
 
 
 
SUBMISSION FORM LITE 
 
1a. Please provide the following details about the principal investigator at 
YORK 
 
Name of Applicant: 
 
Albert Danso 
e-mail address: 
 
ad853@york.ac.uk 
Telephone: 07515806104 
Staff/Student Status: Student 
Dept/Centre or Unit: 
 
Management 
Head of Department: 
 
Prof. Jill Schofield 
HoD e-mail address: 
 
Jill.schofield@york.ac.uk 
Head of Research: 
(if applicable) 
 
HoR e-mail address: 
(if applicable) 
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1b. Any other applicants (for collaborative research projects) 
 
Name of Applicant: 
 
N/A 
e-mail address: 
 
 
Telephone:  
Staff/Student Status:  
Dept/Centre or Unit: 
 
 
Head of Department: 
 
 
HoD e-mail address: 
 
 
Head of Research: 
(if applicable) 
 
HoR e-mail address: 
(if applicable) 
 
 
 
Name of Applicant: 
  
e-mail address: 
  
Telephone: 
 
Staff/Student Status: 
 
Department/Centre or 
Unit: 
 
 
Head of Department: 
  
HoD e-mail address: 
  
Head of Research: 
(if applicable)  
HoR e-mail address: 
(if applicable)  
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2.  If you are a student please provide the following supervisory details for your 
project: 
 
1
st
 Supervisor 
 
Dr. Muhammad Moshfique Uddin 
e-mail address: 
 
moshfique.uddin@york.ac.uk 
2
nd
 Supervisor 
 
Dr. Keith Anderson 
e-mail address: 
 
keith.anderson@york.ac.uk 
 
 
3. Please provide the following details about your project: 
 
Title of Project: 
 
Dimensions of capital structure of companies in Ghana 
 
Date of Submission to 
ELMPS: 
 
 
12/11/12 
Project Start Date: 
 
October, 2011 
Duration: 
 
3 years 
Funded Yes/No: 
 
No 
Funding Source: 
 
Personal 
External Ethics Board 
Jurisdictions: 
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4.  Summary of research proposal 
 
Aims and objectives of the research 
Please outline the questions or hypotheses that will be examined in the research. 
 
The study aims at investigating the capital structure practices of firms in Ghana. It aims to 
answer the following questions: what are the critical firm-level factors that affect debt-equity 
choice of companies in less developed markets? Beyond this, do country-level factors also 
affect capital structure practices of firms in developing economies? Do the theoretical models 
that explain the debt-equity choice in the advanced markets also applicable in the context of a 
developing economy like Ghana? Has the recent global financial crisis had any impact on the 
debt-equity choice of companies in developing economies? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Methods of data collection 
Outline how the data will be collected from or about human subjects.  
The data will be collected through questionnaire survey. Questionnaires will be 
delivered to selected companies either personally or using postal delivery system. The 
respondents will be requested to complete the questionnaire within two weeks after 
which they will be hand collected or returned through postal delivery using prepaid 
envelop to be provided by the researcher. 
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Recruitment of participants 
How many participants will take part in the research? How will they be identified and 
invited to take part in the study? How will informed consent be obtained?  
231 companies will be randomly from the Register general department in Ghana. 
Each of the company will be notified either by email or by telephone and will be 
requested to participate in the survey. If any of the company does not want to 
participate then it will be dropped from the sample frame. The initial contact will be 
followed by delivery of questionnaire which will also include a separate section 
explaining the data protection and anonymity issues. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Participant information sheets and consent forms 
Please attach (1) the project information sheet to be given to all participants and (2) the 
informed consent form.  (n.b. failure to submit these documents may delay the approval 
process.) 
 
Please confirm you have included the project information sheet to be given to all participants 
with your submission to ELMPS.  If this has not been attached, please explain why this is the 
case. 
 
 
I have enclosed a copy of the research questionnaire 
 
 
 
Please confirm you have included all the relevant informed consent forms.  If these have not 
been attached, please explain why this is the case. 
 
The nature the survey does not require any separate consent form to be filled by the 
respondents. Respondents will initially be contacted either through the email or the telephone 
to seek their consent in taking part of the survey. 
 
 
 
 
Are the results to be given as feedback or disseminated to your participants (if yes please 
specify when, in what form, and by what means) 
Results are not to be given as a feedback to firms that will take part in this survey. 
However, those firms which might be interested in the research findings will be asked to 
provide their contact details at the back of the research questionnaire for copies of the 
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results/findings to be sent out to them. 
 
 
 
 
 
Anonymity 
In most instances the Committee expects that anonymity will be offered to research subjects. 
Please set out how you intend to ensure anonymity. If anonymity is not being offered please 
explain why this is the case. 
A cover letter attached to the questionnaire will give an assurance to the respondents  
that their responses would be kept strictly anonymous and in complete confidence and 
that in no circumstance will their individual identities be revealed to any third party 
and that any information gathered will be solely used for this research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data collection 
All personal and sensitive data must be collected and stored in accordance with the Data 
Protection Act 1998. Please set out all the types of data you will be collecting (e.g. 
interviews, questionnaires, recordings) 
 
Please detail type(s) of data. 
 
The data that will be collected will be basically companies’ financial information 
 
 
 
 
Where is the data to be collected and where will it be stored electronically?  Please describe 
what protection there will be in relation to electronic storage? 
 
The information will be gathered from firms in Ghana and once I am back in the UK, 
the responses will be coded and stored on the University of York’s secure server. 
 
Where is the data to be stored in paper form?  Please describe how this will be protected. 
The paper form will be kept under lock in one of the cabinets at the PhD room in the 
York Management School 
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At what point are you proposing to destroy the data, in relation to the duration of this project? 
And how? 
 
The data gathered will be destroyed after I have defended my thesis. All the 
information will be destroyed appropriately in consultation with my supervisors.   
 
 
 
 
If you are sharing data with others outside your department, what steps are you taking to 
ensure that it is protected? 
 
 
N/A 
 
If the data is to be exported outside the European Union, what steps are you taking to ensure 
that it is protected? (Note: you must identify how you will comply with Data Protection 
Act 1998 requirements.) 
 
N/A 
 
 
 
 
Perceived risks or ethical problems 
Please outline any anticipated risks or ethical problems that may adversely affect any of the 
participants, the researchers and or the university, and the steps that will be taken to address 
them. (Note: all research involving human participants can have adverse effects.) 
 
Risks to participants (e.g. emotional distress, financial disclosure, physical harm, transfer of 
personal data, sensitive organisational information…) 
 
There are no known risks to the participants. In fact, most of the information that is to be 
collected should under normal condition be available publicly in the form of companies’ 
annual reports. That is why at certain a part of the questionnaire, the researcher has stated 
that firms that can provide their published annual reports are not required to fill that part.  
This questionnaire is however being used due to the fact that many companies in Ghana do 
not submit their annual reports to the Company House in the country.  
 
 
 
 
Risks to researchers (e.g. personal safety, physical harm, emotional distress, risk of 
accusation of harm/impropriety, conflict of interest…) 
 
 
There is no  known risk. 
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University/institutional risks (e.g. adverse publicity, financial loss, data protection…) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Financial conflicts of interest (e.g. perceived or actual with respect to direct payments, 
research funding, indirect sponsorship, board or organisational memberships, past 
associations, future potential benefits, other…) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v. Please draw the committee’s attention to any other specific ethical issues this study raises. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Ethics checklist 
Please confirm that all of the steps indicated below have been taken, or will be taken, 
with regards to the above named project submitted for ethical approval. If there are 
any items that you cannot confirm, or are not relevant to your project, please use the 
space provided below to explain.  
 
Please tick if true, otherwise leave blank: 
 
Informed consent will be sought from all research participants where appropriate 
 
All data will be treated anonymously and stored in a secure place 
All Relevant issues relating to Data Protection legislation have been considered (see 
http://www.york.ac.uk/recordsmanagement/dpa/)  
All quotes and other material obtained from participants will be anonymised in all 
reports/publications arising from the study where appropriate 
 
All reasonable steps have been taken to minimise risk of physical/ psychological 
harm to project participants. 
 
All reasonable steps have been taken to minimise risk of physical/mental harm to 
researchers 
 
 
 
 
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Participants have been made aware of and consent to all potential futures uses of the 
research and data  
 
With respect to indemnity Sue Final (University IP Manager  
e-mail: sue.final@york.ac.uk) has been made aware of the research, where 
appropriate 
 
There are no known conflicts of interest with respect to finance/funding 
 
The research is approved by the Head of Department, Unit, Centre or School 
 
 
Please explain in the space below, why any of the above items have not yet been confirmed: 
 
All unmarked items are not relevant in the case of this research as there are no known 
risks to both the participants and also the researcher. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Other comments 
Are there any issues that you wish to draw to the Committee’s attention (it is your 
responsibility to draw any ethical issues to ELMPS that may be of perceived or actual 
interest)? 
 
 
7. Submission Checklist for Applicants 
Finally, please sign the form and ensure that all of the indicated documents below are sent 
both electronically to: elmps-ethics-group@york.ac.uk, and in hard copy to the ELMPS 
Chair, Caroline Hunter, York Law School, University of York, Law and Management 
Building, Freboys Lane, York YO10 5GD. 
 
 ELMPS Application form 
 
 Consent form for participants (In my case is the cover letter) 
 
 Information Sheet for participants 
 
 ELMPS Compliance form 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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8.  Signed undertaking 
 
In submitting this application I hereby confirm that there are no actual or perceived 
conflicts of interest with respect to this application (and associated research) other than 
those already declared.  
 
Furthermore, I hereby undertake to ensure that the above named research project will meet 
the commitments in the checklist above. In conducting the project, the research team will be 
guided by the Social Research Association’s/AHRC’s/ESRC’s ethical guidelines for 
research. 
 
 
 
            Albert Danso 
……………………………………….. (Signed Lead Researcher/Principal Investigator) 
 
                08/01/13 
……………………………………….. (Date) 
 
       Dr. Moshfique Uddin 
……………………………………….. (Signed Supervisor (where relevant)) 
 
                    08/01/13 
……………………………………….. (Date)  
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Appendix 4. Summary statistics of leverage and firm-specific factors 
 
 
COUNTRY 
 
LEV 
 
ROA 
 
PR 
 
VT 
 
TA 
 
SZ 
 
GR 
 
TX 
BOTSWANA 103 103 103 102 103 103 100 103 
Mean 0.12 0.12 0.09 .00 0.30 11.27 0.00 0.01 
Median (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.00) (0.18) (10.71) (0.00) (0.00) 
         
GHANA 183 183 183 183 183 183 178 185 
Mean 0.20 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.30 10.54 0.00 0.03 
Median (0.12) (0.05) (0.05) (0.00) (0.26) (10.72) (0.00) (0.02) 
         
IVORY 
COAST 
202 202 202 202 202 202 202 202 
Mean 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.20 11.21 0.00 0.40 
Median (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.00) (0.14) (11.45) (0.00) (0.03) 
         
KENYA 153 153 153 153 153 153 152 153 
Mean 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.27 10.65 0.00 0.01 
Median (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.00) (0.22) (10.75) (0.00) (0.01) 
         
MAURITIUS 217 217 217 217 217 217 216 218 
Mean 0.19 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.36 11.57 0.00 0.02 
Median (0.15) (0.04) (0.04) (0.00) (0.36) (11.47) (0.00) (0.01) 
         
NIGERIA 462 462 462 462 462 462 461 462 
Mean 0.16 0.07 0.08 0.00 0.30 12.65 -0.00 0.24 
Median (0.09) (0.05) (0.06) (0.00) (0.28) (12.69) (0.00) (0.12) 
         
SOUTH 
AFRICA 
1214 1214 1214 1214 1214 1214 1214 1214 
Mean 0.18 0.14 0.11 0.00 0.35 13.60 -0.00 0.03 
Median (0.14) (0.11) (0.09) (0.00) (0.27) (13.50) (0.00) (0.03) 
         
ZAMBIA 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 
Mean 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.00 0.39 10.71 0.00 0.03 
Median (0.10) (0.06) (0.06) (0.00) (0.37) (11.38) (0.00) (0.03) 
         
Total 2638 2638 2638 2637 2638 2638 2627 2643 
Mean 0.16 0.10 0.09 0.00 0.32 12.49 0.00 0.03 
Median (0.11) (0.08) (0.07) (0.00) (0.26) (12.59) (0.00) (0.02) 
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Appendix 5. Variance Inflation Factor Analysis (VIF) 
 
 
Variable 
 
VIF 
 
1/VIF 
 
PR 
 
1.07 
 
0.934614 
 
VT 
 
1.02 
 
0.984233 
 
TA 
 
1.15 
 
0.870981 
 
SZ 
 
1.56 
 
0.639461 
 
TX 
 
1.18 
 
0.845300 
 
IN 
 
1.25 
 
0.801585 
 
ED 
 
6.34 
 
0.157768 
 
CP 
 
2.48 
 
0.403241 
 
SM 
 
8.86 
 
0.112817 
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